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ABSTRACT 
 
 In theory, all relevant information is incorporated in stock prices timely and completely 
and therefore prices respond related news quickly in efficient financial markets. In today’s 
information age, technological advances provide investors with fast access to a vast number of 
information resources. One can argue that these advances can help market efficiency due to easy 
and quick access to relevant information. On the other hand, these technological advances not 
only facilitate availability of relevant information but also facilitate availability of all types of 
information—both relevant and irrelevant information signals. In essence, one can argue that 
there is (over)exposure to information which may come with a cost in the form of distraction and 
limited attention to relevant information. After considering these previous points, this study 
sheds more light on investor distraction and its impact on stock prices in two essays. My first 
essay introduces a new type of investor distraction, which arises from the discrepancy between 
investors’ mood state and the content of the firm news. My second essay shows the importance 
of culture to explain investors’ information processing .Moreover; the findings of my second 
essay are consistent with an investor distraction effect caused by cultural factors which are 
assumed as irrelevant factors in investors’ information environment.  
In my first essay titled “Overexposure to Unrelated News and Investor Distraction: 
Earnings News and Big Sports Games”, I use mood-generating events – proxied by big sports 
games –that contain no information on firm fundamentals but occur concurrently with earnings 
vi 
 
announcements to test the hypothesis that investors’ attention shifts away from financial news 
that is incongruent with investors’ mood states, thereby leading to underreaction.  I empirically 
confirm the existence of mood-conflicting distraction. I find stronger post-earnings 
announcement drift and delayed response ratio, and weaker immediate volume reaction, when 
the earnings announcing firm’s local investors’ sports mood is inconsistent with the earnings 
news’ content (good vs. bad). This effect strengthens with firm’s proximity to the location of the 
mood source. 
 In my secon essay titled “Post-Earnings Announcement and Religious Holidays”, I show 
the role of culture, proxied by religion, in financial information processing and the impact of 
culture on financial outcomes through investor inattention. I examine whether and how the 
religious holiday calendar affects investors’ information processing by investigating price 
reactions to U.S. firms’ earnings announcements that occur during Easter week. I find different 
patterns for short-term and delayed responses to Easter week earnings surprises. Moreover, there 
is a stronger immediate (delayed) reaction to good (bad) news, primarily found in less religious, 
predominantly Protestant areas. The results are consistent with a religion-induced investor 
distraction effect. The findings also show the role of religious characteristics in firms’ 
information environment and the locality of stock prices. 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.0 OVEREXPOSURE TO UNRELATED NEWS AND INVESTOR DISTRACTION: 
EARNINGS NEWS AND BIG SPORTS GAMES  
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
Although there are many studies of investor sentiment showing the impact of mood states 
on asset prices, there is little evidence from the finance literature on the impact of mood on 
investors’ attention allocation. Specifically, past studies focuses solely on mood congruent 
effects such as a) the relationship of asset prices to exogenous mood shifters like sport events 
(Edmans, Garcia and Norli (2007)), weather (Saunders (1993), Hirschleifer and 
Shumway(2003)) length of day (Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (2003)), or advertising (Fehle, 
Tsyplakov, and Zdorovtsov (2005)), b) mood congruent judgment bias (Agarwal, Duchin and 
Sosyura (2012)), and c) mood congruent memory (Bodoh-Creed (2012)). On the other hand, 
behavioral science literature contains extensive psychological evidence on mood induced 
attention changes and judgment biases (e.g. Isen (1984), Clark and Isen (1982) and Tversky and 
Kahneman (1973), among many others). Kahneman (1973) argues that attention is determined by 
an “allocation policy”, which is itself determined by several factors, such as physiological state, 
personality, and current mood. I conjecture that mood can lead to investor distraction because it 
can cause cognitive biases through its influence on memory, evaluation, and behavior (e.g., see 
Gardner (1985) or Forgas (1992)).  
2 
 
In this paper, I empirically investigate whether investor behavior reflects human tendency 
to focus on mood-congruent content when processing information.
 1
In particular, I test whether 
investors’ mood states play a role in propensity to pay attention to new firm information or to 
ignore it. This paper extends the literature on investor inattention
2
 by introducing a new type of 
investor distraction, which I call as mood-conflicting investor distraction. This study also 
investigates whether mood-conflicting investor distraction cause underreaction to earnings news 
that is conflicting with investors’ mood state. I use big sports events as a proxy for exogenous 
mood-generating shocks to investors’ information environment and empirically test whether 
sports mood can serve as a background affective filter which helps investors to evaluate relevant 
firm information contained in earnings announcements.
3
 In addition, this is consistent with the 
view that investors experiencing a good sports mood state are looking at the world through rose-
colored glasses (Schweitzer et al (1992)). I posit that when processing earnings news, investors 
will do so in a mood-congruent way, i.e. by emphasizing the positive, and overlooking or 
discounting the negative pieces of information. In this case, the mood-conflicting investor 
distraction hypothesis suggests that negative firm news to be reflected in prices with a delay, 
which causes prices to display a negative post earnings announcement drift (PEAD).
 4
 Similarly, 
                                                          
1
 This type of mood-induced attention shift has also been observed in experimental subjects’ studies in the field of 
psychology. For example, biased attention to pleasant (unpleasant) information as a function of positive (negative) 
mood experience causes more life satisfaction (anxiety) (Cavanagh, Urry, and Shin (2011)). 
 
2
 Limited investor attention is one of the explanations put forth by the literature for underreaction-related anomalies, 
such as the post-earnings announcement drift. Studies that have looked at time periods when inattention is more 
likely include Francis, Pagach, and Stephan (1992), Bagnoli, Clement, and Watts (2005), DellaVigna and Pollet 
(2009), and (Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2009). Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009) provide an example of how investors 
struggle to process multiple stimuli and perform multiple tasks at the same time.  
 
3
 The use of sports data in the finance literature is fairly new. For example see Brown and Hartzell (2001), Edmans, 
Garcia and Norli (2007), and Palomino, Renneboog and Zhang (2009) and Bernile and Lyandres (2011).  
 
4
 Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) define PEAD as “the tendency for a stock’s cumulative abnormal returns to drift in 
the direction of an earnings surprise for several weeks following an earnings announcement”. PEAD is a major 
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when experiencing a bad sports mood state, investors will tend to focus more on the negative 
earnings news and less on the positive. In this case, the mood-conflicting investor distraction 
argument suggests and underreaction to positive earnings news to be reflected in positive PEAD.   
My empirical findings provide strong support for the mood-conflicting distraction 
hypothesis. I find high levels of delayed response to earnings news when firms, which are 
located near cities with teams competing in big sports events, announce earnings around the day 
of the sports event and when the type of earnings news is in disagreement with the sports mood 
state experienced by local investors. This effect is both statistically and economically significant 
and accounts for, on average, up to an additional 9% of PEAD.
5
 Also consistent with the view 
that investors’ mood state can cause distraction in the form of inattention to mood-incongruent 
firm news, I find that trading volume of firms located around cities with teams competing in big 
sports events declines around the time of the games. Furthermore, the results are generally 
stronger for the subsamples of firms located closer to the home areas of teams competing in the 
big games, where sports mood is expected to be stronger. Since the mood-conflicting distraction 
effect manifests itself through a local investor base channel, my evidence also highlights the 
importance of the local component of stock pricing, which has not received sufficient attention in 
many other studies with the exception of those focusing on local bias.
6
 My findings essentially 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
financial market anomaly that holds an important place in both finance and accounting literatures. Livnat and 
Mendenhall (2006) report that “Brennan [1991, p. 70] calls it a “most severe challenge to financial theorists,” and 
Fama [1998, p. 286] refers to it as “the granddaddy of all underreaction events.” 
 
5
 The 9% additional PEAD is observed when drift is measured by the cumulative abnormal return for the period 
starting two days after the current earnings announcement and ending one day after the next earnings announcement 
(CAR(Et,Et+1), see Livnat and Mendenhall (2006)). The effect is even bigger, amounting to an additional 10.5% of 
PEAD when I measure drift using the cumulative abnormal return over the (2, 75) day window after the earnings 
announcement.  
 
6
 my findings are therefore also in line with the local bias literature that suggests retail investors (Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner (2005)) and professional managers (Coval and Moskowitz (2001)) show some local preference in their 
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suggest that mood-generating unrelated news can produce mood states that shift attention away 
from mood-inconsistent firm news and thereby lead to underreaction due to mood-conflicting 
investor distraction effects. 
Delayed response ratio
7
 tests also show empirical findings similar to my PEAD tests. 
Earnings announcements by firms located close to cities with teams competing in big sports 
events (i.e. when there is sports mood) have a large delayed portion (i.e. up to 70%-75% of the 
long term response) of the stock response. The portion of the delayed price response declines 
with firm distance from the mood source, i.e. from the home cities of the teams competing in the 
big games. In addition, this finding is particularly pronounced among firms that display a 
combination of a) positive earnings surprises and headquarters’ location close to cities hosting 
sports teams that lost in a big sports event, and to a lesser extent, b) negative earnings surprises 
and headquarters’ location close to cities hosting teams that won in a big sports event. Thus, the 
mood-conflicting distraction effect is asymmetric,  and consistent with prior studies that show 
differences in the way information is being processed under positive versus negative mood states 
(e.g., see Forgas (1992) and Sinclair and Mark (1992) and Edmans et al (2007)).
8
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
investments. Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008) suggest that the local bias effect is more pronounced in areas with 
relatively few firms per capita. 
 
7
 Delayed response ratios are ratios of the delayed stock response to the long-term stock response generated similar 
to DellaVigna and Pollet (2009). 
 
8
 The psychology literature suggests this asymmetric reaction to bad news and good news is rooted in the fact that 
negative information induces a greater influence on people’s impressions than positive information (Ronis and 
Lipinski (1985), Singh and Teoh 2000, Van der Pligt and Eiser (1980), and Vonk (1993) (1996) among others). The 
finance and accounting literature also highlights the role of sentiment into generating asymmetric investor reactions 
to good and bad news. For example, Edmans et al. (2007) examine national stock indices and find strong market 
reaction to national teams’ soccer matches but only after big tournament losses that generate widespread bad mood. 
Livnat and Petrovits (2009) suggest that the PEAD is a greater after bad news during high investor sentiment times 
than during low investor sentiment times. 
 
5 
 
The underlying rationales for the choice of big sports events as the basis for this 
empirical analysis of mood-induced investor distraction are as follows. First, it is well 
established that big sports events are both capable of producing mood
9
 and can have a direct 
emotional effect on stock prices and economic outcomes.
10
 Second, sports events have an impact 
on a sizeable portion of society and sports-induced mood is effective at both the individual and 
the community levels (White (1989) and Wann et al. (2001)). Big sports events can potentially 
trigger “socially induced” mood contagion stimulated through social interactions.11 Mood 
contagion may in turn stimulate similarity in changes of attention within a group (Hatfield, 
Cacioppo, and Rapson (1993)).
 12
 Third, sports events are appropriate for a study of investor 
distraction because, by definition, they do not produce any information that is either related to 
firm fundamentals or relevant for investment decisions. Consequently, finding underreaction to 
earnings news can only be interpreted as the result of big sports events’ impact on investors’ 
information processing, in the form of inattention to mood-conflicting earnings news.  
                                                          
9
 See Schwarz et al. (1987), Arkes, Herren, and Isen (1988), Hirt et al. (1992), or Wann et al. (1994), among others. 
In a recent paper, Edmans, Garcia and Norli (2007) use the aforementioned psychological evidence of a link 
between sports and mood to motivate and examine of whether stock prices indices reflect investor sentiment related 
to soccer games’ results. Consistent with the notion that sports events can affect human behavior, Edmans et al. 
(2007) show that national stock market indices decline after losses of national soccer teams, but they do not discover 
a similar effect for the case of wins. 
 
10
 See Edmans et al. (2007), Ashton et al. (2003) , and  Berument and Yucel (2005) among others. 
 
11
 People are exposed to the subject of important sports events through their daily social interactions. Major sports 
events, such as the Super Bowl, are intensely followed by a large proportion of the population with large media 
coverage not only during the actual time of the games but also during pre- and post- game periods. Big sport games 
like final/championship games are always at the top of the list of the most viewed TV shows in a given year. For 
example, according to Nielsen Media Research (www.huffingtonpost.com, www.tampabay.com, (accessed on 
2.7.2011)) Super Bowl XLV is the most viewed TV broadcast in history in the U.S. 
 
12
 Neumann and Strack (2000) define mood contagion as the automatic transfer of mood between individuals. Kelly 
(2004) defines emotional contagion as the process in which the moods and emotions of people around a person 
influences the person.  Hatfield et al. (1993) suggest that emotional contagion generates a similarity and harmony of 
attention, emotion, and behavior.  McIntosh, Druckman, and Zajonc (1994)) suggest a change in a person’s emotions 
similar to another person’s emotions through “socially induced affect”. I conjecture that sports induced mood can 
create similar results in group behavior that is suggested for any mood effect by psychology literature.  
 
6 
 
I use earnings announcements as my test environment because they constitute firm news, 
which investors typically pay close attention to, occur regularly on a quarterly basis but not 
always on the same calendar day. Thus, this helps to identify a large number of earnings news 
that can be matched with concurrent news about big sports events and to construct a sample that 
can be used to provide a clear answer as to whether mood-conflicting distraction can lead to 
underreaction to earnings news that are incongruent with sports mood. 
 In addition, any sports-induced mood state that affects stock price reaction to earnings 
news is expected to be more pronounced when the investor base overlaps with the sports fan 
base, i.e. among “local” firms located near the home city of the teams competing in the big 
game. Thus, if stock prices have a significant local component (Pirinsky and Wang (2006)) there 
should be more post earnings announcement drift caused by mood-conflicting investor 
distraction for local firms around the time of big sports games. My findings showing more 
pronounced mood confliction investor distraction effect for the firms located closer the mood 
source provide support to this view. Moreover, my additional tests show a higher distraction for 
the subsample of firms with higher local retail investor ownership. All these points suggest that 
the mood-confliction distraction effect comes mainly through the local investor channel and this 
paper shows the importance of local investor channel on financial outcomes. 
This paper is also closely related to the recent limited investor attention literature that 
provides evidence of distracting effects associated with an array of different news (simultaneous 
corporate news from other companies, timing/day of the corporate event and etc.) that are related 
to the corporate event.
13
 The main distinction between this paper and earlier papers is that my 
                                                          
13
 Francis, Pagach, and Stephan (1992), and  Bagnoli, Clement, and Watts (2005)) show limited attention associated 
with event occurrence during non-trading hours, whereas others show that this is the case on Fridays (DellaVigna 
and Pollet (2009)), down market periods (Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2009)), and low trading volume (Hou, Peng, and 
7 
 
paper presents evidence of investor distraction caused by limited attention due to mood-
conflicting relevant information.  On the other hand, earlier studies show a distraction effect 
induced by factors that do not include any mood content that can cause judgment bias and/or 
cause an attention shift toward certain types of information.  Moreover, my paper provides a 
novel approach to the investigation of mood effects on investor attention by focusing on 
exposure to sports news that by design is unrelated to investment decisions, but a source of 
mood.  
In a recent theoretical paper Bodoh-Creed (2012) provides a model for the impact of 
mood congruent memory on financial outcomes. Bodoh-Creed’s (2012) model employs market 
affective states as a cue for information congruent with the affect of the agents suggesting that 
agents recall information from memory and this process causes them to have biased beliefs 
which leads to mispricing.
14
 My results are in line with his model. Big sports events exogenously 
change investors’ mood and cause attention allocation to shift toward mood-congruent financial 
news and to shift away from mood-conflicting financial news.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section includes a 
description of the data and the sample selection. Section 3 shows summary statistics and 
provides a discussion on mood-conflicting distraction. Section 4 presents the empirical results of 
multivariate stock response, delayed response and volume reaction tests. Section 5 provides a 
conclusion. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Xiong (2009)). Hirshleifer et al. (2009) suggest that a high number of earnings announcements in a given day limits 
the immediate reaction to a firm’s earnings surprise in the day and strengthens the post-announcement drift of the 
firm. In addition to behavioral bias, limited attention can also be induced by constraints in investor’s information 
processing (see Hou, Peng and Xiong (2009) or Palomino, Renneboog and Zhang (2009)). 
14
 Bodoh-Creed’s (2012) model makes some predictions about short-run overreactions and price corrections. It also 
suggests that knowledgeable or sophisticated investors are more affected by the biases induced by mood-congruent 
memory. 
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1.2 DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
I include earnings announcements of NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ firms that issued 
earnings news within the (-1,+2) trading day window around dates of widely followed sports 
games in the U.S. Firm location information is crucial in terms of measuring a firm’s proximity 
to the source mood induced by sports events in my paper. Therefore, I require the firms in my 
sample of earnings announcements around game dates to have firm location information from 
Compact Disclosure, which provides firms’ correct location at any point time and accounts for 
headquarter changes. After imposing the aforementioned requirements, I end up with 97,304 
earnings announcements occurring any time during the period between 1989 and 2006 by firms 
with available headquarter zip code information that matches with the zip code information in 
Census zip code files. Out of this entire sample of quarterly earnings announcements, 5,096 
announcements are within the (-1, +2) trading day window around the dates of major sport 
events. 
I use Google web search and some sports statistics websites to identify dates for the 
following major U.S. sports events: Super Bowl, AFC and NFC championship games, NBA 
playoffs final game   (if it is the 6
th
 or 7
th
 game of the best of seven series), MLB playoff final 
game (if it is 6
th
 or 7
th
 game of the best of seven series) and NCAA basketball playoff final 
game.
15
  I identify 80 such big-game dates for the years 1989-2006. I use Google web search, 
and some other sport websites
16
 to obtain each team’s stadium address, which is my proxy for 
                                                          
15
 Those websites are: http://www.nfl.com/superbowl/history, http://www.basketball-reference.com/playoffs/ , 
http://www.sports-reference.com/cbb/postseason/ , http://www.pro-football-reference.com/super-bowl/ , 
http://www.baseball-reference.com/postseason/, http://www.cbssports.com/collegebasketball/ncaa-
tournament/history/yearbyyear   (accessed in April 2011).  
 
16
 http://www.nflfootballstadiums.com/NFL-Football-Stadium-Reviews.htm , http://www.baseball-
statistics.com/Ballparks/ , http://basketball.ballparks.com/ , http://www.sportmapworld.com/  (accessed in April 
2011). 
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team location. Distance between firm and team locations is calculated using longitudes and 
latitudes from the Census 2010 zip code data file. I require my sample firms to have non-missing 
information from COMPUSTAT, CRSP, and I/B/E/S databases as well as Compact Disclosure.  
In particular, I use the COMPUSTAT, CRSP, and I/B/E/S databases to determine the 
earnings announcements and extract the information needed to compute the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) around and after earnings announcements, following Livnat and Mendenhall 
(2006) as “the difference between the firm’s daily return from the CRSP and the daily return on 
the portfolio of firms with the same size (the market value of equity from June) and book-to-
market (B/M) ratio (from the prior December)”.  The CAR between two consecutive earnings 
announcements, CAR(Et,Et+1) , is defined as the cumulative abnormal return for the period 
starting two days after the current earnings announcement and ending one day after the next 
earnings announcement.  
In addition to requiring that earnings announcement dates and stock price information are 
not missing in COMPUSTAT, I also require that firm size for the corresponding quarter end is 
larger than $5 million and stock price per share is greater than $1. I match I/B/E/S forecasts and 
COMPUSTAT earnings data, and use the primary earnings definition from I/B/E/S. I measure 
earnings surprise by the forecast error which I define as FEiq=(Eiq-Fiq)/Piq . FEiq is calculated by 
subtracting analyst expectations (i.e., the median of forecasts reported to I/B/E/S in the 90 days 
prior to the earnings announcement) from actual earnings and then normalized by the price per 
share at the end of the quarter obtained from COMPUSTAT.
17
 In my tests, I use a bad (good) 
earnings news indicator variable for the lowest (highest) FEiq quintile every fiscal quarter, which 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
17
 I have also experimented with other deflators without obtaining materially different results. 
 
10 
 
I call as FE1 (FE5). my PEAD measures are CAR (Et,Et+1) and CAR (2, 75)
18
. The dependent 
variables in the immediate reaction regressions are CAR (-1,1) and CAR(0,1), where day 0 is the 
day of the earnings announcement. In some of my tests, I also use the delayed response, which 
follows DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), is defined as the delayed stock response to the long-term 
stock response     ratio. 
19
 
My tests also control for other variables that can affect return performance, such as firm 
size, book-to-market ratio, earnings volatility, reporting lag, analyst coverage, and share turnover 
as well as day of the week, month, year, and two-digit SIC industry indicator variables. 
Consistent with Hirshleifer et al. (2009), Earnings volatility is computed as the standard 
deviation of the deviations of quarterly earnings computed over a four year period ending with 
the quarter preceding the current earnings announcement. I require a minimum of four split-
adjusted quarterly earnings to calculate this variable. Share turnover is the average monthly 
trading volume normalized by the average number of share outstanding for the one year period 
that ends at the end of corresponding fiscal quarter. Reporting lag is the number of days between 
the quarter end and earnings announcement day. Log (1+ # of analyst) is constructed by using 
the number of analyst that follows the firm during the corresponding quarter.  
1.3 SUMMARY STATISTICS AND MOOD-CONFLICTING DISTRACTION 
1.3.1 Summary Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1.1 reports summary statistics for the sample of firms whose earnings 
announcements occur on dates around big sports games. Panel B provides descriptive statistics 
                                                          
18
 Following DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) I also use CAR computed over the (2, 75) trading day window (CAR (2, 
75)) as an alternative measure of PEAD. Note that the CAR (2, 75) trading day windows will not always accurately 
capture PEAD because a firm can announce its next earnings earlier (later) than the end of a fiscal quarter. 
 
19
 To compute the ratio, I use CAR (-1, Et+1) and CAR (0, 75) as long-term stock responses for corresponding ratios.  
CAR (-1, Et+1) and CAR (0, 75) are calculated similar to the other cumulative abnormal returns mentioned above. 
11 
 
for the subsample of firms whose earnings announcements occur on dates around big sports 
games and whose location is within 200 miles of a city with a sports team that competed in a big 
sports event.  When comparing the two samples in terms of means and medians I do not see 
much difference across any of the variables with the exception of earnings volatility that seems 
to be a bit lower in the subsample of firms located close to sports teams competing in the big 
games.  
1.3.2 Mood-Conflicting Distraction 
Recent studies in the limited investor attention literature suggest attention grabbing 
factors such as timing/day of the corporate event can lead to investor distraction. These papers 
show distraction effects emanating from factors lacking mood content. In contrast, my empirical 
investigation employs distracting information signals, which are unrelated to firm fundamentals 
but have mood content that affects investors’ attention allocation and response. In Figure 1.1, I 
display the relative attention allocation to positive and negative firm news for different cases of 
distraction, i.e. without mood content or with positive or negative mood content.  A distracting 
factor without any distinguishing (positive or negative) mood content leads to the same degree of 
inattention to both positive and negative firm news.   
When distraction originates from an event with mood content, the degree of attention 
allocated to firm news depends on the combination of mood and firm news types. Investors 
receive firm news that can either be consistent or inconsistent with the mood state they are 
experiencing. When firm news is in agreement with current mood, investors will allocate more 
attention to it. On the other hand, when firm news is incongruent with the current mood state, 
investors will pay less attention to it. Thus, the mood-conflicting distraction effect amounts to an 
asymmetric delayed stock price response to firm news. When there is negative mood, there will 
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be more delayed response to good firm news and less delayed response to bad firm news. 
Similarly, when there is positive mood, there will be more delayed response to bad firm news 
and less delayed response to good firm news. The picture that emerges from the stock price 
responses to earnings announcement news received by investors that are concurrently exposed to 
sports mood is in line with the mood-conflicting distraction effect described above.   
Figure 2 shows the time path of the stock responses (measured by mean cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) over different event windows) for the two types of mood-conflicting 
investor distraction cases: (i) good firm news and concurrent unrelated news inducing bad mood, 
and, in a similar manner, (ii) bad firms news and concurrent unrelated news inducing good 
mood. Mood-conflicting distraction predicts that people who live in areas with a strong mood 
state will allocate their attention differently than other times because they experience a mood 
state which amounts to an exogenous shock to their attention allocation process.  Consistent with 
my mood-conflicting distraction argument, Figure 2 shows that stock prices react with a delay to 
mood-conflicting earnings news suggesting that investors allocate less attention to news that are 
incongruent with the mood state they experience.  
Moreover, Figure 2 shows that the mood-conflicting distraction effect is asymmetric, i.e. 
different for the cases of good mood combined with bad earnings news and bad mood combined 
with good earnings news. When there is good earnings news (depicted by FE5) paired with bad 
sports mood, I observe a slow drift after the earnings announcement in the direction of the 
earnings surprise that lasts for about a month and a half, followed by stronger drift for the next 
half month (i.e., window [+45, +60]) and not much of a drift thereafter. On the other hand, in the 
case of bad earnings news (depicted by FE1) coupled with good sports mood, there is also a slow 
drift in the initial period that extends for a month, followed by a stronger drift over the next half 
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month (i.e. up to day 45) and a slight correction thereafter. Thus even though the magnitude of 
the mood-conflicting distraction effect, as captured by the delayed price response, is stronger for 
good firm news coupled with bad sports mood the evolution of PEAD is a bit slower than that of 
bad firm news coupled with good sports mood. This result is indicative of bad mood’s greater 
persistence and significance compared to good mood and is consistent with both the prediction of 
prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979)) as well as with the empirical evidence from 
numerous other studies documenting an asymmetry in the magnitudes of bad versus good mood 
effects (e.g. see Carroll et al. (2002), White (1989) or Edmans et al. (2007), among others). 
A closer look at Figure 2 in terms of magnitude of stock responses to mood-conflicting 
firm news, reveals that the delayed response or PEAD (i.e. in terms of CAR(2,75)) is more 
pronounced among firms located near cities with losing teams than among those located near 
cities with winning teams. Moreover, the underreaction to good earnings news issued by firms in 
areas exposed to negative mood decreases with distance to the source of distraction. CAR(2,75) 
drops from about 12% for firms within 100 miles from the mood source to about 6% for firms 
located within 200 miles from the mood source. This pattern implies the importance of local 
investors for this mood-conflicting distraction effect. The magnitude of the delayed response is 
smaller in absolute terms for the other case of mood-conflicting distraction. There is a delayed 
negative stock price response of up to 7.3%, on average, when the firms that are located in areas 
with positive mood announce bad firm news. Therefore, the delayed response (PEAD) effect is 
asymmetric. The PEAD effect is more pronounced for good earning news which is consistent 
with recent literature (e.g. see Hirshleifer et al. (2009)). In addition, and consistent with studies 
in psychology and other behavioral sciences that suggest a stronger impact of negative mood 
compared to the positive one, the mood-conflicting investor distraction is stronger when it is 
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induced by negative mood
20
. Overall, the pattern of reactions to mood-conflicting firm news 
cases shown in Figure 2 is very much in line with the interpretation that emerges from Figure 1. 
My earlier discussion suggests that investors will allocate more attention to firm news 
that is congruent with the current mood. Figure 3 displays stock responses for the two types of 
mood-consistent firm news cases:  (i) good earnings news occuring when investors experience 
good mood emanating from firm fundamentals-unrelated (i.e. sports) news, and (ii) bad earnings 
news when there is bad sports mood. I observe a reasonably strong short-term stock reaction to 
good earnings news that is announced when sports mood is positive while the delayed response 
is in the opposite reaction. Similarly, there is some strong short-term stock reaction to bad 
earnings news issued when sports mood is negative, again followed by delayed response in the 
opposite reaction. These findings imply some initial overreaction possibly due to the greater 
attention allocated to mood-consistent firm news and support the notion that the mood-consistent 
information signals receive more attention and larger information processing resources. Overall, 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 support the notion that mood-conflicting investor distraction can cause 
investors to underreact to mood-incongruent firm news. On the other hand, investors’ tendency 
to pay more attention to mood-congruent firm news may cause overreaction. 
1.4 MULTIVARIATE TESTS 
1.4.1 Stock Response Tests 
In this section I examine mood conflicting distraction using market response regression 
models whose main independent variables account for mood content emanating from unrelated 
news (i.e. big sports games), firm news and their interaction.  I also control for many other 
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 See Ronis and Lipinski (1985), Singh and Teoh 2000, Van der Pligt and Eiser (1980), and Vonk (1993) (1996) 
among others. 
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factors that have been shown to matter for stock price responses to earnings news using the 
following model: 
 
  CAR=β0+ β1Win+ β2Loss+ β3Win*FE5+ β4Loss*FE5+ β5Win*FE1+ β6Loss*FE1                                              
+ β7FE5 + β8FE1 +Controls                                                                                                      (1) 
 
In the equation above, Win represents a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a 
firm is located near a city with a winning team and the value of zero otherwise. Loss is a similar 
dummy variable for firms near a city with a losing team. The control variables are firm size, 
book-to-market ratio, earnings volatility, reporting lag, analyst coverage, and share turnover as 
well as day of the week, month, year, and two-digit SIC industry indicator variables. I estimate 
model (1) separately for subsamples of firms located within 100, 150 and 200 miles from the 
aforementioned cities and report the results for delayed stock response and immediate stock 
reaction to earnings announcements issued around game dates in my sample in Table 1.2, Panels 
A and B, respectively. In all regressions the base group consists of firms located further away 
from both cities with winning teams and cities with losing teams.  
Consistent with the earlier univariate evidence, the results in Panel A suggest a strong 
mood-conflicting investor distraction effect that gets stronger with greater exposure to sports 
mood. In particular, the coefficient of Loss*FE5 is economically and statistically significant, 
especially for firms that are close to cities with a sports team that plays in a big game. For 
example, a firm with high earnings surprise (good earnings news) and within 100 miles from a 
city with a losing team will exhibit 9% to 10.5% higher post-earning announcement drift. This 
effect is statistically significant for firms within up to 150 from a losing team’s city when PEAD 
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is measured by CAR(Et,Et+1) and up to 200 miles from a losing team’s city when PEAD is 
measured by CAR (2, 75).  
The coefficients of Win*FE1 are also consistent with the mood-conflicting distraction 
hypothesis. For example, a firm with low earnings surprise (bad earnings news) that is within 
100 miles of a city with a winning team has 4.7% to 6.4% more negative PEAD. The effect 
persists for distances up to 200 miles for both alternative PEAD measures. In addition, and 
similar to my earlier results, the magnitude of delayed stock response to mood-conflicting bad 
earnings news is smaller than the one for mood-conflicting good earnings news. This result is in 
line with Hirshleifer et al. (2009) who show distracting news has a stronger effect on companies 
that experience positive earnings surprises and with the psychology literature’s evidence21 of a 
stronger impact of negative mood on attention shifts and judgment biases. Also in line with the 
earlier findings and with the mood-consistent attention allocation argument, the coefficients of 
Loss*FE1 and Win*FE5 are in all but one model statistically insignificant. In addition, earlier 
studies have shown higher drift after high earnings surprises. My results also show that the 
coefficient of FE5 is statistically significant, and the coefficient has very similar magnitude in all 
models (about 3.5% to 3.9%).  
  Next, in Panel B, I look at the immediate reaction to earnings announcements using the 
model shown in equation (1). The dependent variable is CAR (-1, 1) in first three columns of 
Panel B and CAR (0, 1) in last three columns. The immediate reaction regression results are in 
line with prior evidence. The FE5 coefficient suggests that there is about 1.6% to 2% higher 
return as immediate reaction to high earnings surprises, regardless of firm distance to the city 
                                                          
21
 See the discussions in Beevers and Carver (2003) and Cavanagh et al.(2011) related to attentional shifts and 
biases. Also see Ronis and Lipinski (1985), Singh and Teoh 2000, Van der Pligt and Eiser (1980), and Vonk (1993) 
(1996) that suggest a greater impact of negative information signals on impressions. 
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with a team competing in a big sports game. The FE1 coefficient suggests that the immediate 
reaction to low earnings surprises for all firm-team city distances amounts to about 3% to 3.4% 
lower return. 
The coefficient of Win*FE5 for immediate reaction is also positive but statistically 
significant only for firms located within 200 miles of cities with a winning team in one column 
suggesting that there may be a strong initial reaction to mood-consistent information. Consistent 
with this notion, the Win*FE5 coefficient is negative in some of the PEAD regressions, 
indicating the possibility of a correction of some initial overreaction to positive mood-consistent 
earnings news.  
1.4.2 Delayed Response Ratio Tests  
Having provided strong PEAD results in support of the mood-conflicting hypothesis I 
now perform delayed response ratio tests and report their results in Table 1.3. As in the previous 
table, these tests are performed separately for subsamples of earnings announcing firms located 
within 100, 150 and 200 miles from the source of sports mood. In Panel A, delayed response 
ratios of mood-conflicting good firm news (Loss*FE5 effect) and mood-conflicting bad firm 
news (Win*FE1 effect) are one at a time contrasted with those of all other announcements.  
Following DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), I define delayed response ratio as ratio of the delayed 
stock response (CAR(Et, Et+1) and CAR (2, 75)) to the long-term stock response (CAR (-1, Et+1) 
and CAR (0, 75), respectively). I estimate delayed stock response and long-term stock response 
from extreme earnings news quintiles only as in the following model; 
 
CAR=β0 + β1Win+ β2Loss + β3Win*Top + β4Loss*Top + β5Top + Controls                  (2) 
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This model is estimated by using the same control variables used in Panels A and B and 
in a similar way, and only extreme earnings surprise (FE5 and FE1) announcements are included 
in estimations. In above model, Top is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if earnings 
surprise is in the highest surprise quintile (FE=5) and the value of zero if it is in the lowest 
surprise quintile (FE=1). For example, in the last three columns of Panel A where I use CAR 
(2,75) and CAR (0,75) for the delayed response ratio computation, the delayed response ratio of 
mood-conflicting good firm news (Loss*FE5 effect) is [ (β4 
(2,75)
 +β5 
(2,75)
 )  / (β4 
(0,75)
+ β5 
(0,75)
)] 
whereas the delayed response ratio of mood-conflicting bad firm news (Win*FE1 effect) is      
[(β3 
(2,75)
 +β5 
(2,75)
 ) / (β3 
(0,75)
+ β5 
(0,75)
)]. For all other announcements, i.e. those by firms that are 
not located near cities with a winning or losing sports team, the delayed response ratio is         
[(β5 
(2,75)
) / β5 
(0,75)
)]. 
Panel A shows that, up to, 72% of the long-term response is delayed for earnings news 
announced during big sports events by firms located near the losing team’s cities. Consistent 
with prior evidence, the delayed response effect gets larger with proximity to the losing teams’ 
cities. In contrast, only about 21% to 26% of the long-term response is delayed in the case of 
announcements made by firms not located near cities with a sports team competing in big sports 
games. Moreover, the difference between negative mood-conflicting distraction announcements 
and other announcements without mood content is statistically significant, especially for the 
subsamples of firms located nearer to the mood source. Delayed response ratios calculated based 
on CAR(Et,Et+1) show smaller magnitudes for earnings news issued around game dates by firms 
located near a winning teams’ cities. One possible explanation for this is that CAR(Et,Et+1) 
captures drift up to the next earnings announcement date whereas CAR (2,75) accounts for the 
PEAD over a fixed time period which ends by the 75
th
 day after the announcement. Moreover, 
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since on average, there is considerable reporting lag between fiscal quarter end and earnings 
announcement date (about 28 days in my sample), the occurrence of differences between the 
next announcement date (Et+1) and 75 days after earnings announcement is not surprising. Recall 
also that, as shown in Figure 2, this difference is more pronounced in the case of the Win*FE1 
effect compared to the Loss*FE5 effect.
22
   
In Panel B, I compare cases that contain mood-conflicting earnings announcements with 
all other announcements that lack any mood content. This is accomplished by combining the 
mood-conflicting distraction effects in one group whereas and the mood-consistent effects in 
another group as in the model shown below;
23
 
 
CAR=β0 + β1GameDist+ β2*MoodConflicting*Top + β3*MoodConsistent*Top                                      
+ β4Top +    Controls                                                                                                                   (3) 
 
In the equation above, GameDist represents a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
if a firm is located within certain distance (from 100 miles up to 200 miles) of a city with a 
winning or losing team and the value of zero otherwise. MoodConflicting is an indicator variable 
that takes a value of one if either Loss*FE5 or Win*FE1 is equal to one and the value of zero 
otherwise. MoodConsistent is an indicator variable that takes a value of one if either Loss*FE1 
                                                          
22
 Figure 2 displays a bigger change between 61st and 75th days for the Win*FE1 effect compared to the Loss*FE5 
effect. Since the time between two consecutive earnings may not always be the same, CAR (2, 75) can be sometimes 
contaminated by the reaction to a subsequent earnings announcement if it occurs at different time.  Some other 
studies use different time period to measure PEAD such as (2,61) event window (Hirshleifer et al. (2009) among 
others).  When I use (2,61) to measure PEAD in my all tests I obtain similar findings. These results are not shown 
here for the sake of brevity but are available upon request.  
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 Once, again, this model is estimated using only extreme earnings news quintiles (see DellaVigna and Pollet 
(2007).  
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or Win*FE5 is equal to one and the value of zero otherwise.  The estimation of the delayed 
response ratios in Panel B is similar to the one in Panel A.
24
 The results in Panel B show that the 
difference between mood-conflicting announcements and those that lack any mood content  in 
terms of response ratios is significant across all distance subsamples and increases with 
proximity to the source of distraction. In sum, the evidence in Table 1.2 and 1.3 provides strong 
support for the mood-conflicting investor distraction hypothesis.  
Next, I examine the subsample of firms that are located near areas exposed to sports 
mood to test whether it can produce more pronounced and clear patterns of the mood-conflicting 
distraction effect. I use the following regression model: 
 
CAR=β0+β1Loss+β2Loss*FE5+β3FE5+β4Loss*FE1+β4FE1+Controls       (4)       
                           
Since the test sample includes only firms in or near cities with winning or losing teams, I 
do not include both win and loss dummies and their interactions in this model. I choose to 
include the Loss rather than the Win dummy variable because, based on my results thus far, the 
distraction effect is expected to be stronger among firms located near a losing team’s city. In 
Table 1.4, I show the regression results for the model in equation (4) estimated using subsamples 
defined based on firm headquarters’ distance from the home cities of teams competing in big 
sports events. For the subsample of firms only within 100 miles of cities with a sports team that 
plays a big game, a high earnings surprise combined with negative mood associated with home 
team loss results in 13.5% to14% higher drift. The Loss*FE5 effect declines from 13.5%-14% to 
                                                          
24
 For example, in last three columns, delayed response ratio of all mood-conflicting distraction effects based on 
Model (3) is defined as [(β2 
(2,75)
 +β4 
(2,75)
 ) / (β2 
(0,75)
+ β4 
(0,75)
)]. Similarly, for other announcements of firms that are 
not located near cities with a winning or losing sports team (announcements without mood content), delayed 
response ratio is defined as [(β4 
(2,75)
) / β4 
(0,75)
)].  
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8.6% as the firm distance goes up from 100 miles to 200 miles, but remains statistically 
significant in all subsamples except in the 200 miles distance subsample when PEAD is 
measured by CAR (2, 75). The coefficient of Loss*FE1 is not statistically significant in any of 
the different distance subsamples. 
Correspondingly, Panel B displays the immediate reaction results for the subsample of 
firms that are close to cities with a losing or a winning team. As expected, FE5 (FE1) shows a 
significant 3.5% to 4.3% higher (1.8% to 2.5% lower) immediate reaction for positive (negative) 
earnings surprises across most distance subsamples. Overall, my results in this subsection also 
point out that the distraction effect of bad sports mood coupled with good earnings news is more 
pronounced than the corresponding distraction effect of good sports mood coupled with bad 
earnings news.       
1.4.3 Volume Response Tests 
Investor distraction implies that there will be less trading volume response to earnings 
surprises (e.g. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) and Hirshleifer et al. (2009)).  I first use the 
following regression model in order to test this hypothesis for mood-conflicting distraction: 
 
AbnormalVol[0,1]=β0+β1Game+β2Game*ExtFE+β3ExtFE+Controls       (5)              
                    
AbnormalVol[0,1] is equal to the average of the abnormal trading volume on the earnings 
announcement date and on the next day (see Hirshleifer et al. (2009)).  Abnormal trading volume 
for a given day t is calculated by subtracting the average log dollar daily volume from the           
(-41,-11) window relative to day t from the log dollar volume on day t. As the previous studies 
suggest, higher trading volume is expected around both good and bad earnings news. Therefore 
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in my model (5), I use an indicator variable of extreme earnings surprise (FE1 or FE5), ExtFE, as 
well as its interaction with a dummy variable, Game, that takes the value of one if a firm is 
located within certain distance (from 100 miles up to 200 miles) from a city with a sports team 
playing a big game and the value of zero otherwise.  I use the same control variables that I use in 
the multivariate tests of the previous section. In addition, following Hirshleifer et al. (2009) I 
control for the impact of market-wide abnormal trading volume, which I define as the average 
abnormal trading volume of all CRSP firms. 
Table 1.5, Panel A presents the trading volume response regressions’ results for 
subsamples of various firm distances to the city of a big sports game. The coefficient of 
Game*ExtFE is negative across all distance definitions and its magnitude declines with distance. 
Although the coefficient’s sign is in line with the distraction argument, and the decline in the 
magnitude of the coefficient with distance is consistent with my earlier results, it is statistically 
insignificant. This result is similar to the one in DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) where the 
distraction effect becomes statistically insignificant after controlling for aggregate market 
volume. More importantly, it is possible that lower statistical power could be attributed to 
limitations of regression model (5)—specifically, to the inability of the Game*ExtFE   variable 
to distinguish mood-conflicting and mood-consistent earnings news. In order to further explore 
this possibility and to clearly account for a distraction effect, I estimate the following new model:  
 
 AbnormalVol[0,1]=β0+β1Game+β2GameDistractionExtFE+β3GameOtherExtFE                                                                                                                                             
+β4ExtFE+Controls                                                                                                                   (6)      
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Model (6) is essentially like model (5), but includes the variables GameDistractionExtFE 
and GameOtherExtFE in place of Game*ExtFE. GameDistractionExtFE is an indicator variable 
that takes the value of 1 if Win*FE1=1 or Loss*FE5=1, and therefore indicates cases of mood-
conflicting earnings news. GameOtherExtFE is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
Win*FE5=1 or Loss*FE1=1. Panel B reports the results for regression model (6). The coefficient 
of GameDistractionExtFE is negative across all distance definitions, and its magnitude declines 
with distance to the source of sports mood. It is statistically significant for firms within 100-150 
miles of cities with a sports team, consistent with the mood-conflicting distraction effect, which 
predicts lower abnormal trading volume for firms whose earnings news is incongruent with the 
sports mood experienced by local investors. The coefficient of GameOtherExtFE is statistically 
insignificant in all columns.  
1.4.4 Is There a General Distraction Effect?  
Having established the existence of a mood-conflicting distraction effect I now address 
the possibility that such an effect could be part of a general distraction effect caused by sports 
events which exists even without considering mood content. In particular, I examine whether the 
market gets distracted by earnings announcements around the time of big sports events by 
estimating the following models: 
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CAR=β0+β1GameTime+β2GameTime*FE5+β3GameTime*FE1+ 
B4*FE5+B5*FE1+Controls                                                                                                     (7) 
 
CAR=β0+β1Game200mi+β2Game200mi*FE5+β3Game200mi*FE1+ 
B4*FE5+B5*FE1+Controls                                                                                                      (8) 
 
In model (7) above, GameTime is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm’s 
earnings announcement occurs around the time of big sports events and the value of zero 
otherwise. Model (8) is similar to model (7) above, but instead of simply accounting for the 
timing of the announcement I also measure the proximity to the source of the unrelated news (i.e. 
the sports news) by replacing GameTime with Game200mi, a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if a firm is located within 200 miles of a city with a team competing in a big sports 
event and the value of zero otherwise. This variable, Game200mi, helps to consider cases of 
greater exposure to sports news. In both models, there are also interactions of FE5 and FE1 with 
GameTime and Game200mi, respectively. My test in this section is similar to my earlier stock 
response tests and I also control for size, book-to-market, number of analysts that follow the 
firm, reporting lag, earnings volatility, share turnover, industry, day of week, month and year.  
Panel A of Table 1.6 contains the results for model (7) depicted in odd numbered 
columns and those for model (8) in even numbered columns. The estimation includes all 
earnings announcements observations with firm location and other firm information that are 
issued during my sample period. The first four columns show results for delayed response 
regressions, and the last four columns show results for immediate reaction regressions. There is 
no statistically significant difference in delayed response between announcements issued around 
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big sports games and all other announcements. However, there is some difference in immediate 
reaction between announcements issued around big sports games and other announcements. This 
pattern is different for announcements of firms located close to participating teams’ cities than 
for other firms making announcements around game time. All announcements with good 
earnings news issued around game days show an attenuated immediate reaction by 0.7%, 
whereas the announcements, especially good earnings news, of the firms located near team cities 
display a somewhat boosted immediate reaction. The results from these tests show that without 
accounting for mood content PEAD is not significantly affected by sports events, and thus reveal 
that there is no general sports event distraction effect in that no PEAD . Furthermore the results 
also highlight the importance of proximity to the source of sports mood.   
I also examine delayed response ratios for GameTime and Game200mi. As I did before 
and based onDellaVigna and Pollet (2009), I estimate regression models by only focusing on 
extreme earnings news quintiles. Delayed response ratio computation includes the following 
models: 
 
CAR=β0+β1GameTime+β2GameTime*Top+β3Top+Controls                                     (9) 
 
CAR=β0+β1Game200mi+β2Game200mi*Top+β3Top+Controls                                 (10) 
 
The above models are estimated by using the same control variables used in the Panel A 
regression, and include only extreme earnings surprise (FE5 and FE1) announcements. In the 
above models, Top is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if earnings surprise is in the 
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highest surprise quintile (FE=5) and the value of zero if earnings surprise is in the lowest surprise 
quintile (FE=1). 
Panel B of Table 1.6 shows that the delayed response of announcements issued around 
game times are not statistically significantly different, and are actually even smaller, than that of 
announcements from other times. This result is in line with the evidence in Panel A and 
consistent with the view that there is no general distraction effect associated simply with the 
timing of big sports events. A comparison of delayed responses for Game200mi and Other also 
shows an insignificant difference. The lower half of Panel B indicates that, up to, 54% of stock 
response takes places with delay for earnings news announced around the time of big sports 
events with issuing firm location near team cities competing in big sports events. For other 
announcements, delayed response only accounts for, up to, 37% of long-term response.  Even 
though this is a sizeable difference, it is not significant in statistical terms. However, this result 
denotes the importance of proximity to the source of unrelated news, in that it strengthens the 
delayed response to firm news. 
1.4.5 Local Stock Ownership 
So far I have shown that mood-conflicting distraction is stronger among firms located 
closer to the source of mood inducing unrelated news.  This pattern is consistent with the 
existence of a sizeable local component in the pricing of stocks and highlights the potential role 
of local investors in the mood-conflicting distraction effect. In order to further examine and 
verify the importance of local investors, I run two additional tests. 
First, following prior studies that examined the importance of local component of asset 
pricing (e.g. Pirinsky and Wang (2006)), I re-examine the distraction effect using the subsample 
of earnings announcements around big sports events excluding firms that are located in the New 
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York area. Since New York is the heart of the U.S. financial markets and the home of numerous 
financial institutions, the locality of investors is expected to have a smaller role in any financial 
outcome compared to the other places. Table 1.7 shows the results of tests for the subsample 
excluding New York firms.  In Panel A, the pattern and magnitude of the Loss*FE5 and 
Win*FE1 coefficients are very similar to those displayed in Table 1.2 and in line with the  strong 
mood-conflicting distraction effect that becomes gradually weaker with distance from the source 
of the mood-inducing sports news.  
Panel B reports results for the short-term price reaction tests. The findings are, once 
again, very similar to the short response results provided in Table 1.2.  Consistent with the notion 
of a distraction effect, there is no pronounced reaction to firm mood-conflicting earnings news. I 
conclude that, my findings remain robust when I exclude from my investigation the areas that are 
expected to have less pronounced impact of local investors.  
Next, I examine the impact of the size of local retail investor ownership. I construct a 
local stock ownership index and use it to divide my sample into two subsamples, one with more 
local ownership and one with less local ownership. The local stock ownership index contains 
several factors that reflect the likelihood of stock ownership by local investors. For example, 
Coval and Moskowitz (1999) suggest that small firms have higher levels of local ownership and 
they also imply that individual investors are more likely to own local stocks compared to 
institutional investors. Therefore, I use firm size and institutional ownership in constructing the 
local ownership index. In addition, other components of the local ownership index are investors’ 
income, education and age.
25
 In particular, I use the proportion of population with a college 
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 Investors’ income and education are important in determining in (especially individual) investors’ stock market 
participation and thus local stock ownership (Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2008) and  Brown, Ivkovic, Smith, and 
Weisbenner (2008) among others). Previous studies of stock market participation also control for investor age 
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degree in a county, the median household income of a county from 1990 and 2000 Censuses and 
the proportion of people who are 65 years old or older in a firm’s headquarter county. I use 
interpolation to fill in the missing values for years between Censuses.  
I first rank firms into deciles after sorting on each of the five factors and then, for each 
firm observation, I compute the local ownership index by taking the average value of the ranks.
26
 
Specifically, I divide my sample into ten firm size groups based on the corresponding NYSE 
equity deciles and assign corresponding index values  as in the following: Firms that are in the 
smallest (biggest) size group takes the value of  10 (1).  Similarly, I divide the sample into ten 
institutional ownership groups and assign corresponding index values as in the following: Firms 
that are in the smallest (biggest) institutional ownership takes the value of 10 (1). I also repeat a 
similar procedure for my county level variables—education, income and age variables. I divide 
the sample into ten groups and assign corresponding index values as in the following: Firms that 
are located in a county, which is in the biggest (smallest) county level variable takes the value of 
10 (1).  The local ownership index is the average of the five ranks and can take values between 1 
and 10, with higher index values representing greater likelihood of larger local ownership.  
The median value of my local ownership index is about 5.6. In order to examine the 
impact of local ownership on my findings, I divide the sample of firms that announce earnings 
around big sports events into two as in the following: Firms that have local index values higher 
than the median value (5.6) form the more local ownership subsample whereas firms whose local 
index values are lower than the median value (5.6) form the less local ownership subsample. I 
repeat my tests for these two subsamples and present the results in Table 1.8.  Consistent with 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2008) and Brown et al.(2008), among others). Moreover, older local investors are 
influential and can affect corporate policies (Becker et al. (2011)). 
26
 If some factors have missing values for a given firm observations then I use the remaining factors to compute the 
local ownership index value. 
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the notion that local retail investors are the drivers of the mood-conflicting distraction effect, the 
results are stronger, especially for Loss*FE5, for firms with more local ownership. Panel A 
shows that the magnitude of the Loss*FE5 coefficient, especially for the firms that are within 
shorter distances from cities with sports teams, is about 20%-30% higher than that of the 
corresponding coefficients from the tests based on the full sample shown in Table 1.2.  
Consistent with earlier results, this result is statistically significant, economically important and 
becomes weaker as the distance to the cities with sports teams becomes bigger. The mood-
conflicting distraction effect of good sports news concurrently occurring with bad firm news—
Win*FE1—does not appear to be different between the subsamples of firms with more and less 
local ownership. This is somewhat expected considering its smaller magnitude compared to the 
distraction effect emanating from bad sports news concurrently occurring with good firm news—
Loss*FE5— shown in my earlier results.  
Moreover, observing a weaker mood-conflicting investor distraction effect for positive 
mood is consistent with behavioral studies suggesting a stronger impact of negative mood 
compared to the positive one
27
.  Panel B presents immediate reaction results. The results for the 
subsample of firms with higher fraction of local investors are consistent with the earlier tables. 
The coefficients for mood-conflicting distraction effects are not pronounced as in my earlier 
findings. Loss has significant coefficient values which suggest a negative mood effect on all 
firms near cities with a losing team. Win*FE5 is statistically significant for some columns which 
indicates a mood-consistent returns when firms that are within longer distances of cities with a 
winning team. On the other hand, the immediate reaction results obtained using the subsample of 
firms with less local ownership are different and somewhat opposite. Overall, the results of Table 
                                                          
27
 See Ronis and Lipinski (1985), Singh and Teoh 2000, Van der Pligt and Eiser (1980), and Vonk (1993) (1996) 
among others. 
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1.8 suggest that mood-conflicting distraction is more pronounced among firms with more local 
ownership and are consistent with the notion that mood effects enhance the importance of the 
local component of price formation.  
1.5 CONCLUSION 
Technological advances provide investors with fast access to a vast number of 
information resources which facilitate availability of large amounts of all types of information. 
Given investors limited cognitive capacity (Kahneman (1973)), overexposure to information may 
come with a cost in the form of distraction and limited attention to relevant information. In this 
paper, I extend the literature on PEAD and investor inattention, which thus far primarily consists 
of different examples of how calendar and time effects and/or attention-grabbing events interfere 
with investors’ information processing capacity and cause underreaction to firm news.  
I analyze investors’ ability to process fundamentals- related (firm) information when it is 
inconsistent with the mood state they experience. In support of the mood-conflicting distraction 
hypothesis, I show that the combination of earnings surprise content and corresponding type of 
mood associated with the major sports events is important in determining investor distraction. 
Consistent with my mood-conflicting investor distraction hypothesis, I find stronger post-
earnings announcement drift and delayed response ratio and weaker immediate volume reaction 
when the earnings news content is inconsistent with local sports mood. In addition, my findings 
show the importance of local investor attention on stock prices. In particular, my findings 
suggest that an investor distraction effect evolving primarily through the local investor base 
channel, which has not received sufficient attention in other studies.   
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1.6 FIGURES 
 
Type of 
Distraction 
Type of Firm news 
Positive (+) Firm 
News 
Negative (-) Firm 
News 
Distraction caused by information/event   
without mood content 
Less attention 
 
Less attention 
 
 
Distraction caused by 
event/information with 
mood content 
 
Distraction caused by     
Negative mood(-)  
Mood-conflicting 
information  leads to 
Less attention 
Mood-consistent  
information leads to  
More attention 
 
Distraction caused by      
Positive mood(+)   
Mood-consistent 
information leads to  
More attention 
Mood-conflicting  
information leads to 
Less attention 
 
Figure 1.1: Positive or Negative Firm News and Types of Distraction 
This figure shows the relative attention allocation to positive and negative firm news for different 
cases of distraction, i.e. without mood content or with positive or negative mood content 
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Figure 1.2: Time-path of PEAD when Earnings Surprises are in Conflict with Sports Mood 
 
This figure shows the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for different event windows 
and different earnings surprise quintiles for the firms that are located near bad or good sports 
news(cities with losing or winning teams) for mood-conflicting earnings news cases.. CARs are 
for subsample of firms with different distances to bad or good sports news (cities with losing or 
winning teams). CARs are for (0,1) event window as well as the periods from 2 days after the 
current earnings announcement to 30 days (or 45 or 61 or 75 or 90 days) after the announcement. 
In other words, the depicted CAR event windows are [0,+1], [+2,+30], [+2,+45], [+2,+61], 
[+2,+75], and [+2,+90]. CAR is the difference between the firm’s daily return and the daily 
return on the portfolio of firms with the same size and book-to-market ratio”.  FE5 is an indicator 
variable that takes value of 1 for the FE=5 and value of 0 for everything else.FE1 is an indicator 
variable that takes value of 1 for the FE=1 and value of 0 for everything else. 
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Figure 1.3: Time-path of PEAD when Earnings Surprises are Consistent with Sports Mood 
 
This figure shows the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for different event windows 
and different earnings surprise quintiles for the firms that are located near bad or good sports 
news(cities with losing or winning teams) for mood-consistent earnings news cases. CARs are 
for subsample of firms with different distances to bad or good sports news (cities with losing or 
winning teams). CARs are for (0,1) event window as well as the periods from 2 days after the 
current earnings announcement to 30 days (or 45 or 61 or 75 or 90 days) after the announcement. 
In other words, the depicted CAR event windows are [0,+1], [+2,+30], [+2,+45], [+2,+61], 
[+2,+75], and [+2,+90]. CAR is the difference between the firm’s daily return and the daily 
return on the portfolio of firms with the same size and book-to-market ratio”.  FE5 is an indicator 
variable that takes value of 1 for the FE=5 and value of 0 for everything else.FE1 is an indicator 
variable that takes value of 1 for the FE=1 and value of 0 for everything else. 
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1.7 TABLES  
 
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A: All Earnings Announcements of Firms around game Times 
 N Mean p10 Median p90 
Size($M) 5,096 3,318.01 68.55 549.70 5,865.57 
B/M 5,096 0.563 0.138 0.457 1.029 
Earnings surprise 5,096 -0.0009 -0.0045 0.0003 0.0045 
Earnings Volatility 5,088 6.59% 0.03% 0.13% 0.69% 
Share turnover 5,096 9.49% 1.90% 6.89% 19.83% 
Reporting Lag 5,096 28.4 20 27 36 
# Analysts 5,096 4.3 1 3 10 
Panel B: Earnings Announcements of Firms within 200 miles Team Cities Around Game Ttimes 
 N Mean p10 Median p90 
Size($M) 943 3,065.64 76.98 572.92 6,136.23 
B/M 943 0.53 0.12 0.44 1.01 
Earnings surprise 943 -0.0004 -0.0050 0.0003 0.0046 
Earnings Volatility 943 1.25% 0.03% 0.14% 0.79% 
Share turnover 943 9.70% 1.97% 7.10% 20.30% 
Reporting Lag 943 27.522 18 26 36 
# Analysts 943 4.3 1 3 10 
Panel A of Table 1.1 reports summary statistics of the subsample of firms whose earnings announcements occur on 
dates around big sports games. Panel B provides descriptive statistics for firms whose earnings announcements 
occur on dates around big sports games and whose location is within 200 miles of a city with a sports team that 
competed in a big sports event. This table reports number of observations (N), mean, median, and the 10th and 90th 
percentile values for each variable. Size is company’s market value. B/M is company’s book to market ratio. 
Earnings volatility is measured as the standard deviation of the deviations of prior four year quarterly earnings from 
the earnings one year ago. Share turnover is the average monthly trading volume normalized by the average number 
of share outstanding for the one year period that ends at the end of corresponding fiscal quarter. Reporting lag is the 
number of days between the quarter end and earnings announcement day.  Log (1+# of analysts) is logarithm of the 
number of analysts that follows the firm during the corresponding quarter. The sample period is the years between 
1989 and 2006. 
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Table 1.2: Earnings Announcements around Game Times 
Panel A: Delayed Response (PEAD) Regressions 
Dependent Variable :  CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,75) 
Distance to Team Location: 100 miles 150 miles 200 miles 100 miles 150 miles 200 miles 
Win 0.0215 0.0092 0.0075 0.0207 0.0101 0.0108 
 
(0.237) (0.547) (0.671) (0.239) (0.475) (0.460) 
Loss 0.0195 0.0187 0.0088 0.0191 0.0171 0.0079 
 
(0.094)* (0.084)* (0.365) (0.287) (0.250) (0.442) 
Win*FE5 -0.0382 -0.0376 -0.0222 -0.0242 -0.0282 -0.0262 
 
(0.149) (0.090)* (0.451) (0.332) (0.221) (0.427) 
Loss*FE5 0.0899 0.0581 0.0420 0.1049 0.0703 0.0473 
 
(0.034)** (0.079)* (0.121) (0.026)** (0.068)* (0.071)* 
Win*FE1 -0.0469 -0.0313 -0.0415 -0.0635 -0.0589 -0.0783 
 
(0.013)** (0.055)* (0.013)** (0.003)*** (0.042)** (0.034)** 
Loss*FE1 -0.0103 -0.0010 -0.0076 -0.0076 0.0020 -0.0053 
 
(0.796) (0.974) (0.832) (0.873) (0.961) (0.889) 
FE5 0.0347 0.0355 0.0352 0.0369 0.0377 0.0389 
 
(0.008)*** (0.006)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.004)*** 
FE1 0.0186 0.0177 0.0199 0.0244 0.0244 0.0276 
 
(0.191) (0.235) (0.201) (0.121) (0.143) (0.103) 
Constant 0.0126 0.0161 0.0144 0.0140 0.0181 0.0172 
 
(0.597) (0.517) (0.579) (0.394) (0.253) (0.322) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5088 5088 5088 5088 5088 5088 
R-squared 0.036 0.035 0.034 0.039 0.038 0.037 
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Table 1.2 (cont.) 
      Panel B: Immediate Reaction Regressions 
Dependent Variable :  CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) 
Distance to Team Location 100 miles 150 miles 200 miles 100 miles 150 miles 200 miles 
Win 0.0054 0.0048 0.0035 0.0031 0.0026 0.0028 
 
(0.004)*** (0.205) (0.046)** (0.246) (0.501) (0.172) 
Loss -0.0021 0.0009 -0.0016 0.0002 0.0022 0.0009 
 
(0.439) (0.632) (0.478) (0.912) (0.196) (0.467) 
Win*FE5 0.0087 0.0145 0.0137 0.0080 0.0100 0.0078 
 
(0.161) (0.100) (0.043)** (0.386) (0.140) (0.379) 
Loss*FE5 0.0191 0.0129 0.0127 0.0108 0.0085 0.0075 
 
(0.347) (0.344) (0.325) (0.580) (0.462) (0.513) 
Win*FE1 0.0159 0.0083 0.0083 0.0124 0.0070 0.0050 
 
(0.162) (0.311) (0.307) (0.453) (0.611) (0.711) 
Loss*FE1 0.0118 0.0108 0.0046 0.0109 0.0122 0.0054 
 
(0.300) (0.285) (0.604) (0.141) (0.037)** (0.347) 
FE5 0.0193 0.0188 0.0184 0.0160 0.0157 0.0157 
 
(0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** 
FE1 -0.0339 -0.0339 -0.0335 -0.0303 -0.0306 -0.0299 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Constant 0.0666 0.0657 0.0657 0.0441 0.0440 0.0437 
 
(0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.015)** (0.016)** (0.015)** 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5088 5088 5088 5088 5088 5088 
R-squared 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.064 0.064 0.064 
Dependent variables are CAR (Et,Et+1) and CAR(2,75) in Panel A  and CAR(-1,1) and CAR (0,1) in Panel B. Distance to Team 
City shows the distance to the sports mood source, which is distance to the location of a winning(losing) team competing in the 
big sports game. Win (Loss) takes value of one if the firm that issued an earnings announcement is headquartered within a 
specific distance from a location with a sports team that “won” (“lost”) a big game and zero otherwise. Day 0 represents the day 
of earnings announcement in all CAR event window definitions. CAR(Et,Et+1) is the cumulative abnormal return between 
current earnings announcement and the next one. FE is a rank variable that represents (1 to 5) earnings surprise quintiles.FE5 is 
an indicator variable that takes value of 1 for the FE=5 and value of 0 for everything else.FE1 is an indicator variable that takes 
value of 1 for the FE=1 and value of 0 for everything else. This table controls for Size, B/M ratio, Log (1+ #of analyst), 
Reporting Lag, Earnings Volatility, Share Turnover, which are defined in Table 1.1. This table also includes controls of two-digit 
SIC, day of week, month, year indicator variables. Control variable are not shown for brevity. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity, clustered by the day of announcement. Robust p-values are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
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Table 1.3: Delayed Response Ratio Tests 
Ratio of the Delayed Stock Response to the Long-Term Stock Response 
Response Ratio representation [CAR(Et,Et+1) / CAR(-1,Et+1)] [CAR(2,75) / CAR(0,75)] 
Distance to Team City 100 miles 150 miles 200 miles 100 miles 150 miles 200 miles 
Panel A: Analysis of Response Ratios of Mood-Conflicting Distraction Effects Separately 
Announcements subject to Negative mood-conflicting  
distraction (Loss*FE5 effect)  
0.6108 0.5606  0 .4837 0.7204 0.6595 0.5846 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Announcements subject to Positive mood-conflicting  
distraction (Win*FE1 effect) 
0.2892 0.1174 0.3391 0.5245 0.4441 0.5478 
(0.522) (0.852) (0.235) (0.047)** (0.082)* (0.002)*** 
Other announcements without  
mood content 
0.2344 0.2391 0.2645 0.2321 0.2357 0.2102 
(0.055)** (0.038)** (0.025)** (0.117) (0.116) (0.203) 
Difference between Negative mood-conflicting distraction 
 announcements & Other announcements without content  
0.3763 0.2825 0.3018 0.4883 0.4238 0.3744 
(0.020)** (0.111) (0.104) (0.006)*** (0.028)** (0.079)* 
Difference between Positive mood-conflicting distraction   
announcements & other announcements without content  
0.0548 -0.1333 0.1167 0.2924 -0.1333 0.3376 
(0.907) (0.784) (0.710) (0.334) (0.784) (0.157) 
Panel B: Analysis of Response Ratios of Mood-Conflicting Distraction Effects in One Combined Distraction Effect 
Announcements subject to Mood-conflicting distraction  
(Loss*FE5 & Win*FE1 effects)  
0.6499 0.6015 0.5869 0.7599 0.7156 0.6761 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Other announcements  
without content 
0.2233 0.2396 0.2119 0.2177 0.2216 0.2012 
(0.077)* (0.055)* (0.119) (0.159) (0.158) (0.237) 
Difference between  Mood-conflicting distraction  
 announcements & Other announcements without content  
0.4266 0.3619 0.3619 0.5422 0.4940 0.4748 
(0.004)*** (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.001)*** (0.005)*** (0.012)** 
Dependent variables are delayed response ratios of [CAR(Et,Et+1) / CAR(-1,Et+1)] in first three columns and [CAR(2,75) / CAR(0,75)] in last three columns. Delayed response 
ratios are constructed by flowing DellaVigna and Pollet (2009). This table only includes announcements with good (depicted by FE5) and bad (depicted by FE1) in delyed 
response ratio tests. CAR definitions and FE5 and FE1 representations are in line with Table 1.2 and CAR( -1,Et+1) is the cumulative abnormal return between one day before the 
current earnings announcement and the next announcement. Distance to Team City shows the distance to the sports mood source, which is distance to the location of a winning 
(losing) team competing in the big sports game. Win (Loss) takes value of one if the firm that issued an earnings announcement is headquartered within a specific distance from a 
location with a sports team that “won” (“lost”) a big game and zero otherwise. This table controls for Size, B/M ratio, Log (1+ #of analyst), Reporting Lag, Earnings Volatility, 
Share Turnover, which are defined in Table 1.1. This table also includes controls of two-digit SIC, day of week, month, year indicator variables. Control variable are not shown for 
brevity. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, clustered by the day of announcement. Standard errors are calculated by using Delta method. Robust p-values are in 
parentheses.  (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%).                           
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Table 1.4: Firms Located Near the Source of Big Sports News 
 
 Panel A: Delayed Response (PEAD) Regressions 
   Dependent Variable CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,75) 
Distance to Team City 100 miles 150 miles 200 miles 100 miles 150 miles 200 miles 
Loss 0.0095 0.0152 0.0006 0.0095 0.0100 -0.0048 
 
    (0.540)     (0.499)     (0.977) (0.309) (0.606) (0.758) 
Loss*FE5 0.135 0.0991 0.0761 0.1403 0.1049 0.0861 
 
(0.025)** (0.025)**     (0.151) (0.026)** (0.017)** (0.093)* 
Loss*FE1 -0.0082 -0.0135 0.0105 0.0204 0.0210 0.0466 
 
    (0.790)     (0.460)     (0.453) (0.708) (0.613) (0.222) 
FE5 0.0118 -0.0002 0.0107 0.0323 0.0138 0.0164 
 
    (0.677)     (0.991)     (0.628) (0.439) (0.657) (0.582) 
FE1 0.0076 0.0172 -0.0029 -0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0261 
 
    (0.479) (0.004)***     (0.756) (0.986) (0.955) (0.216) 
Constant -0.1507 0.0992 -0.0562 -0.1362 0.0010 -0.1551 
 
(0.081)*     (0.228)     (0.459) (0.234) (0.987) (0.221) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 581 739 943 581 739 943 
R-squared 0.182 0.154 0.124 0.186 0.154 0.130 
       Panel B: Immediate Reaction Regressions 
   Dependent Variable: CAR(-1,1) CAR(0,1) 
Distance to Team City 100 miles 150 miles 200 miles 100 miles 150 miles 200 miles 
Loss -0.0037 -0.0044 -0.0068 0.0018 -0.0006 -0.0031 
 
    (0.716)     (0.436) (0.045)**     (0.877)     (0.932)     (0.214) 
Loss*FE5 0.0058 -0.002 0.0007 -0.0033 -0.0033 0.0012 
 
    (0.801)     (0.833)     (0.967)     (0.920)     (0.767)     (0.943) 
Loss*FE1 -0.011 -0.0024 -0.0025 -0.0111 -0.0016 -0.0008 
 
    (0.596)     (0.838)     (0.766)     (0.450)     (0.876)     (0.947) 
FE5 0.0435 0.0419 0.0354 0.0429 0.0362 0.0287 
 
(0.000)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** (0.038)** (0.010)*** (0.027)** 
FE1 -0.009 -0.0184 -0.025 -0.0051 -0.0153 -0.0223 
 
(0.076)* (0.037)** (0.012)**     (0.619)     (0.267)     (0.109) 
Constant 0.0837 0.1146 0.0797 0.0639 0.0635 0.0568 
 
    (0.117) (0.050)** (0.090)*     (0.351) (0.061)*     (0.119) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 581 739 943 581 739 943 
R-squared 0.165 0.139 0.124 0.167 0.143 0.127 
Dependent variables are CAR (Et,Et+1) and CAR(2,75) in Panel A  and CAR(-1,1) and CAR (0,1) in Panel B. Distance to Team 
City shows the distance to the sports mood source, which is distance to the location of a winning(losing) team competing in the 
big sports game. This table only includes subsample of firms that are located close to the cities with teams participating in a big 
sports game and with announcements around big sports news.  In this table, Loss takes value of one if the firm that issued an 
earnings announcement is headquartered within a specific distance from a location with a sports team that “lost” a big game and 
zero if the firm that issued an earnings announcement is headquartered within a specific distance from a location with a sports 
team that “won”.  FE5 and FE1 variables and CARs are defined as they are defined in Table 1.2. This table controls for Size, 
B/M ratio, Log (1+ #of analyst), Reporting Lag, Earnings Volatility, Share Turnover, which are defined in Table 1.1. This table 
also include controls of two-digit SIC, day of week, month, year indicator variables. Control variable are not shown for brevity. 
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, clustered by the day of announcement. Robust p-values are in parentheses (* 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
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Table 1.5: Trading Volume Response Regressions 
 
Panel A: Overall Effect for Games 
Dependent Variable :                                                                 AbnormalVol [0,1] 
Distance to Team City: 100 miles 150 miles 200 miles 
Game*ExtFE -0.2534 -0.1521 -0.0054 
 
(0.163) (0.286) (0.972) 
Game 0.0788 0.0501 -0.0041 
 
(0.634) (0.746) (0.972) 
ExtFE 0.195 0.1882 0.1666 
 
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Constant 0.6956 0.6891 0.6879 
  (0.173) (0.176) (0.171) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5088 5088 5088 
R-squared 0.064 0.064 0.064 
Panel B: Distraction Effect of Games vs. Other Effect of Games 
Dependent Variable :                                                                      AbnormalVol [0,1] 
Distance to Team City 100 miles 150 miles 200 miles 
GameDistractionExtFE -0.3632 -0.2202 -0.0465 
 
(0.017)** (0.013)** -0.562 
GameOtherExtFE -0.1557 -0.0973 0.0353 
 
(0.492) (0.692) (0.89) 
Game 0.0745 0.0505 -0.005 
 
(0.650) (0.745) (0.967) 
ExtFE 0.1936 0.1882 0.166 
 
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
Constant 0.6889 0.6878 0.6845 
  (0.171) (0.172) (0.165) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 5088 5088 5088 
R-squared 0.064 0.064 0.064 
Dependent variable is AbnormalVol [0,1], which is equal to the average of abnormal trading volume on the earnings 
announcement date and of the abnormal trading on the next day.  Distance to Team City shows the distance to the sports mood 
source, which is distance to the location of a winning (losing) team competing in the big sports game. FE5 and FE1 variables are 
defined as they are defined in Table 1.2. In Panel A, Game takes value of one if a firm is within a certain "distance" to "big sport 
game city" and value of zero for everything else. Panel B decomposes game distance into two based on stock market reaction 
results of distraction effect as in the following: GameDistractionExtFE takes value of 1 if Win*FE1=0 or Lost*FE5=0 and value 
of 0 for everything else. GameOtherExtFE takes value of 1 if Win*FE5=0 or Lost*FE1=0 and value of 0 for everything else. This 
table controls for Size, B/M ratio, Log (1+ #of analyst), Reporting Lag, Earnings Volatility, Share Turnover, which are defined in 
Table 2.1. This table also includes controls of two-digit SIC, day of week, month, year indicator variables. This table also 
controls for market-wide abnormal trading volume defined as “the average abnormal trading volume of all CRSP firms”. Control 
variable are not shown for brevity. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, clustered by the day of announcement. 
Robust p-values are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%).  
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Table 1.6: Stock Response to All Announcements during Sample Years 
Panel A : Delayed Response (PEAD) and Immediate Reaction Regressions 
    
 
Delayed Response Immediate Reaction 
Dependent Variable CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,75) CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) 
Gametime 0.0023 
 
0.0015 
 
-0.0001 
 
0.0010 
 
 
(0.571) 
 
(0.687) 
 
(0.958) 
 
(0.461) 
 Gametime*FE5 -0.0032 
 
0.0008 
 
-0.0077 
 
-0.0071 
 
 
(0.487) 
 
(0.837) 
 
(0.074)* 
 
(0.025)** 
 Gametime*FE1 0.0126 
 
0.0177 
 
-0.0014 
 
-0.0010 
 
 
(0.201) 
 
(0.120) 
 
(0.548) 
 
(0.483) 
 Game200mi 
 
0.0099 
 
0.0089 
 
0.0006 
 
0.0021 
  
(0.377) 
 
(0.334) 
 
(0.773) 
 
(0.067)* 
Game200mi*FE5 
 
0.0055 
 
0.0108 
 
0.0042 
 
0.0002 
  
(0.443) 
 
(0.328) 
 
(0.099)* 
 
(0.966) 
Game200mi*FE1 
 
-0.0085 
 
-0.0148 
 
0.0034 
 
0.0031 
  
(0.344) 
 
(0.108) 
 
(0.665) 
 
(0.563) 
FE5 0.0325 0.0323 0.0320 0.0319 0.0293 0.0288 0.0252 0.0248 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
FE1 -0.0018 -0.0010 -0.0020 -0.0009 -0.0310 -0.0311 -0.0277 -0.0278 
 
(0.463) (0.654) (0.406) (0.656) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Constant -0.0158 -0.0155 -0.0063 -0.0059 -0.0043 -0.0042 -0.0029 -0.0028 
 
(0.496) (0.503) (0.789) (0.801) (0.583) (0.595) (0.671) (0.682) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 96885 96885 96885 96885 96880 96880 96880 96880 
R-squared 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.053 0.053 0.047 0.047 
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Table 1.6 (cont.) 
Panel B: Ratio of the Delayed Stock Response to the Long-Term Stock Response 
Response Ratio representation [CAR(Et,Et+1) / CAR(-1,Et+1)] [CAR(2,75) / CAR(0,75)] 
Response Ratio for Gametime 0.2472  0.2688  
 (0.033)**  (0.043)**  
Response Ratio for Other times 0.3465  0.3845  
 (0.000)***  (0.000)***  
Difference between the response ratio for Gametime and 
other days 
-0.09923  -0.11567   
(0.398)  (0.389)  
     
Response Ratio for Game200mi  0.4291  0.5425 
  (0.003)***  (0.043)** 
Response Ratio for Other   0.3413  0.3777 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** 
Difference between the response ratio for Game200mi  
and other announcements  
 0.0878  0.1647 
 (0.541)  (0.184) 
In Panel A, dependent variables are CAR (Et,Et+1), CAR(2,75), CAR(-1,1), and CAR (0,1), respectively. First four columns show delayed response regressions, 
and last four columns show immediate reaction regressions in Panel A.  Dependent variable is delayed response ratio in Panel B, which is the ratio of the delayed 
stock response to the long-term stock response.  In Panel B, delayed response ratios are for [CAR(Et,Et+1) / CAR(-1,Et+1)] in first two columns and [CAR(2,75) 
/ CAR(0,75)] in last two columns. FE5 and FE1 variables and CARs are defined as they are defined in Table 1.2. GameTime is a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if a firm’s earnings announcement happens around the time of big sports events and the value of zero otherwise. Game200mi is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if a firm is located within 200 miles of a city with a team competing in a big sports event and the value of zero otherwise. This table 
controls for Size, B/M ratio, Log (1+ #of analyst), Reporting Lag, Earnings Volatility, Share Turnover, which are defined in Table 1.1. This table also includes 
controls of two-digit SIC, day of week, month, year indicator variables. Control variable are not shown for brevity. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity, clustered by the day of announcement. Robust p-values are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
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Table 1.7: Tests with a Subsample that Excludes New York Area   
Panel A: Delayed Response (PEAD) Regressions 
Dependent Variable CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,75) 
Distance to Team City 100 miles 150 miles 200 miles 100 miles 150 miles 200 miles 
Win 0.0230 0.0088 0.0086 0.0228 0.0106 0.0127 
 
(0.121) (0.450) (0.616) (0.112) (0.332) (0.374) 
Loss 0.0226 0.0209 0.0089 0.0216 0.0188 0.0077 
 
(0.044)** (0.042)** (0.401) (0.183) (0.147) (0.393) 
Win*FE5 -0.0387 -0.0366 -0.0245 -0.0229 -0.0265 -0.0266 
 
(0.211) (0.137) (0.461) (0.415) (0.274) (0.464) 
Loss*FE5 0.0898 0.0554 0.0438 0.1027 0.0662 0.0480 
 
(0.038)** (0.109) (0.118) (0.027)** (0.085)* (0.062)* 
Win*FE1 -0.0482 -0.0300 -0.0339 -0.0658 -0.0592 -0.0689 
 
(0.003)*** (0.085)* (0.026)** (0.005)*** (0.055)* (0.028)** 
Loss*FE1 -0.0046 0.0042 -0.0014 -0.0022 0.0069 0.0006 
 
(0.887) (0.861) (0.961) (0.955) (0.827) (0.984) 
FE5 0.0345 0.0352 0.0349 0.0364 0.0372 0.0381 
 
(0.010)*** (0.006)*** (0.012)** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.006)*** 
FE1 0.0173 0.0163 0.0178 0.0232 0.0231 0.0253 
 
(0.211) (0.269) (0.255) (0.118) (0.147) (0.126) 
Constant 0.0482 0.0521 0.0518 0.0491 0.0538 0.0546 
 
(0.063)* (0.052)* (0.057)* (0.094)* (0.062)* (0.058)* 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4943 4943 4943 4943 4943 4943 
R-squared 0.035 0.035 0.033 0.038 0.038 0.037 
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Table 1.7 (cont.) 
 Panel B: Immediate Reaction Regressions 
Dependent Variable: CAR(-1,1) CAR(0,1) 
Distance to Team City 100 miles 150 miles 200 miles 100 miles 150 miles 200 miles 
Win 0.0072 0.0056 0.0040 0.0052 0.0037 0.0035 
 
(0.018)** (0.225) (0.115) (0.156) (0.438) (0.206) 
Loss -0.0027 0.0006 -0.0019 0.0002 0.0022 0.0009 
 
(0.371) (0.741) (0.478) (0.926) (0.135) (0.599) 
Win*FE5 0.0069 0.0137 0.0116 0.0047 0.0078 0.0057 
 
(0.240) (0.125) (0.114) (0.619) (0.215) (0.496) 
Loss*FE5 0.0225 0.0151 0.0154 0.0130 0.0099 0.0091 
 
(0.328) (0.328) (0.257) (0.527) (0.418) (0.449) 
Win*FE1 0.0142 0.0077 0.0071 0.0107 0.0065 0.0044 
 
(0.222) (0.322) (0.401) (0.522) (0.619) (0.762) 
Loss*FE1 0.0121 0.0111 0.0044 0.0124 0.0135 0.0062 
 
(0.293) (0.280) (0.619) (0.138) (0.012)** (0.212) 
FE5 0.0188 0.0182 0.0180 0.0159 0.0156 0.0156 
 
(0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** 
FE1 -0.0344 -0.0345 -0.0339 -0.0310 -0.0313 -0.0306 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Constant 0.0715 0.0706 0.0712 0.0475 0.0473 0.0474 
 
(0.020)** (0.019)** (0.018)** (0.029)** (0.028)** (0.024)** 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4943 4943 4943 4943 4943 4943 
R-squared 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.065 0.065 0.065 
Dependent variables are CAR (Et,Et+1) and CAR(2,75) in Panel A  and CAR(-1,1) and CAR (0,1) in Panel B. 
Distance to Team City shows the distance to the sports mood source, which is distance to the location of a 
winning(losing) team competing in the big sports game. Win (Loss) takes value of one if the firm that issued an 
earnings announcement is headquartered within a specific distance from a location with a sports team that “won” 
(“lost”) a big game and zero otherwise. FE5 and FE1 variables and CARs are defined as they are defined in Table 
1.2. This table controls for Size, B/M ratio, Log (1+ #of analyst), Reporting Lag, Earnings Volatility, Share 
Turnover, which are defined in Table 1.1. This table also includes controls of two-digit SIC, day of week, month, 
year indicator variables. Control variable are not shown for brevity. Standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity, clustered by the day of announcement. Robust p-values are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
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Table 1.8: Local Ownership Subsamples  
Panel A: Delayed Response (PEAD) Regressions 
        More Local Ownership Less Local Ownership 
Dep. Variable  CAR(Et,Et+1)               CAR(2,75) CAR(Et,Et+1) CAR(2,75) 
Distance to  
Team City 
100 mi 150 mi 200 mi 100 mi 150 mi 200 mi 100 mi 150 mi 200 mi 100 mi 150 mi 200 mi 
Win 0.0208 0.0188 0.0082 0.0122 0.0082 0.0049 0.0119 -0.0069 0.0024 0.0229 0.0073 0.0154 
 
(0.238) (0.256) (0.760) (0.581) (0.682) (0.842) (0.455) (0.710) (0.885) (0.092)* (0.559) (0.300) 
Loss 0.0243 0.0287 0.0048 0.0239 0.0249 0.0051 0.0236 0.0175 0.0179 0.0253 0.0201 0.0189 
 
(0.203) (0.149) (0.758) (0.277) (0.265) (0.755) (0.041)** (0.074)* (0.009)*** (0.093)* (0.140) (0.081)* 
Win*FE5 -0.0593 -0.0591 -0.0456 -0.0273 -0.0267 -0.0364 0.0444 0.0194 0.0414 0.0323 0.0023 0.0207 
 
(0.265) (0.140) (0.400) (0.606) (0.530) (0.524) (0.129) (0.327) (0.039)** (0.268) (0.897) (0.424) 
Loss*FE5 0.1247 0.0787 0.0776 0.1352 0.0926 0.0823 -0.0159 -0.0032 -0.0314 0.0112 0.0102 -0.0274 
 
(0.036)** (0.064)* (0.024)** (0.029)** (0.069)* (0.018)** (0.629) (0.910) (0.201) (0.721) (0.714) (0.214) 
Win*FE1 -0.0616 -0.0553 -0.0559 -0.0607 -0.0687 -0.0871 -0.0049 0.0192 -0.0047 -0.0544 -0.0249 -0.0475 
 
(0.068)* (0.165) (0.251) (0.058)* (0.137) (0.156) (0.921) (0.776) (0.927) (0.024)** (0.509) (0.089)* 
Loss*FE1 -0.0384 -0.0208 -0.0094 -0.0439 -0.0254 -0.0199 0.0458 0.0256 0.0046 0.0594 0.0431 0.0256 
 
(0.416) (0.638) (0.836) (0.420) (0.637) (0.673) (0.166) (0.279) (0.857) (0.188) (0.202) (0.440) 
FE5 0.0446 0.0462 0.0442 0.0500 0.0505 0.0510 0.0233 0.0236 0.0239 0.0240 0.0249 0.0263 
 
(0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.021)** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.050)* (0.058)* (0.045)** (0.026)** (0.033)** (0.021)** 
FE1 0.0233 0.0231 0.0230 0.0331 0.0339 0.0362 0.0138 0.0134 0.0164 0.0155 0.0148 0.0180 
 
(0.096)* (0.088)* (0.074)* (0.081)* (0.074)* (0.043)** (0.411) (0.453) (0.364) (0.317) (0.364) (0.265) 
Constant 0.0577 0.0601 0.0625 0.0905 0.0921 0.0933 -0.1989 -0.1914 -0.2004 -0.2123 -0.2048 -0.2141 
 
(0.468) (0.469) (0.447) (0.272) (0.285) (0.277) (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2482 2482 2482 2482 2482 2482 2606 2606 2606 2606 2606 2606 
R-squared 0.058 0.057 0.056 0.067 0.065 0.065 0.069 0.067 0.068 0.069 0.068 0.068 
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Table 1.8 (cont.) 
 Panel B: Immediate Reaction Regressions 
      
  More Local Ownership Less Local Ownership 
Dep. Variable: CAR(-1,1) CAR(0,1) CAR(-1,1) CAR(0,1) 
Distance to  
Team City 
100 mi 150 mi 200 mi 100 mi 150 mi 200 mi 100 mi 150 mi 200 mi 100 mi 150 mi 200 mi 
Win 0.0015 -0.0012 0.0016 -0.0009 -0.0028 0.0018 0.0093 0.0104 0.0051 0.0055 0.0073 0.0042 
 
(0.625) (0.870) (0.750) (0.898) (0.773) (0.834) (0.035)** (0.090)* (0.313) (0.263) (0.208) (0.356) 
Loss -0.0130 -0.0084 -0.0086 -0.0106 -0.0071 -0.0064 0.0097 0.0111 0.0044 0.0124 0.0132 0.0071 
 
(0.047)** (0.012)** (0.025)** (0.034)** (0.062)* (0.121) (0.021)** (0.045)** (0.158) (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.040)** 
Win*FE5 0.0143 0.0248 0.0212 0.0110 0.0190 0.0111 0.0107 0.0082 0.0080 0.0183 0.0067 0.0087 
 
(0.160) (0.105) (0.072)* (0.475) (0.081)* (0.327) (0.081)* (0.103) (0.522) (0.032)** (0.374) (0.544) 
Loss*FE5 0.0342 0.0270 0.0227 0.0232 0.0193 0.0167 0.0016 -0.0048 0.0021 -0.0009 -0.0036 -0.0020 
 
(0.345) (0.302) (0.313) (0.478) (0.381) (0.405) (0.933) (0.785) (0.835) (0.938) (0.752) (0.823) 
Win*FE1 0.0103 0.0036 0.0036 0.0130 0.0076 0.0037 0.0270 0.0264 0.0167 0.0090 0.0100 0.0035 
 
(0.410) (0.793) (0.796) (0.297) (0.660) (0.836) (0.096)* (0.163) (0.226) (0.723) (0.661) (0.875) 
Loss*FE1 0.0194 0.0177 0.0156 0.0211 0.0153 0.0128 0.0064 0.0041 -0.0116 -0.0004 0.0138 -0.0024 
 
(0.439) (0.420) (0.282) (0.224) (0.317) (0.222) (0.853) (0.894) (0.397) (0.991) (0.430) (0.765) 
FE5 0.0151 0.0140 0.0138 0.0121 0.0112 0.0115 0.0219 0.0220 0.0216 0.0193 0.0196 0.0195 
 
(0.021)** (0.036)** (0.034)** (0.023)** (0.037)** (0.037)** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** 
FE1 -0.0345 -0.0344 -0.0346 -0.0297 -0.0294 -0.0291 -0.0339 -0.0342 -0.0325 -0.0312 -0.0325 -0.0308 
 
(0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
Constant 0.0521 0.0534 0.0546 0.0342 0.0353 0.0358 0.0453 0.0454 0.0461 0.0247 0.0269 0.0258 
 
(0.151) (0.118) (0.113) (0.061)* (0.048)** (0.050)* (0.010)*** (0.006)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Controls  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2482 2482 2482 2482 2482 2482 2606 2606 2606 2606 2606 2606 
R-squared 0.081 0.081 0.081 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.091 0.092 0.090 0.082 0.084 0.081 
In Panel A, CAR (Et,Et+1) is the dependent variable for columns 1-3 and columns 7-9 whereas  CAR(2,75) is the dependent variable for columns 4-6 and columns 10-12.In Panel B, CAR (-
1,1) is the dependent variable for columns 1-3 and columns 7-9 whereas  CAR(0,1) is the dependent variable for columns 4-6 and columns 10-12. In both panels, columns 1-6 report the 
results for more local ownership subsample whereas columns 7-12 report the results for less local ownership subsample.I divide my sample into two based on median value of my local 
ownership index. If an observation's local ownership index value is greater (lower) than the median value of the index then it is included in more (less) local ownership subsample. Local 
ownership index is constructed based on firm size, institutional ownership, local income, local education and local senior citizen proportion.More details about the index are provided in the 
paper. Distance to Team City shows the distance to the sports mood source, which is distance to the location of a winning (losing) team competing in the big sports game. Definitions of Win 
and Loss are provided in the earlier tables. FE5 and FE1 variables and CARs are defined as they are defined in Table 1.2. This table controls for Size, B/M ratio, Log (1+ #of analyst), 
Reporting Lag, Earnings Volatility, Share Turnover, which are defined in Table 1.1. This table also includes controls of two-digit SIC, day of week, month, year indicator variables. Control 
variable are not shown for brevity. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, clustered by the day of announcement. Robust p-values are in parentheses (* significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). 
46 
 
 
1.8 REFERENCES 
 
Arkes, H., Herren, L., Isen, A., (1988). The role of potential loss in the influence of affect on 
risk-taking behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 42, 181–193. 
 
Agarwal, S., Duchin, R., Sosyura, D., (2012). In the mood for a loan: The causal effect of 
sentiment on credit origination. Working paper, National University of Singapore, University of 
Washington, and University of Michigan. 
Ashton, J., Gerrard, B., Hudson, R., (2003). Economic impact of national sporting success: 
Evidence from the London Stock Exchange. Applied Economic Letters 10, 783–785. 
 
Bagnoli, M., Clement, M. B., Watts, S. G., (2005). Around-the-clock media coverage and the 
timing of earnings announcements. Working paper, Purdue University. 
 
Baker, A. G., Mercier, P., Valleettourangeau, F., Frank, R., Pan, M., (1993). Selective 
associations and causality judgments—Presence of a strong causal factor may reduce judgements 
of a weaker one. Journal of Experimental Psychology—Learning, Memory and Cognition 19, 
414–432. 
 
Ball, R., Brown, P., (1968). An empirical evaluation of accounting income numbers. Journal of 
Accounting Research 6, 159–77. 
 
Barberis, N., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., (1998). A model of investor sentiment. Journal of 
Financial Economics 49, 307-343. 
 
Becker, B., Ivkovic, Z., Weisbenner, S., (2011). Local dividend clienteles. Journal of Finance 66, 
655–684. 
 
Beevers, C. G., Carver, C. S., (2003). Attentional bias and mood persistence as prospective 
predictors of dysphoria. Cognitive Therapy and Research 27, 619–637.  
 
Bernard, V. L., Thomas, J. K., (1989). Post-earnings-announcement drift: Delayed price response 
or risk Premium? Journal of Accounting Research 27, 1–36. 
 
Bernard, V. L., Thomas, J. K., (1990). Evidence that stock prices do not fully reflect the 
implications of current earnings for future earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 13, 
305-340. 
 
Bernile, G., Lyandres, E., (2011). Understanding investor sentiment: The case of soccer. 
Financial Management 40, 357–380. 
 
Berument, H., Yucel, E. M., (2005). Long live Fenerbahce: Production boosting effects of soccer 
in Turkey. Journal of Economic Psychology 26, 842–861. 
 
47 
 
Bodoh-Creed, A., (2012). Mood, memory, and the evaluation of asset prices. Working paper, 
Cornell University. 
 
Brennan, M. J., (1991). A perspective on accounting and stock prices. The Accounting Review 
66, 67–79. 
 
Brown, G. J., Hartzell, J.C., (2001). Market reaction to public information: The atypical case of 
the Boston Celtics. Journal of Financial Economics 60, 333-370. 
 
Brown, J. R., Ivkovic, Z., Smith, P. A., Weisbenner, S. (2008). Neighbors matter: Causal 
community effect and stock market participation. Journal of Finance 63 1509-1531. 
 
Busemeyer, J. R., Myung, I. J., McDaniel, M. A., (1993). Cue competition effects—Empirical 
tests of adaptive network learning models. Psychological Science 4, 190–195. 
 
Calvo, M. G., Lang, P. J., (2004). Gaze patterns when looking at emotional pictures: 
Motivationally biased attention. Motivation and Emotion 28, 221-243. 
 
Carroll, D., Ebrahim, S., Tilling, K., Macleod, J., Smith, G. D., (2002). Admissions for 
myocardial infarction and World Cup football: Database survey. British Medical Journal 325, 
1439–1442. 
 
Cavanagh, S. R., Urry, H. L., Shin, L. M., (2011). Mood-induced shifts in attentional bias to 
emotional information predict ill- and well-being. Emotion 11, 241-248. 
 
Clark, M. S., Isen, A. M., (1982). Toward understanding the relationship between feeling states 
and social behavior, in: A. H. Hastorf and A. M. Isen (eds.), Cognitive Social Psychology, 
Elsevier/North Holland, New York, pp. 73-108.. 
 
Coval, J. D., Moskowitz, T. J., (1999). Home bias at home: Local equity preference in Domestic 
Portfolios, Journal of Finance 54, 2045-2073. 
 
Coval, J. D.,  Moskowitz, T. J., (2001). The geography of investment: Informed trading and asset 
prices, Journal of Political Economy 109, 811–841. 
 
Daniel, K. D., Hirshleifer, D., Subrahmanyam, A., (1998). Overconfidence, arbitrage, and 
equilibrium asset pricing. Journal of Finance 56, 921-965. 
 
DellaVigna, S., Pollet, J. M., (2009). Investor inattention and Friday earnings announcements. 
Journal of Finance 64, 709–749. 
 
Edmans, A., Garcia, D., Norli, O., (2007). Sports sentiment and stock returns. Journal of Finance 
62, 1967–1998. 
 
Fama, E. F., (1998). Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance. Journal of 
Financial Economics 49, 283–306. 
48 
 
Fehle, F., Tsyplakov, S., Zdorovtsov, V., (2005). Can companies influence investor behavior 
through advertising? Super Bowl commercials and stock returns. European Financial 
Management 11, 625-648.  
 
Forgas, J. P., (1992). Affect in social perceptions: Research, evidence and an integrative model, 
in: W. Stroebeand and M. Hewstone (eds.), European Review of Social Psychology, Vol. 3. 
Wiley, New York, pp. 183-224. 
 
Foster, G., Olsen, C., Shevlin, T., (1984). Earnings  releases,  anomalies,  and  the  behavior  of 
security  returns. The Accounting Review 59, 574-603. 
 
Francis, J., Lafond, R., Olsson, P. M., Schipper, K., (2004). Accounting anomalies and 
information uncertainty. Working paper, Duke University. 
 
Francis, J., Pagach, D. Stephan, J., (1992). The stock market response to earnings 
announcements released during trading versus nontrading periods. Journal of Accounting 
Research 30, 165–184. 
 
Frazzini, A., (2006). The disposition effect and under-reaction to news. Journal of Finance 61, 
2017-2046.  
 
Gardner, M. P., (1985). Mood states and consumer behavior: A critical review. Journal of 
Consumer Research 12, 281-300. 
 
Griffin, D., Tversky, A., (1992). The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence. 
Cognitive Psychology 24, 411–435. 
 
Hatfield, E., Cacioppo, J.T., Rapson, R. L., (1993). Emotional Contagion. Current Directions in 
Psychological Science 2, 96-99. 
  
Hirshleifer, D., Lim, S. S., Teoh, S. H. (2009). Driven to distraction: Extraneous events and 
underreaction to earnings news. Journal of Finance 64, 2289-2325. 
 
Hirshleifer, D., Shumway, T., (2003). Good day sunshine: Stock returns and the weather. Journal 
of Finance 58, 1009–1032. 
 
Hirt, E. R., Erickson, G. A., Kennedy, C., Zillmann, D., (1992). Costs and benefits of allegiance: 
Changes in fans’ self-ascribed competencies after team victory versus defeat. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 63, 724–738. 
 
Hong, H., Kubik, J. D., Stein, J. C., (2006). Social interaction and Stock-market Participation. 
Journal of Finance 59, 137-163. 
 
Hong, H., Kubik, J. D., Stein, J. C., (2008). The only game in town: Stock-price consequences of 
local bias. Journal of Financial Economics 90, 20-37. 
 
49 
 
Hong, H., Stein, J. C., (1999). A unified theory of underreaction, momentum trading, and 
overreaction in asset markets. Journal of Finance 54, 2143-2184. 
 
Hou, K., Peng, L., Xiong, W., (2008). A tale of two anomalies: The implication of investor 
attention for price and earnings momentum. Working paper, Ohio State University and Princeton 
University. 
 
Ingram, R. E., Miranda, J., Segal, Z. V., (1998). Cognitive vulnerability to depression, Guilford, 
New York. 
 
Isen, A. M., (1984). Toward understanding the role of affect in cognition, in: R. S. Wyer Jr. and 
T. K. Srull (eds.), Handbook of Social Cognition, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, pp. 179-236. 
 
Ivkovic, Z., Weisbenner, S. J., (2005). Local does as local is: Information content of the 
geography of individual investors’ common stock investments. Journal of Finance 60, 267–306. 
 
Kahneman, D., (1973). Attention and Effort, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey. 
 
Kahneman, D., Tversky, A., (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk, 
Econometrica 47, 263–292. 
 
Kamstra, M. J., Kramer, L. A., and Levi, M. D., (2003). Winter blues: A SAD stock market 
cycle, American Economic Review 93, 324–343. 
 
Kelly, J. R., (2004). Mood and emotion in groups, in: M. B. Brewer and M. Hewstone (eds.), 
Emotion and motivation: Perspectives on social psychology, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, UK, 
pp. 164-181. 
 
Kim, C., Pantzalis, C., Park, J. C., (2012). Political geography and stock returns: The Value and 
risk Implications of proximity to political power. Journal of Financial Economics 106, 1196-228.  
 
Koster, E. H. W., De Raedt, R., Leyman, L., De Lissnyder, E.,  (2011). Mood-congruent 
Attention and Memory Bias in Dysphoria: Exploring the Coherence among Information-
Processing Biases, Behaviour Research and Therapy 48, 219-225.  
 
Kruschke, J. K., Johansen, M. K., (1999). A Model of Probabilistic Category Learning. Journal 
of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 25:1083–1119. 
 
Liang, L., (2003). Post-earnings announcement drift and market participants’ information 
processing biases. Review of Accounting Studies 8, 321–45. 
 
Livnat, J., Mendenhall, R. R., (2006). Comparing the post-earnings announcement drift for 
surprises calculated from analyst and time series forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 44, 
177–205. 
 
50 
 
Livnat, J., Petrovits, C., (2009). Investor sentiment, post earnings announcement drift, and 
accruals. Working paper, New York University. 
 
Mathews, A., Bundy, M., (1998). A Cognitive model of selective processing in anxiety. 
Cognitive Therapy and Research 22, 539-560. 
 
McIntosh, D. N., Druckman, D.,  Zajonc, R. B., (1994). Socially induced affect, in D. Druckman 
and R. A. Bjork (eds.), Learning, Remembering, Believing: Enhancing Human Performance, 
National Academy Press, Washington, DC, pp. 251-276. 
 
Narayanamoorthy, G., (2003). Conservatism and cross-sectional variation in the post-earnings-
announcement drift. Working paper, Yale School of Management. 
 
Neumann, R. Strack, F. (2000). Mood contagion: The automatic transfer of mood between 
persons. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 79, 211-23. 
 
Palomino, F., Renneboog, L., Zhang, C., (2009). Information Salience, Investor sentiment, and 
stock returns: The case of British soccer betting. Journal of Corporate Finance 15, 368-387. 
 
Pirinsky, C., Wang, Q., (2006). Does corporate headquarters location matter for stock returns. 
Journal of Finance 61, 1991-2015. 
 
Ronis, D. L., Lipinski, E. R., (1985) Value and uuncertainty as wweighting factor in impression 
formation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 21, 47-60. 
 
Saunders, E. M,. (1993). Stock prices and Wall Street weather. American Economic Review 83, 
1337–1345. 
 
Schwarz, N., Strack, F., Kommer, D., Wagner, D., (1987). Soccer, rooms, and the 
quality of your life: Mood effects on judgements of satisfaction with life in general and with 
specific domains. European Journal of Social Psychology 17, 69–79. 
 
Schweitzer, K., Zillmann, D., Weaver, J., and Luttrell, E., (1992). Perception of threatening 
events in the emotional aftermath of a televised college football game. Journal of Broadcasting 
and Electronic Media 36, 75–82. 
 
Simons, D. J., Chabris, C. F., (1999). Gorillas in my midst: Sustained in attentional blindness for 
dynamic events. Perception 28, 1059–1074. 
 
Sinclair, R. C., Mark, M. M., (1992). The influence of mood state on judgment and action, in: L. 
L. Martin and A. Tesser (eds.), The Construction of Social Judgments, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 
pp. 165-193. 
 
Singh, R., Teoh, J. B. P., (2000). Impression formation from intellectual and social traits: 
Evidence for behavioural adaptation and cognitive processing. British Journal of Social 
Psychology 39, 537–54. 
51 
 
Tversky, A., Kahneman, D., (1973). Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and 
probability. Cognitive Psychology 5, 207-232. 
 
Van der Pligt, J., Eiser, J. R., (1980). Negativity and descriptive extremity in impression 
formation. European Journal of Social Psychology 10, 415-419. 
 
Vonk, R., (1993). The negativity effect in trait ratings and in open-ended description of persons. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 19, 269-78. 
 
Vonk, R., (1996). Negativity and potency effects in impression formation. European Journal of 
Social Psychology 26, 851-865. 
 
Wann, D., Dolan, T., Mcgeorge, K., Allison, J., (1994). Relationships between spectator 
identification and spectators’ perceptions of influence, spectators’ emotions, and competition 
outcome. Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology 16, 347–364. 
 
Wann, D., Melnick, M., Russell, G., Pease, D., (2001). Sport Fans: The Psychologyand Social 
Impact of Spectators, Routledge, London. 
 
White, G., (1989). Media and violence: The case of professional football championship games. 
Aggressive Behavior 15, 423–433. 
 
Williams, J. M. G., Watts, F. N., MacLeod, C. M., Mathews, A., (1988). Cognitive psychology 
and emotional disorders, Wiley, Oxford, UK. 
 
Zhang, X. F., (2006). Information uncertainty and stock returns, Journal of Finance 61. 105-137. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.0 POST-EARNINGS ANNOUNCEMENT DRIFT AND RELIGIOUS HOLIDAYS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Finance theory suggests that investors use all available relevant information when they 
make decisions in financial markets wherein information is completely and timely incorporated 
into prices. However, the finance literature presents evidence which suggests that frictions in 
financial markets can prevent fully and timely incorporation of relevant information into stock 
prices. One mechanism causing such an effect is investor distraction. The investor distraction 
argument suggests that any factor that distracts investors and mitigates attention can delay the 
incorporation of firm news into stock prices. This view is supported by a recent body of research 
showing that limited attention has an impact on stock returns, effectively causing market 
underreaction to firm-related news.
28
  Recent studies also suggest that cultural attributes are 
important factors that affect economic outcomes, and “cultural-based explanations” can shed 
more light on some economic phenomena (see Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006) among 
others). Religion is one of the main factors that shape society’s culture and therefore it can be 
considered as a driver of the impact of culture on economic behavior. Similarly, recent studies 
show that religion has an influence on corporate decision making as well as on investment 
                                                          
28
 Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009) show that extraneous news, measured by same-day earnings announcements 
made by other firms, leads to an underreaction to firm-related news. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) find that market 
underreaction is associated with event occurrence on Fridays, which is consistent with greater likelihood of investor 
inattention. 
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behavior (Hilary and Hui (2009), Kumar et al. (2011), Grullon et al. (2010), and Golombick et al. 
(2011) among others).  In this paper, I examine the role of culture, proxied by religion, in 
explaining investors’ information processing.   
In particular, I examine whether and how the religious holiday calendar impacts 
investors’ information processing. I investigate price reactions to U.S. firms’ earnings 
announcements issued during the week before Easter, commonly known as Holy Week and, next 
to Christmas, the most important period in the Christian religious calendar.
29
 I hypothesize that 
when corporate earnings news is released during the Holy Week there will be delayed 
incorporation of information into stock prices due to investor inattention. Consistent with the 
view that religious activities occurring during Easter week distract investors, my findings show a 
stronger drift after earnings surprises released during Easter week. In addition, my empirical 
results show that local religious characteristics affect investors’ response to firm news. Investors’ 
response to earnings news released during Easter week is different for the areas with different 
religiosity and religious affiliations. Therefore, my paper also presents evidence on local 
component of investors (in)attention.   
Major religious holidays, like Easter, are a big part of religious tradition that is embraced 
by a large proportion of the population in the U.S, including both the more religious individuals 
who regularly attend church and those who may not be regular church attendees but choose to 
follow Christian traditions around major religious holidays like Christmas and Easter. In 
                                                          
29
 I use earnings announcements as my test environment because they are firm news that can occur on different 
calendar days. This helps to see how concurrent religious holiday periods change investors’ response to firm news. 
Post-earnings announcement drift is a major financial market anomaly that holds an important place in the literature 
for very long time (Ball and Brown (1968)). Investor inattention or limited investor attention provides an 
explanation for underreaction-related anomalies. My empirical findings lend support to the limited attention 
argument, and suggest that religious holiday sentiment-induced distraction makes investors not respond immediately 
to earnings announcements. 
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particular, I use the days prior to Easter Sunday as the setting for my investigation of the relation 
between religious holidays and investor inattention. I restrict my sample to earnings 
announcements issued few days prior to Good Friday and do not include those issued prior to 
Christmas, the other major Christian holiday. This is done for three reasons. First, by excluding 
earnings announcements prior to Christmas, I avoid the problem of potential contamination of 
post-earnings announcement drifts (PEADs) by the January effect.  Second, there are only a 
small number of firms that choose to issue earnings announcements just prior to Christmas. 
Third, since this paper is about distraction associated with religious holidays, I drop Christmas 
because it is far more than a religious holiday and has evolved into a commercialized tradition 
that transcends religion. I conjecture that Good Friday is a less commercialized and more pious 
holiday compared to Christmas, and therefore any findings I produce can more directly be 
associated to a religious effect. Note that my results also hold when I add the Christmas period 
observations to my test sample. The results of the tests that include both Good Friday and 
Christmas holiday observations can be provided upon a request. Also, please note that in this 
paper, I use the terms religious holiday, Easter holiday or holiday interchangeably. 
I posit that during Easter week it is common for people to partly shift their focus away from their 
daily routine and they get distracted. This conjecture is supported by evidence from various 
Gallup polls conducted over the years indicating significantly higher than normal religious 
participation rates around Easter, and an increased religious mood effect during Easter Week 
compared with other periods of a calendar year. Moreover, Easter can trigger distraction among 
investors because Good Friday is a day when schools and financial markets are closed 
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throughout the United States. Good Friday is also an official holiday in 11 states
30
 and thus, it is 
common for families to take a vacation during the Easter weekend or to plan family gatherings or 
visits with friends. Overall, there are some additional factors that lead to distraction in addition to 
a religion-induced distraction during Easter week. 
Furthermore, earnings announcements issued during the Holy Week provide a good 
setting to investigate a distraction effect because, by itself, Easter does not include any 
information content related to firm performance or stock prices. Therefore, it is not expected to 
find a link between Easter and investors’ reaction to firm news, earnings news in particular, 
unless Easter has some distraction effect on investors’ behavior.  
My empirical results support the argument that Easter is associated with investor 
inattention. In particular, I show a higher delayed response to earnings news (more post earnings 
announcement drift) when firms make announcements in the Holy Week days prior to Good 
Friday. Rational investors would be expected to incorporate earnings surprises into their 
decisions in a timely manner. However, my results indicate that religious holidays present a large 
enough distraction that prevents investors from processing earnings surprise news timely and 
completely. I find that, compared with other periods, firms’ earnings announcements issued 
during the Holy Week are associated with an additional post-earnings announcement drift 
(PEAD) up to 9.6% for negative earnings surprises and up to 3.7% for positive surprises. This 
PEAD effect is not just statistically significant but also economically important. This effect 
exists even after controlling for the potential travel or vacation effect associated with Easter 
week. I use two event windows in defining the announcements that occur just prior to Easter 
holiday—one goes back two days earlier and the other one goes back three days earlier from 
                                                          
30
 Good Friday is a state holiday in the following states: Connecticut, Texas, Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Tennessee, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, New Jersey, North Carolina and North Dakota. 
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Good Friday.  In general, all my empirical findings are stronger for the tests that use the event 
window which is closer to Good Friday and this suggests that the distraction effect becomes 
stronger as Easter Holiday time comes closer. This suggests that the stock price responses 
indicating a distraction effect is caused by Easter holiday.  Moreover, the finding showing that 
the PEAD effect is more pronounced for bad earnings news than for good earnings news is 
consistent with the view that investors’ positive mood associated with the upcoming Easter 
holiday. In particular, this finding is consistent with the notion that investors may become more 
(less) receptive to good (bad) news prior to Easter and this leads to a more delayed incorporation 
of bad news in stock prices due to distraction and less attention paid to negative news compared 
to good news. Moreover, my findings show that the religious holiday distraction effect is robust 
to the impact of possible distraction coming from vacation plans and high travel volume in 
religious holidays. In sum, my results are consistent with the arguments of Hou et al. (2008) who 
suggest that limited attention is induced by constraints in investor’s information processing 
rather than a behavioral bias and that inattention-driven underreaction weakens with investor 
attention.  
In addition to the potential investor distraction effect, religious holidays are associated 
with a good, positive, optimistic mood (see Beit-Hallahmi and Argyle (1997) and Białkowski, 
Etebari, and Wisniewski (2011)). These two effects can be consistent with the following two 
opposing scenarios. On one hand, if the higher positive mood around Easter makes investors 
more receptive to good news, it can lead to higher immediate reaction to good earnings news 
compared with bad earnings news and a correspondingly lower delayed response (PEAD) for 
good news compared with bad news. On the other hand, if the positive Easter mood results in a 
general tendency to anticipate good news, then investors would be less (more) surprised by good 
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(bad) earnings news compared with bad (good) earnings news, and therefore there would be a 
weaker (stronger) immediate reaction and stronger (weaker) delayed response to good (bad) 
earnings news.  
Conversely to both of the above scenarios’ predictions, this paper shows that both the 
immediate reaction and the delayed response (PEAD) to earnings announcements occurring prior 
to the Easter holiday are more pronounced for bad earnings news. Any of the two alternative 
scenarios stated above cannot explain this result completely. Therefore, I expand my 
examination by focusing on my sample based on different local religious adherence statistics in 
order to provide an explanation for this seemingly puzzling result and to shed more light on the 
investor sentiment and inattention that occur around Easter. By doing so is also consistent with 
the notion that local investors are disproportionally important in the pricing of nearby stocks (see 
Hong et al (2008), and Pirinski and Wang (2006) among others).
31
 
In particular, I start my expanded analysis by first studying whether my results change 
across subsamples of firms formed based on the degree of religiosity in the location where a firm 
is headquartered. Recent literature suggests that religion or religiosity can have an impact on 
corporate decisions and stock market outcomes (see Hillary and Hui (2009), Grullon, Kanatas 
and Weston (2010) and Bialkowski et al (2011) among others).
32
 I use the county level religious 
participation proportion for a firm’s headquarter county from the ARDA datasets in order to 
                                                          
31
 Hong et al. (2008) show that the firms in areas with low population and relatively few firms have higher stock 
prices due to “only-game-in-town’’ effect. Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) argue that local investors have access to 
better and more information about local firms, leading retail investors to display local bias. Pirinsky and Wang 
(2006) show that firms that have headquarters in the same geographic location have a strong degree of comovement 
of stock prices. 
 
32
 Hilary and Hui (2009) find that firms headquartered in more religious areas have lower degrees of risk exposure. 
Bialkowski et al. (2011) study investor sentiment and show higher stock returns during Ramadan in Muslim 
countries. Grullon et al. (2010) suggest that religiosity is negatively related to corporate unethical behavior. 
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measure religiosity. The rationale for this investigation is that the degree of religiosity is a driver 
of the investor distraction effect induced by religious holidays.  
My findings show that firms located in less religious counties display a higher drift after 
earnings announced during the Easter week than firms located in more religious counties. In 
addition, less religious areas show greater immediate responsiveness to good earnings news 
relative to bad earnings news, thereby giving rise to a higher delayed response to bad news. On 
the other hand, more religious areas are slightly more responsive to bad earnings news around 
the earnings announcement date and thereafter show a delayed response to good earnings news, 
albeit a weaker one than that of the firms located in less religious areas after bad news. In 
particular, the PEAD following bad earnings news announced during Easter holidays is up to              
-17.5% for firms in less religious areas. This suggests a significant effect in both statistical and 
economic terms. On the other hand, firms in more religious areas experience a PEAD after good 
news that is about 2.8%. The lower PEAD effect in more religious areas supports the argument 
that the distraction effect of religious holidays is less pronounced among people that attend 
church regularly. Religion and religious participation play a bigger role in people’s lives in more 
religious areas and form a significant part of people’s habits and daily routines in those areas. 
Thus Easter does not bring major changes to daily life in those areas and is not a significant 
distraction. In contrast, religious holidays can be more distracting in less religious areas because 
religion, religious participation, and planning for vacation and/or family gatherings, which play a 
smaller role in the daily routine in other times, can take a prominent role during the Easter week.  
This paper also investigates the way local religious affiliation (Protestant vs. Catholic) 
affects investor inattention induced by religious holidays. Recent literature shows that the impact 
of religion on investment and corporate decisions can vary across different religious affiliation 
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groups.
33
 Golombick, Kumar and Prawada (2011) suggest that religious affiliation can explain 
some of the differences in stock preferences of mutual fund managers. Grullon et al. (2010) 
suggest differences in corporate misbehavior can be traced back to religiosity and religious 
affiliation.  Furthermore, Grullon et al. (2010) also suggest that different religious affiliations 
“experience different utilities” “despite taking identical actions”. They suggest that different 
religious affiliations lead to different approaches to corporate issues coming from 
Protestantism’s emphasis on pride in moral behavior whereas the emphasis of Catholicism is on 
guilt about immoral behavior. Similarly, I conjecture that religious affiliation can affect the 
observation and experience of major religious holidays, like the Holy Week, and lead to 
differences in attention across communities dominated by Catholics or Protestants during the 
week of Easter. Overall, my empirical results are in line with recent studies and suggest that 
there are differences in investor inattention between predominantly Catholic and areas 
predominantly Protestant areas. This study shows that the PEAD effect coming from the investor 
distraction induced by Easter holidays is more (less) pronounced for the firms located in areas 
with a larger proportion of Protestants (Catholics). Moreover, the analysis of the combined effect 
of local religiosity and religious affiliation suggests an important impact on the distraction effect. 
The holiday PEAD effect after bad earnings news is the highest for firms located in less religious 
and predominantly Protestant areas, consistent with my previous findings based on local 
                                                          
33
 Golombick et al. (2011) analyzes the impact of religious inclinations on institutional investor behavior and show 
that Catholic managers have more preference for MSCI US Catholic Values Index stocks than Protestant managers. 
They suggest “that managers consider religious convictions when investing but these convictions are not sacrificed 
for financial performance as per Bollen’s (2007) conditional utility hypothesis. That there develops an overall tilting 
of portfolios towards stocks aligned with a fund manager‘s religious convictions is consistent with the idea that SR 
investors are rational in that, while attaching value to the SR attribute of an asset, they put its financial performance 
first”. Hilary and Hui (2009) find that the importance of religiousness in corporate decision making can be differ 
based on religious composition and the effect is more consistent for the firms in areas with a large proportion of 
Protestants compared to the areas with a large proportion of Catholics.  
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religiosity and religious affiliation. This negative drift is the strongest, up to -25.12%, among 
firms that announce earnings just prior to Good Friday.  
My results are robust to geographic effects. Specifically, I examine whether geographic 
factors that are associated with my religion-based cultural characteristics measures may be the 
drivers of the observed differences in investor inattention during religious holidays. My findings 
suggesting this is not the case.
34
 My empirical results are also consistent with the local bias 
argument that stock prices include a sizeable local component.  Religious characteristics of local 
investors, who show a disproportionate preference for local stocks, are correlated with the degree 
of inattention around Easter and give rise to a delayed reaction to local stocks earnings news.  
My results are also not affected by the Friday PEAD effect (DellaVigna and Pollet (2009)) or the 
busy earnings announcement day effect (Hirshleifer et al. (2009)). 
This paper shows the importance of culture, proxied by religion, to explain investors’ 
information processing and the impact of culture on the outcomes of financial decisions through 
investor inattention. In particular, this paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. 
First, this study supports the notion that religious holidays can distract investors and lead to 
delayed incorporation of firm information into security prices. Second, I highlight the local 
component of the investor inattention effect. Specifically, I find that local religious 
characteristics (religious participation rate and affiliation) of firms that make earnings 
announcements during Easter holiday period affect the extent of investor distraction. Thus, my 
                                                          
34
 My results are retained after excluding firms located in big metropolitan areas, therefore, I can conclude that the 
investor distraction induced by Easter holiday periods does not come from a big metropolitan area effect. I also 
examine the impact of Easter on investor distraction across different geographic regions. I show that the results 
based on geographic regions are in harmony with those based on groups formed after sorting on religiosity and 
religious affiliation. 
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paper also presents new evidence that unfolds the religious characteristics of the local component 
of stock prices.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides additional 
background information and presents a short summary of previous studies. Section 3 includes a 
description of the data and the sample selection method used in this paper. Section 4 discusses 
univariate statistics. It also reports the univariate statistics for religiosity and religious affiliation 
subsamples. Section 5 provides the empirical results of multivariate tests for full sample 
regressions. Section 6 shows the empirical results of multivariate tests for subsample analyses. 
Section 7 presents the results of additional tests. Section 8 provides a conclusion. 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) describe PEAD as “the tendency for a stock’s cumulative 
abnormal returns to drift in the direction of an earnings surprise for several weeks following an 
earnings announcement”.  Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) report that “Brennan [1991, p. 70] calls 
it a “most severe challenge to financial theorists,” and Fama [1998, p. 286] refers to it as “the 
granddaddy of all underreaction events.” The literature has provided many alternative 
explanations for the PEAD phenomenon, such as a) investors making wrong assumptions about 
the properties of earnings (Bernard and Thomas (1990) and Barberis,Shleifer and Vishny 
(1998)), b) information uncertainty (Zhang (2006)), c) cognitive limits (Hong and Stein (1999)), 
d) overconfidence (Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998)), e) disposition effect 
(Frazzini (2006)), and f) limited attention (Hirshleifer et al. (2009), DellaVigna and Pollet 
(2009)). 
Hirshleifer et al. (2009) presents a summary of the behavioral and psychological 
literature on limited attention. The main argument in that literature suggests that people have 
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limited abilities to process information, and exposure to information over their capacity can lead 
to distraction effects. Simons and Chabris (1999) find that selective attention can make people to 
neglect apparent visuals in psychological experiments. Griffin and Tversky (1992) suggest that 
people can underreact to events that happen periodically whereas they overreact to ongoing 
events with consistent results.  Hirshleifer et al. (2009) report that Baker et al. (1993), 
Busemeyer, Myung, and McDaniel (1993), and Kruschke and Johansen (1999)) suggest that 
people process related information less in experiments when they are exposed to irrelevant 
information.  Therefore, the psychological literature implies that limited information processing 
capacity can lead to distraction and incomplete information processing. 
This paper is also related to the growing body of literature that shows the different 
impacts of religion and religious characteristics on stock market outcomes and corporate 
decisions. Hilary and Hui (2009) suggest that religion affects corporate culture and corporate 
decisions in the U.S. Hilary and Hui (2009) find that local religiosity affects corporate risk taking 
behavior.  Grullon et al. (2010) show that religiosity is negatively related to corporate unethical 
behavior. Grullon et al. (2010) also suggest that different religious affiliations lead to different 
approaches to corporate issues. They suggest that this result can be attributed to differences in 
perception of the same issue for different religious affiliations. For example, Grullon et al. 
(2010) report that Protestantism puts emphasis on pride in moral behavior while Catholicism 
puts emphasis on guilt in immoral behavior. McGuire et al. (2012) suggest that firms located in 
religious areas are less likely to have financial reporting irregularities.  Golombick et al. (2011) 
argue that although Catholic mutual fund managers have a higher preference for the stocks 
aligned with the Catholic Values Index, they still prioritize financial characteristics over 
religious affiliation in their stock trades.  
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Another strand of the literature that is related to this paper is looking at the financial 
markets around holidays. Lakonishok and Smidt (1988), and Ariel (1990) show higher stock 
returns prior to holidays. Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2004) report lower trading volume in the 
US market during Jewish holidays. They also report lower stock returns for Yom Kippur and 
higher stock returns for Rosh Hashnah.  Similarly, Jacobs and Weber (2011) show that firms 
located in  different regions of Germany that have regional holidays have lower trading volume 
compared to firms located in other regions in Germany. They suggest that the lower trading 
effect they show can be attributed to the distraction effect. Bialkowski et al. (2011) find that 
stock returns are higher and less volatile during Ramadan for the stock markets in some Muslim 
countries. They suggest that their results are coming from the mood and happiness generated by 
a religious sentiment.  This paper also suggests that religious holidays create an investor 
sentiment as well as investor distraction. 
My results suggest that local characteristics impact investors’ attention which implies that 
local bias is related to the distraction effect (the PEAD effect). Therefore, my study builds on the 
recent literature on local bias. In this literature, Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) suggest that local 
investors have an access to better and more information about local firms, leading retail investors 
to display local bias. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) present evidence of local bias in professional 
managers. Pirinsky and Wang (2006) suggest that firms that have headquarters in the same 
geographic location show a strong degree of comovement of stock prices. Hong et al. (2008) find 
that that the local bias effect is higher for the areas with relatively few firms per capita.  My 
subsample analyses indicate that the religious holiday PEAD effect differs based on local 
characteristics such as local religious participation rate and religious affiliation.   
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2.3 DATA AND SAMPLE SELECTION 
My sample includes earnings announcements issued a few days just prior to Good Friday 
in the period from 1989 to 2006. In the Western Christian calendar Easter always falls on a 
Sunday between March 22 and April 25, inclusively. The following day, Easter Monday, is a 
legal holiday in many countries with predominantly Christian traditions, but not in the U.S. In the 
US, almost all retail stores, shopping malls and even some restaurants are closed on Easter 
Sunday. Good Friday, is a holiday in 11 states. Moreover, the vast majority of private businesses, 
public schools as well as financial markets are closed on Good Friday.  
I use the pre-holiday event windows (-2,0) and (-3,0), where 0 represents Good Friday.
35
 
I use the COMPUSTAT, CRSP, and I/B/E/S databases to determine earnings announcements and 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) before and after earnings announcements. I follow a 
methodology in line with Livnat and Mendenhall (2006). I first require that earnings 
announcement date and stock price information are not missing in COMPUSTAT. I also require 
that firm size for the corresponding quarter end is larger than $5 million. I match I/B/E/S 
forecasts and COMPUSTAT earnings data, and use the primary earnings definition from I/B/E/S. 
I use stock-split adjusted quarterly earnings and forecasts to calculate the earnings surprise 
(FEiq). I follow the prior literature and use forecast error to measure earnings surprise as 
FEiq=(Eiq-Fiq)/Piq . FEiq is calculated by subtracting analyst expectations from actual earnings 
and then normalized by the price per share at the end of the quarter obtained from COMPUSTAT. 
I use the median of forecasts reported to I/B/E/S in the 90 days prior to the earnings 
announcement as a measure of analysts’ expectations. I calculate cumulative abnormal returns by 
using the CRSP database following Livnat and Mendenhall (2006), who define CAR (Et,Et+1) as 
                                                          
35
 I use websites such as http://www.opm.gov/operating_status_schedules/  or, http://www.timeanddate.com/ 
calendar/ to determine the Good Friday dates for the sample years. 
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“cumulative abnormal return for the period from two days after the current earnings 
announcement to one day after the next earnings announcement”. CAR (Et,Et+1)  is the 
cumulative abnormal return between current earnings announcement and the next one, and it is 
“the difference between the firm’s daily return from CRSP and the daily return on the portfolio 
of firms with the same size (the market value of equity from June) and book-to-market (B/M) 
ratio (from the prior December)” as Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) describe.  CAR (2,61) ,    
CAR(-1, 1), and CAR(0, 1) are defined in similar fashion for the trading days’ windows of 
(+2,+61),   (-1,+1), and (0,+1) respectively
36
. The sample includes stocks that are traded in 
NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. Previous studies have shown that religious inclinations have an 
impact on institutional investor behavior ((Golombick et al. (2011)). Therefore, in my analysis of 
religious holiday distraction effect on PEAD I control for institutional holdings, extracted from 
13F filings. The earnings announcement sample around Easter holidays is subsequently matched 
with firm location data, which I obtain from COMPUSTAT and correct for headquarter changes 
using information from Compact Disclosure. After matching with firm location data, I have 
93,704 earnings announcements of firms with headquarter zip code and location information for 
the years 1989 to 2006. Next, I exclude firm earnings announcement observations with 
corresponding quarter ending stock price less than $5.
37
 By doing so, I exclude the observations 
of firms whose stock is traded infrequently. There are also some observations with missing 
institutional holdings information. After considering these observations, my final sample is 
further reduced to 58,241 firm-quarter observations. 
                                                          
36
 In cumulative abnormal return (CAR) definition, day 0 is the day of the earnings announcement. 
37
 The tests that include the stocks with quarter ending price less than $5 give results similar to the test results that I 
report in the following sections. These results can be provided to the reader upon request. 
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My sample also contains local religiosity and religious affiliation variables, constructed 
using information from the Association of Religion Data Archives (ARDA) Religious 
Congregations and Membership Study (2000) dataset. As the ARDA website reports, this dataset 
is completed by the Association of Statisticians of American Religious Bodies (ASARB), and  
shows religious adherence statistics for “149 Christian denominations, associations, or 
communions (including Latter-day Saints and Unitarian/Universalist groups); two independent 
Christian churches; Jewish and Islamic totals; and counts of temples for six Eastern religions”38. 
This dataset has two advantages over the earlier versions of the ARDA dataset used in previous 
studies. First, it is updated, and it includes statistics for more religious bodies. Second, it also 
includes the adjusted rates of adherence (Finke and Scheitle (2005)) at the county level that 
accounts for uncounted religious groups and adjusting for undercounted minority groups.
39
 
My main dependent variables that capture PEAD in the delayed response tests are      
CAR (Et, Et+1) and CAR (2, 61). The reason I use both in my tests is that none of the two 
measures is clearly superior, but each of the two has advantages as well as shortcomings. The 
advantage of CAR (2, 61) is that it uses the standardized length of two months for the drift 
period. However, it does not accurately capture the exact period between successive earnings 
announcements. On the other hand, CAR (Et, Et+1) correctly captures the length of the period 
between earnings announcements, but its shortcoming is the fact that the latter period of the 
window can include some of the anticipated or actual short term reaction to the next earnings 
announcement. My dependent variables in the immediate reaction regressions are CAR (-1, 1)  
and CAR(0, 1). I winsorize CAR variables at 1% level to mitigate the effects of outliers.  
                                                          
38
 http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/RCMSCY.asp 
39
 The use of raw and unadjusted rate may lead to differences in adherence rates. Finke and Scheitle (2005) state that 
“after accounting for the uncounted, (they) estimated that the national adherence rate is 63 percent rather than the 50 
percent estimated by using the RCMS data alone”. 
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Following past studies (e.g. Hirshleifer (2009)), my tests also control for other factors 
that could be associated with the market’s reaction to earnings news, such as firm size, book-to-
market ratio, earnings volatility, reporting lag, share turnover, earnings persistence and 
institutional ownership. Earnings volatility is measured as the standard deviation of prior four 
year quarterly earnings from the earnings one year ago. I require a minimum of four split-
adjusted quarterly earnings to calculate this variable. Share turnover is the average monthly 
trading volume normalized by the average number of share outstanding for the one year period 
that ends at the end of corresponding fiscal quarter. Reporting lag is the number of days between 
the quarter end and earnings announcement day.  Log(1+# of analysts) is logarithm of the 
number of analysts that follows the firm during the corresponding quarter. Earnings Persistence 
is the “stock split-adjusted first-order autocorrelation coefficient of earnings per share for the 
past 4 years”40. I require at least four observations to form this variable. Institutional ownership 
is the percentage of shares that institutions hold for the corresponding fiscal quarter. I also use 
day of the week, month, year, and two-digit SIC industry indicator variables in my regression 
models. 
2.4 UNIVARIATE STATISTICS 
2.3.1 Summary Statistics 
Panel A of Table 2.1 shows descriptive statistics for my sample firms. Briefly, my 
summary statistics are similar to those reported in earlier PEAD studies. For example, the 
average firm in the sample has a market valuation of a bit less than $3.4 billion (a skewed 
measure, since the median value is just over half a billion dollars), a book-to-market ratio of 
0.53, a share turnover of 9.8%, institutional ownership of 56% and is followed by about four 
                                                          
40
 See Hirsheleifer et al. (2009). 
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security analysts. Panel B of Table 2.1 shows the mean values and number of observations for 
the immediate reaction (CAR (-1, 1) and CAR(0, 1)) and post-earnings announcement drift                
(CAR (Et, Et+1) and CAR (2, 61)) variables. This information is provided for the full sample, i.e. 
for all earnings announcements made during my study period and for the subsamples of earnings 
announcements issued in the (-2,0) and (-3,0) windows prior to Good Fridays (t=0). For the 
sample that includes all earnings announcements, the average value of the immediate reaction to 
earnings announcements is 0.23% in terms of CAR (-1, 1) and 0.12% in terms of CAR (0, 1). On 
the other hand, the immediate reaction for the firms that announce earnings around religious 
holidays is between 0.35% and 0.77% in terms of CAR (-1, 1) and between 0.26% and 0.46% in 
terms of  CAR (0, 1). This result is consistent with previous studies (e.g., see Lakonishok and 
Smidt (1988), and Ariel (1990)) which show higher stock returns prior to religious holidays. The 
average delayed response to earnings announcements for my full sample is -0.91% in terms of 
CAR (Et, Et+1) and -0.89% in terms of CAR (2, 61). On the other hand, delayed response to 
earnings news for firms that announce around religious holidays varies between -0.82% and        
-1.65% in terms of CAR (Et, Et+1)   and -0.71% and -1.48% in terms of CAR (2, 61).  
2.4.2 Stock Response for Easter Week Announcements:   
Next, in Table 2.2, I report univariate statistics of PEAD (Post-Earnings Announcement 
Drift) and immediate reaction to bad and good earnings surprises that occur in the (-2,0) and (-
3,0) windows prior to Good Friday. After ranking announcements on earnings surprise, I define 
the lowest quintile (FE=1) as bad earnings news and the top earnings surprise quintile as good 
earnings news (FE=5). I also report PEAD and immediate market reaction for different 
religiosity and religious affiliation subsamples of firms experiencing good and bad earnings news 
before Easter. Panel A utilizes the sample of firms that issued earnings announcements before 
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the Easter holiday and shows the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for different event 
windows and good/bad earnings surprise quintiles. Firms in the lowest earnings surprise quintile 
(FE=1) display statistically significant immediate reaction which averages between -2.21 % and    
-2.7%. They also have statistically significant PEAD, ranging on average between -7.35% and       
-9.18%. The firms that are in the highest earnings surprise quintile (FE=5) show a sizeable and 
statistically significant average immediate reaction ranging between 3.65% and 4.27%. They also 
have statistically significant PEAD, on average between 4.69% and 5.82%. Overall, the findings 
in Panel A show a greater immediate reaction to positive earnings news compared to negative 
earnings news and a more pronounced delayed response to bad earnings news compared to good 
earnings news. This result is in line with the argument that there is a good, positive mood prior to 
the Easter holiday, which may contribute to investors’ inattention, i.e. focusing away from 
concurrent firm news, especially bad news. In sum, the univariate statistics in Panel A support 
the argument that investors are distracted by Easter holidays and underreact to firm news. 
Next, I further explore whether the short term and delayed reaction to extreme earnings 
news varies across groups of firms sorted on religious demographic characteristics of the area the 
firm’s headquarters is located in. Panel B displays average PEAD and immediate market reaction 
for subsamples of firms formed after sorting on the degree of religiosity in the county where the 
firm’s headquarters is located. Religiosity is measured by the adjusted religious adherence (Finke 
and Scheitle (2005)) extracted from the ARDA database. I define firms in the highest (lowest) 
religiosity tercile of my sample as firms located in more (less) religious areas. Note that my 
sample’s mean and median adherence is 65%, much in line with the national adherence rate in 
Finke and Scheitle (2005). Panel B, reports, on average, a weaker immediate reaction and a 
stronger PEAD after bad earnings news issued by firms located in less religious areas. In 
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addition, on average, there is a slightly stronger immediate reaction and stronger PEAD after 
good earnings news about firms in less religious areas compared to firms in more religious areas.  
Overall, the immediate reaction to good news is significant and similar for both religiosity 
subsamples whereas the immediate reaction to bad earnings news is only pronounced for more 
religious areas. The delayed response effect is more pronounced after both good earnings news 
and bad earnings news for firms from less religious areas, and the strongest PEAD effect is after 
bad earnings news in less religious areas.  This result is consistent with the view that Easter 
causes a greater distraction effect among investors that live in less religious areas, because 
religious participation or religion in general, is not a big part of their daily life during other times 
of a calendar year.   
Panel C, shows average values of immediate and delayed response across subsamples 
formed based on religious affiliation. Following Kumar (2009) and Kumar et al. (2011), I 
construct a variable called Catholic-Protestant ratio (CPRATIO) and use it to classify firms into 
those that are headquartered in primarily Catholic versus primarily Protestant areas. County 
Catholic and Protestant rates are extracted from the ARDA dataset. Mean and median values of 
CPRATIO for my sample are 2.32 and 1.82 respectively.  Recent literature suggests that there 
can be differences between religious affiliations in terms of perceptions and approaches for same 
issues (Grullon et al. (2010) among others). I use the following rule to define religious affiliation 
subsamples: if a county has a CPRATIO greater than or equal to 1.2 then I define this area as 
predominantly Catholic area and if a county has a CPRATIO less than or equal to 0.83  then I 
define this area as predominantly Protestant area. In other words, if a given firm is located in a 
county that has at least 20% of or more Catholic (Protestant) population than Protestant 
(Catholic), then I define the firm’s location as predominantly Catholic (Protestant) area.  The 
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immediate response to negative earnings news is similar in both predominantly Catholic and 
Protestant areas whereas the immediate reaction to positive earnings news shows greater 
magnitude for the firms in predominantly Protestant areas. On the other hand, the firms from 
more Catholic areas show statistically significant and strong PEAD after both good earnings 
news and bad earnings news whereas the firms from predominantly Protestant areas display 
statistically significant PEAD only after bad earnings news. However, the magnitude of the 
delayed reaction among firms located in primarily Protestant areas is much stronger than the 
corresponding reaction among firms in primarily Catholic areas. PEAD following bad earnings 
in predominantly Protestant areas can go up to -16.37%. In sum, firms located in Protestant areas 
underreact, on average, more (less) to bad (good) earning news. This result is consisted with the 
fundamental differences in the ethical systems in Catholicism and Protestantism (see, Harrison 
(1985), and also mentioned in Grullon et al. (2010)); Catholics seem to be more inclined to 
emphasize guilt for doing the wrong thing, whereas Protestants emphasize pride for doing the 
right thing.  In general, Panel C suggests that PEAD, especially the one following negative 
earnings surprises just prior to Easter, can be emanating from higher distraction due to the 
relatively greater (lesser) attention paid to positive (negative) news in predominantly Protestant 
areas. 
2.5 MULTIVARIATE TESTS 
2.5.1 Full Sample Regressions 
In this section, I further explore the investor distraction hypothesis in a multivariate 
setting that helps to control for various other factors. In my multivariate regression models, I use, 
alternatively, CAR (Et, Et+1) and CAR (2, 61) as the dependent variable that measures delayed 
response (PEAD) to earnings announcements. I also use, alternatively, CAR (-1, 1) and CAR (0, 
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1) as the dependent variable that measures immediate reaction to earnings announcements. My 
regression models for the full sample regressions are as in the following equation model: 
 
CAR=β0+ β1EasterHoliday+ β2 EasterHoliday*FE5+ β3FE5+ β4 EasterHoliday*FE1      
           + β5FE1+Controls                                                                      (1) 
 
In the equation above, EasterHoliday represents a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if an earnings announcement occurs within the (-2,0) or (-3,0) event windows (in which “0” 
represents the date of Good Friday) and the value of zero otherwise. FE5 is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of one if the earnings surprise is in the highest surprise quintile (FE=5) and 
the value of zero otherwise. FE1 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if earnings 
surprise is in the lowest surprise quintile (FE=1) and the value of zero otherwise. Note that FE is 
the rank (1 to 5) of earnings surprise for the corresponding fiscal quarter. In model (1), there are 
also interactions of FE5 and FE1 with EasterHoliday. These interaction variables are the 
variables of interest in my tests. Consistent with previous studies, my regressions  also control 
for size, book-to-market, number of analysts that follow the firm, reporting lag, earnings 
volatility, share turnover, earnings persistence, institutional investor ownership, as well as 
dummies for firm industry, day of week, month and year. Following DellaVigna and Pollet 
(2009) and Hirshleifer et al. (2009), I adjust standard errors for heteroskedasticity and cluster 
them by earnings announcement day. For the sake of brevity, in all of the following tables, I 
report the coefficients for the earnings surprise variables, the Easter holiday variable and their 
interactions and do not report coefficients for the control variables. 
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Table 2.3 shows the result of regression model (1) estimated using the full sample. The 
dependent variables in Panel A are the drift variables, CAR (Et, Et+1) and CAR (2, 61), whereas 
the dependent variables in Panel B are the immediate reaction variables, CAR (-1, 1) and       
CAR (0, 1). In each panel, there are four regression results for different CAR and EasterHoliday 
event window definitions. 
Consistent with my univarite results, Panel A of Table 2.3 shows that the coefficients of 
EasterHoliday*FE5 and EasterHoliday*FE1 are positive and negative respectively, and almost 
always statistically significant. The magnitude of the EasterHoliday*FE1 coefficient ranges 
from -7.09% to -9.63%. This implies that bad earnings news made public during the Easter week 
are followed by up to 9.6% additional drift (PEAD). The coefficient of EasterHoliday*FE5 is 
statistically significant in three out of four models and takes values between 2.95% and 3.74. 
This result implies that good earnings news during Easter week are followed by 2.9% to 3.7% 
more PEAD.  
The immediate reaction results shown in Panel B are also consistent with my univarite 
results, and the interaction variable coefficients have the expected signs. EasterHoliday*FE1 is 
statistically significant for all CAR (-1, 1) results. EasterHoliday*FE5 is only statistically 
significant in one out of four models. Moreover, a comparison of the interaction terms’ 
coefficients reveals that the immediate reaction to bad firm news is more pronounced than the 
reaction to good earnings news.    
Taken together, the immediate reaction and delayed response (PEAD) results for the full 
sample tests indicate an underreaction to earnings news, especially bad earnings news. However, 
the source of this effect is not easy to decipher from the patterns shown in Panels A and B.  
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There are two possible scenarios for a distraction-driven underreaction effect to exist. 
Both can be developed after I start from the assumption that during a major religious holiday like 
Easter, people will –on average – experience positive mood over and above of the impact of 
holidays on their attention. One view suggests that if there is positive mood, the average investor 
will be more receptive to good news and therefore there will be a higher (lower) immediate 
reaction to good (bad) firm news and later a lower (higher) delayed response to good (bad) news. 
The alternative view suggests that if people are already in a good mood, they also expect to 
experience mostly good news during Easter week. Thus there would be a weak (strong) 
immediate reaction good (bad) news and strong (weak) delayed response for good (bad) firm 
news. Since my results from Panels A and B indicate that both the immediate and the delayed 
reaction is more pronounced for bad earnings, they collectively constitute a puzzle because they 
do not fit any of the two alternative views above. It is possible though, that a clearer story can 
emerge if I inject different cultural/religious characteristics like religiosity and religious 
affiliations into my analysis. This may help to shed more light on the impact of holidays on 
investors’ information processing. In the next sections, I turn my attention to the impact of these 
factors on investors’ information processing. 
2.5.2 Analysis of Vacation/Travel Effect 
Before implementing further detailed analysis aimed at reconciling the puzzling pattern 
that emerges from the immediate and delayed response results in Table 2.3, I test whether these 
results are indeed induced by religious holidays or whether they could be attributed to a more 
general effect stemming from vacation and/or travel plans associated with this holiday. In 
particular, since the extended weekends of Easter Holidays provide a good opportunity for taking 
vacation, it is possible that the pronounced delayed response to earnings news released during 
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Easter Holidays comes from the distraction associated with vacation plans and travel that occurs 
in the extended weekend of Easter week, rather than the religious holiday induced-distraction. In 
order to test the validity of this argument, I include vacation and travel variables in my model 
and examine whether their explanatory power subsumes that of my religion variable.  
One would argue that the findings that I show in my earlier findings are driven by the 
distraction effect induced by family vacations that occur during Easter week. If this is true then 
one would observe the same effect for other holidays, such as Thanksgiving, that have a vacation 
effect Thanksgiving is an important national holiday which includes some cultural and religious 
factors. Therefore, holidays like Thanksgiving, along with other national holidays with a 
vacation effect, can be included in stock response tests. Doing so can help to see whether a 
vacation or travel induced distraction effect is behind my findings or a religion induced 
distraction effect is the main driver of my findings.  
In order to examine the role of vacation/travel effect, I, first, add a dummy variable called 
VacationHoliday, that takes the value of one if an earnings announcement occurs around 
Thanksgiving, 4
th
 of July, or Memorial Day. 
41
 I also include the interaction terms between 
VacationHoliday and firm news indicator variables, VacationHoliday*FE5 and 
VacationHoliday*FE1. Later, I look at my tests after controlling vacation holiday effect.  Table 
2.4 shows that the delayed response and immediate reaction results are very similar to those 
shown Table 2.3. The results for EasterHoliday*FE5 and EasterHoliday*FE1 still holds for both 
delayed response and immediate reaction. For example, EasterHoliday*FE1 is about -7% to -9% 
for PEAD regressions, and all the coefficients for the Easter holiday interaction variables are 
                                                          
41
 Correspondingly, I use the [-2,0] or [-3,0]  windows for these earnings announcements, where 0 is the day of the 
holiday.  
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very similar to those reported in Table 2.3. The immediate reaction and delayed response 
(PEAD) results indicate an underreaction to earnings news, especially bad earnings news, when 
earnings news is released during Easter Holiday. However, there is very little impact of vacation 
holidays on immediate reactions and delayed responses. The only significant coefficient is  
VacationHoliday*FE1 in column 1 of Panel A, and it suggests a negative 3.46% drift for bad 
earnings news announced during vacation holidays. The magnitude of this effect is less than the 
magnitude for EasterHoliday*FE1 in the same model. Overall, the results suggest that vacation 
holidays are not responsible for the religious holiday effect, which persists after controlling for 
vacation holidays. 
Next, I examine whether travel mood induced distraction impact my results or not by 
employing a travel volume proxy. I investigate whether travel plans associated with typical 
extended weekends around major holidays affect investor response to firm news. I proxy travel 
effects by a variable called AirPassengerVol, the U.S. monthly air passenger volume from the 
Bureau of Transport Statistics. The data of air passenger volume is available after 1996
42
. I add 
AirPassengerVol and its interactions with earnings news, AirPassengerVol*FE5 and 
AirPassengerVol*FE1, Later, in a regression model similar to model (1) with the air travel 
volume (proxied by AirPassengerVol) effects and show results in Table 2.5. 
My main results still hold after accounting for the effects of travel volume proxied by 
monthly air passenger volume. The coefficients of Easter holidays effects have a pattern very 
similar to the one in Table 2.3, suggesting that the immediate reaction and delayed response 
results display an underreaction to earnings news (especially bad news) released during Easter 
                                                          
42
 The data is available at https://www.bts.gov/xml/air_traffic/src/index.xml#CustomizeTable . The data shows 
domestic revenue passenger enplanements (in thousands) after 1996. Revenue passenger enplanements are used as a 
measure of the total number of passengers boarding aircraft.  
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holiday after controlling for the distraction induced by high travel volume. Furthermore, calendar 
times with higher travel volumes do not have the same high impact on investor reaction to firm 
news as religious holidays do. Overall, the evidence in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 shows that the 
religious holiday distraction effect is robust to the impact of possible distraction coming from 
vacation plans and high travel volume in religious holidays.  
2.6 SUBSAMPLE TESTS: LOCAL RELIGIOSITY AND AFFILIATION 
In this section, and after having shown that my results are not driven by the impact of 
vacation or travel around the Easter holiday, I implement further analysis to shed more light on 
the origin and the mechanics of the Easter holiday effect. Following the order shown in my 
univariate tests in Table 2.2, this section investigates whether religiosity and religious 
affiliation/religious composition of firm location matter. If my results are driven by distraction 
caused by Easter, and if the pattern shown in the univariate tests is correct, then one may expect 
that firms from less religious areas experience a stronger delayed response to firm news whereas 
firms from more religious areas experience a lower effect. As discussed earlier, this expectation 
is based on the rationale that religious holidays can be a greater (smaller) distraction for non-
religious (religious) people because for them religion is a smaller (bigger) part of their daily 
routine. Moreover, if the distraction effect is more pronounced in the less religious counties, I 
should be able to observe a clearer pattern of immediate and delayed reactions to earnings news, 
which might help to reconcile the somewhat puzzling pattern of my main result from Table 2.3, 
wherein prices seem to react to bad earnings surprises both immediately and in delayed fashion. 
Table 2.6 displays the multivariate test results of delayed response and immediate market 
reaction for different religiosity subsamples. First four columns of both Panel A and B display 
the multivariate test results for a subsample of firms that are located in more religious areas 
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whereas the last four columns of both panels report the results for a subsample of firms that are 
from less religious areas. As before, firms in more religious areas are located in areas that fall in 
the highest religiosity tercile of my sample, and firms in less religious areas are located in areas 
that fall in the lowest religiosity tercile of my sample. 
Panel A shows a statistically significant PEAD after bad earnings news only for the 
subsample of firms that are located in less religious areas. The coefficient of EasterHoliday*FE1 
is negative, economically large (ranging between -12.65% and -17.52%) and statistically 
significant in all columns for firms from less religious areas. The EasterHoliday*FE5 coefficient 
has the expected positive signs in three out of four models but is statistically significant in only 
two out of the four models in the subsample of firms located in the more religious areas. The 
magnitude of the significant coefficients is about 3%, indicating that it has much lower economic 
significance compared to the magnitude of PEAD for negative earnings news by firms in less 
religious areas. To sum up, Panel A shows that there is some PEAD after good earnings news for 
the firms located in more religious counties whereas the  PEAD after bad earnings news is only 
pronounced for the firms that are located in less religious counties.  
Panel B shows the immediate reaction results for the religiosity subsamples. There is 
more pronounced immediate reaction to good earnings news by firms located in less religious 
areas whereas there is more pronounced immediate reaction to bad earnings news by firms 
located in more religious areas. Taken together the results in Panels A and B imply that investors 
in less religious areas are more surprised by good firm news during Easter holiday period and 
show more pronounced immediate reaction. They tend to pay less attention to bad firm news to 
which there is strong delayed response. The results are consistent with the notion that distraction 
leads to higher underreaction to bad earnings news announced during Easter week in less 
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religious areas. On the other hand, investors in more religious areas are slightly more surprised 
by bad earnings news as indicated by the immediate reaction to bad news. Consequently, more 
religious areas also show some delayed response to good news.  
These results help to reconcile the seemingly puzzling evidence from the immediate and 
delayed response tests using the full sample. In particular, these results suggest that each of the 
two alternative views stated earlier applies to one of the two different religiosity subsamples. In 
more religious areas, the good mood associated with religious holidays leads to a general 
tendency to expect good news and therefore more religious areas only show a weak immediate 
response to good firm news. Moreover, the expectation of good news associated with Easter’s 
good mood in religious areas can cause the arrival of bad news—the news with the content 
opposite to positive mood—to be perceived as a surprise and thus there is a strong immediate 
reaction. This underreaction to good news relative to bad news causes some delayed response 
following good news in more religious areas. On the other hand, the good mood around Easter in 
less religious areas is a less familiar sentiment that possibly makes people enthusiastically seek 
the positive and dismiss the negative side of things. Thus, in less religious areas good earnings 
news is met with immediate strong reaction whereas bad earnings news is not paid much 
attention to. This effect gives rise to drift after bad earnings news.   
This evidence supports the earlier conjectures that i) major religious holidays, like Easter, 
cause investor distraction, especially in less religious areas, and ii) the positive mood in the less 
religious areas can be viewed as transitory and receptive to positive information, whereas the 
positive mood experienced by the average investor in more religious areas is probably a more 
static/permanent sentiment which makes the arrival of oppositely hued information resemble a 
shock to which there is a sharper reaction. 
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 My results are also consistent with the view that local investors display bias in holding 
disproportionate amounts of local firm stocks and contribute to a sizeable local pricing 
component. In addition, based on differences in local religiosity characteristics, there is variation 
in the local investor distraction effect leading to different kinds of drift following good and bad 
news.  
Next, I examine the question of whether the asymmetric patterns of immediate and 
delayed reactions observed across less and more religious subsamples is driven by differences in 
attitudes toward good or bad news which may exist across areas with different dominant 
religious affiliations. Specifically, in order to study whether religious affiliation has an impact on 
the distraction effect, I divide my main sample into two subsamples based on the dominant 
religious affiliation of the county where the firm is located, captured by the Catholic-Protestant 
ratio (CPRATIO).
43
 As I explain in the previous section, if a county where a given firm is located 
has a CPRATIO greater than or equal to 1.2 (lower than or equal to 0.83) then I classify the 
firm’s location as more Catholic (Protestant) area. Table 2.7 shows both immediate reaction and 
PEAD results for the religious affiliation subsamples. Panel A reports that the PEAD following 
bad earnings news is statistically significant for both religious affiliation subsamples whereas the 
PEAD following good earnings news is a bit more pronounced for the subsample of firms from 
highly Catholic areas. In addition, delayed response (to bad news) has a higher magnitude for the 
firms that are located in predominantly Protestant areas. The PEAD following bad news is 
between -11.04% to -14.13%  for the firms that are located in predominantly Protestant areas 
whereas it is only between -4.41% and -6.47% for the firms that are located in predominantly 
Catholic areas. The PEAD following good news is not very different across Catholic and 
                                                          
43 Following Kumar et al. (2011), I call this ratio as CPRATIO. 
81 
 
Protestant areas: it ranges between 2.63 to 4.18% for the firms in more Catholic areas whereas it 
is about 3.5-4% for the firms from more Protestant areas. 
In Panel B, immediate reaction to earnings news also shows different short-term 
responses for the religious affiliation subsamples. Immediate reaction to bad news is more 
pronounced in predominantly Catholic areas. However, especially for the good earnings news, 
immediate response is stronger among firms in predominantly Protestant areas. This pattern is 
consistent with the differences in attitudes between Catholicism and Protestantism highlighted in 
Grullon et al (2010). Catholics are more responsive to bad news because they are typically 
showing greater emphasis on guilt about doing the wrong thing, whereas Protestants are more 
responsive to good news because of their tendency to emphasize pride about doing the right 
thing. My evidence is in harmony with this argument, showing that Catholic areas ignore good 
(firm) news more prior to Easter and consequently some delayed response to good news while 
Protestant areas ignore bad (firm) news more prior to Easter and a strong delayed response 
(PEAD) to bad news. 
Overall, my results are more pronounced for the firms that are located in predominantly 
Protestant counties and display an asymmetric effect of immediate and delayed responses to 
earnings news around religious holidays. My results are also in line with recent literature (Hilary 
and Hui (2009), Kumar et al. (2011), Grullon et al. (2010), and Golombick et al. (2011) among 
others) suggesting that different religious affiliation impacts investment behavior and corporate 
decision making. 
Last, I investigate whether and how different combinations of religiosity and religious 
affiliation affect investors’ distraction around religious holidays. I start with the two religiosity 
subsamples used in Table 2.6 and divide each one of them further into two, based on the 
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Catholic-Protestant ratio (CPRATIO) of the county where the firm is located following the 
procedure used in Table 2.5. Table 2.8 Panels A and B display multivariate PEAD regression 
results for the “religiosity-religious affiliation” subsamples. Panels C and D report multivariate 
immediate reaction regression results for the subsamples.  
Panel A shows no statistically significant PEAD after bad earnings news by firms  
located in predominantly Catholic and more religious areas whereas the PEAD after bad earnings 
news is statistically significant (and a sizeable additional -21%) for the firms from predominantly 
Protestant and more religious areas. On the other hand, the PEAD after good earnings surprises 
is only statistically significant for firms in predominantly Catholic and more religious areas, but 
it is only about 3.4%. Briefly, more religious and Protestant areas underreact strongly to bad firm 
news announced just prior to Good Friday. 
Next, Panel B shows no statistically significant PEAD after either bad earnings news or 
good earnings news when firms are located in highly Catholic, less religious areas. However, 
there are statistically and economically significant PEADs after both bad and good earnings 
surprises for the firms from low highly Protestant, less religious areas.  The PEAD following 
good news is between 9.19% and 12.39%. The PEAD following bad news has higher magnitude, 
and it is between -18.01 % and -25.12%. Taken together, the results in Panels A and B indicate 
that the distraction effect (after both bad and good earnings news) is strongest among firms 
located in predominantly Protestant, less religious areas and illustrate that religious affiliation 
effects are responsible for at least part of the delayed response results of Table 2.6.  
Panels C and D display the immediate reaction results. In Panel C, immediate reactions to 
both good and bad earnings news are not statistically significant in more religious Catholic areas. 
On the other, immediate reaction is statistically significant for bad earning news from firms in 
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predominantly religious Protestant areas. At first glance, a strong immediate reaction to bad 
news in the more religious-Protestant subsample is not very consistent with my previous 
religious affiliation subsamples’ results, where there was a strong immediate reaction to good 
earnings news in Protestant areas. However, the result is consistent with the religiosity 
subsamples’ results in Table 2.6 where I found a strong immediate reaction to bad news in more 
religious areas.  
Panel D shows that there is some statistically significant immediate reaction to good 
earnings news by firms in predominantly Catholic parts of less religious locations. On the other 
hand, immediate reaction to good earnings news is significant (and about 9%) for the firms in 
predominantly Protestant parts of less religious areas. This result is in line with both earlier 
religiosity and religious affiliation subsample analyses.  
In sum, the results are consistent with my earlier results. The PEAD effect is stronger 
among firms in predominantly Protestant, less religious areas. The fact that the highest delayed 
response to earnings surprises appears in that subsample is also in line with a distraction effect 
caused by religious holidays. I posit that an asymmetric effect for different religious affiliations 
is consistent with the earlier studies that show differences in financial decision-making across for 
different religious affiliations (Grullon et al. (2010), Kumar et al. (2011), and Golombick et al. 
(2011) among others). 
2.7 ADDITIONAL TESTS 
In this section, I explore whether geographic factors might affect my results. In particular, 
I investigate whether investors’ information processing ability varies across metropolitan areas 
and/or geographic regions, where there may be more pronounced differences in daily routines or 
cultural characteristics. I first present multivariate test results for a sample that excludes the firms 
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that are located in big metropolitan areas and then I repeat the tests separately for groups formed 
after sorting firms into geographic regions based on headquarter location.   
In Table 2.9, I show my empirical results for a sample that excludes firms whose location 
is within 100 miles of the three biggest U.S. metropolitan areas (i.e., New York City, Chicago, 
and Los Angeles). Earlier studies suggest that there are some differences in stock characteristics 
between low population density and high population density areas (Hong et al. (2008)) and 
between urban and rural firms (Loughran and Schultz (2005)). Note that the three biggest 
metropolitan areas account for 24,829 out of 89,702 observations in my sample. Given the large 
number of observations and the starkly different nature of the social fabric in the large 
metropolitan areas, it is possible that my main tests would produce a less complicated pattern of 
immediate and delayed reactions to good and bad news once I exclude metropolitan areas’ firms 
from the test sample. Essentially, it is conceivable that differences in cultural characteristics 
between metropolitan and other areas that can affect investors’ information environment during 
religious holidays were partly responsible for the rather odd pattern responses in Table 2.3. Table 
2.9 reports delayed response and immediate reaction regressions for the sample excluding the 
biggest metropolitan areas.  
Panel A shows a statistically and economically significant PEAD after bad earnings news 
whereas it reports less pronounced and statistically significant PEAD after good earnings news. 
This pattern is more consistent with a distraction effect than that of the full sample results 
presented in Table 2.3. In particular, the coefficient magnitudes of the delayed response variables 
are very similar to the ones in Table 2.3, but more importantly, Panel B shows some statistically 
significant positive immediate reaction to good earnings news whereas the immediate reaction to 
bad earnings news is not statistically significant. Taken together, the results in Panels A and B 
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show an asymmetric immediate and delayed response to good and bad news, which improves 
over the puzzling symmetric response to bad news shown in the full sample regressions in Table 
2.3. One could argue that excluding metropolitan areas that arguably are hard to classify into 
different religious characteristics areas makes my results more consistent with a religious holiday 
induced distraction effect. 
Next, I analyze whether investor distraction that occurs during religious holidays varies 
across geographic regions. Different geographic regions may have different (cultural) 
characteristics which may impact investors’ information processing during religious holidays. In 
a recent study, Hong et al. (2008) examine stock-price consequences of local bias by looking at 
the stocks from the nine U.S. Census regions and find higher stock returns for the firms from 
regions with low population and fewer firms because of the only-game-in-town effect.  
Following Hong et al. (2008), I examine whether geographic region of firm location matters for 
the investor distraction induced by religious holidays or not. I divide my sample into to four big 
regional subsamples (Northeast, Midwest, South and West) based on Census definitions.
44
  Table 
2.10, Panel A displays the PEAD results for the Northeast and Midwest regions and Panel B 
shows the same results for the South and West regions. Panels C and D contain the 
corresponding immediate reactions’ results. 
                                                          
44
 The nine U.S. Census regions in Hong et al. (2008) are sub-regions of these fmy big regions. Based on Census 
definitions; the nine U.S. Census region definitions are in the following: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont are in New England Region. New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania are in 
Mid-Atlantic region. Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin are in East-Northcentral region. Iowa, Nebraska, 
Kansas, North Dakota, Minnesota, South Dakota, Missouri are in West-Northcentral region. Delaware ,District of 
Columbia ,Florida ,Georgia ,Maryland ,North Carolina ,South Carolina ,Virginia ,West Virginia are in South 
Atlantic region. Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee are in East-Southcentral region. Arkansas, Louisiana, 
Oklahoma, Texas are in West-Southcentral region. Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Montana, Utah, Nevada, 
Wyoming are in Mountain region. Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, Washington are in Pacific region. These nine 
Census regions make up the fmy big region definition as in the following: New England and Mid-Atlantic regions 
are in Northeast big region. East-Northcentral and West –Northcentral regions are in Midwest big region. South 
Atlantic, East-Southcentral, and West- Southcentral regions are in South big region. Mountain and Pacific regions 
are in West big region definition. 
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Before reporting the empirical results, it is important to note that there are stark 
religiosity and religious affiliation differences among the geographic region subsamples. Since 
average religiosity (adjusted adherence rate) and Catholic-Protestant ratio (CPRATIO) show 
great variation across the regional subsamples, I conjecture that these characteristics may help in 
providing a better explanation for the results.
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Panel A shows that, for Northeast region, the interaction term that captures the PEAD 
after bad earnings news announced during Easter holiday periods is positive in one out of four 
regressions. Even though this result is counter-intuitive, it is only statistically significant once 
and just at the 10% level. It should be noted that the Northeast region has the highest religiosity 
rate and highest CPRATIO among my four geographic region subsamples. Thus the highly 
religious adherent and predominantly Catholic characteristics or some other cultural 
characteristics specific to the Northeast may be the drivers of this, otherwise weak, result. Panel 
A also shows that there isn’t any statistically significant delayed response to either good or bad 
earnings surprises announced during Easter holidays in the Midwest region.  
Panel C shows that among southern firms, PEAD after bad earnings is highly statistically 
and economically significant, with coefficients of about -9% to -10%.  Note that the South is the 
most Protestant region (i.e. it has the lowest CPRATIO) with above-average religiosity rates. 
Underreaction to bad firm news in the South is consistent with my earlier results which show that 
there is strong drift following bad news in predominantly Protestant areas.  Panel C also displays 
a statistically significant PEAD after bad earnings news issued by the firms in the West just prior 
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 Average religiosity (adjusted adherence rate) and Catholic-Protestant ratio (CPRATIO) in my Northeast 
subsample are 77.8% and 4.47 respectively. Average religiosity and CPRATIO for Midwest subsample are 65.1% 
and 1.56, respectively. Average religiosity and CPRATIO for South subsample are 68.6% and 0.65, respectively. 
Average religiosity and CPRATIO in West subsample is 50.2% and 2.6, respectively. On the other hand, average 
religiosity and CPRATIO for the entire sample of observations are 64.7 % and 2.32, respectively.  
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to Easter. PEAD for Western firms is also economically important with a coefficient between -
10.73% and -17.09 %.  The West subsample has the lowest religiosity rate, thus in the West, 
observing a strong PEAD after bad news is consistent with my earlier results which show that the 
firms located in less religious areas have higher PEAD following bad news announced during 
holidays. The result is also in line with my distraction argument that suggests a stronger effect 
for in religious areas.  
Panels C and D report the corresponding immediate reaction to earnings surprises for 
geographic region subsamples. In Panel C, there is some statistically significant immediate 
reaction to good (bad) earnings news announced during Easter holiday period in the Northeast 
(Midwest) subsample. Panel D shows a highly statistically significant immediate reaction to bad 
earnings news by Southern firms when they make earnings announcements during religious 
holidays. In the South, there is also some positive immediate reaction to good earnings news just 
prior to religious holidays. Considering that the South region subsample is predominantly 
Protestant and is slightly more religious, these results are in line with my earlier religiosity and 
religious affiliation results. Panel D reports some pronounced immediate reaction to good 
earnings surprises and no significant immediate response to bad earnings news issued by firms 
located in the West region. Given that the West region subsample is the least religious, this result 
is consistent with my earlier religiosity subsample results which show a more pronounced 
immediate reaction to only good firm news in less religious areas. Briefly, the pattern in 
immediate reaction results is compatible with the one of the PEAD results and, most importantly, 
consistent with my earlier results.  
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2.8 CONCLUSION 
This paper examines whether culture, proxied by religion, affects investors’ ability to 
incorporate relevant information available in earnings announcements into stock prices. In 
theory, one expects rational investors to process and incorporate this type of information into 
stock prices completely and timely. However, recent studies suggest that people have limited 
information processing capabilities and limited attention, and therefore any distraction can lead 
to delayed and/or incomplete information processing. I test this hypothesis by focusing on Easter 
and analyzing whether this religious holiday distracts investors, essentially limits their attention, 
and thereby leads to a delayed inclusion of information into stock prices. I find that there is a 
delayed response to earnings news and an additional post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) 
when earnings announcements occur during Easter week. This underreaction to earnings news 
and delayed incorporation of earnings news into stock prices shows that religious holidays can 
indeed have a distraction effect on investors. In addition, the religious holiday induced-
distraction effect is not subsumed by a parallel-existing travel or vacation effect. 
My subsample analyses also support the investor distraction effect. In the subsample 
tests, I find a higher PEAD effect for the firms located in less religious areas. This result suggests 
that religious holidays have a higher distraction effect in less religious areas because in such 
areas religious rituals and religious participation are not big part of daily routine. 
I also find that there are some differences in the distraction effect for the firms that are 
located in predominantly Catholic versus predominantly Protestant areas. In particular, my paper 
shows that the highest distraction effect is among firms in Protestant parts of less religious areas.  
This result is consistent with earlier studies that suggest different cultural characteristics and 
different perceptions for different religious affiliations (LaPorta et al. (1999), Grullon et al. 
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(2010), and Kumar et al. (2011) among others). This result is also consistent with the recent 
literature that shows differences in individual investment decision and corporate decisions for 
different religious affiliations of firm locations (Hilary and Hui (2009), Kumar et al. (2011), 
Grullon et al. (2010) and Golombick et al. (2011) among others).  In sum, my paper also shows 
empirical findings on the importance of local investor (in)attention. My study adds new evidence 
to the recent literature that studies the impact of local bias and local characteristics on stock 
prices. I show that local religiosity and religious affiliation is important in explaining investor 
inattention or distraction and delayed incorporation of information into stock prices. 
90 
 
2.9 TABLES 
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A. Summary Statistics      
 Size($M) B/M Earnings  
persistence 
Earnings 
 volatility 
Share 
 turnover 
Reporting  
Lag 
Number  
of Analysts 
Inst.  
ownership 
Mean 3,407.52 0.53 0.28 0.328% 9.776% 27.45 4.71 56.05% 
Median 559.28 0.43 0.24 0.001% 7.099% 25 3 55.33% 
N 89,702 89,702 84,743 89,382 89,660 89,702 89,702 58,241 
Panel B. Immediate Reaction and PEAD 
 
 
All Firms Firms announcing earnings during Easter holidays 
  
Full Sample (-2,0) of holidays (-3,0) of holidays 
 
CAR (-1,1) CAR (-1,1) CAR (-1,1) 
 Mean 0.23% 0.35% 0.77% 
 N 89,685 807 1,124 
 
 
CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (Et,Et+1) 
 Mean -0.914% -1.65% -0.82% 
 N 89,694 807 1,124 
 
 
CAR (0,1) CAR (0,1) CAR (0,1) 
 Mean 0.12% 0.26% 0.46% 
 N 89,685 807 1,124 
  
CAR (2,61) CAR (2,61) CAR (2,61) 
Mean -0.89% -1.48% -0.71% 
 N 89,692 807 1,124 
 Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for firm variables. Panel B displays mean values of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for all earnings 
announcements and subsamples of earnings announcements issued in the (-2,0) and (-3,0) windows for Easter Holidays where  day 0 represents 
Good Friday.  In Panel B, columns 2 and 3 show only the earnings announcements issued around Easter Holidays. In all CAR event window 
definition, day 0 represents the day of earnings announcement. CAR( Et,Et+1)  is the cumulative abnormal return between current earnings 
announcement and the next one. Size is company’s market value. B/M is company’s book to market ratio. Earnings volatility is measured as the 
standard deviation of prior four year quarterly earnings from the earnings one year ago. Share turnover is the average monthly trading volume 
normalized by the average number of share outstanding for the one year period that ends at the end of corresponding fiscal quarter. Reporting lag 
is the number of days between the quarter end and earnings announcement day.  Log (1+# of analysts) is logarithm of the number of analysts that 
follows the firm during the corresponding quarter. Earnings Persistence is the first-order autocorrelation coefficient of earnings per share (stock 
split-adjusted) using of prior four year quarterly earnings. Institutional ownership is the percentage of shares that institutions hold for the 
corresponding fiscal quarter. The sample period is from 1989 to 2006 in this table. 
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Table 2.2: Univariate Statistics of Easter Week Announcements 
 
Panel A. Immediate Reaction and PEAD of Firms with Announcements During Easter Holidays 
 FE=1 (Earnings Surprise Quintile 1) FE=5 (Earnings Surprise Quintile 5) 
 Holiday event window CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) 
               (-2,0) -2.7%*** -2.44%*** -9.07%*** -9.18%*** 4.27%*** 3.81%*** 5.31%** 4..82%** 
            (-3,0) -2.29%*** -2.21%*** -7.41%*** -7.35%*** 3.92%*** 3.65%*** 5.82%** 4.69%*** 
Panel B. Religiosity  Subsamples 
B.1 . Firms in More Religious Areas 
 FE=1 (Earnings Surprise Quintile 1) FE=5 (Earnings Surprise Quintile 5) 
Holiday event window CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) 
(-2,0) -3.37%*** -3.01%** -6.37%** -5.05%* 3.49%*** 3.16%*** 3.41% 1.69% 
(-3,0) -2.16%** -2.11%** -4.64%** -3.83%* 3.62%*** 3.34%*** 4.76% 1.99% 
B.1 . Firms in Less Religious Areas 
 FE=1 (Earnings Surprise Quintile 1) FE=5 (Earnings Surprise Quintile 5) 
Holiday event window CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) 
(-2,0) -0.74% -0.89% -12.27%*** -12.94%*** 4.36%** 4.24%*** 8.16%** 9.07%** 
(-3,0) -1.22% -1.41% -10.25%*** -10.78%*** 4.19%*** 4.11%*** 7.48%** 8.01%** 
Panel C. Religious Affiliation  Subsamples 
C.1 . Firms in High CPRATIO (more Catholic) Areas 
 FE=1 (Earnings Surprise Quintile 1) FE=5 (Earnings Surprise Quintile 5) 
Holiday event window CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) 
(-2,0) -3.02%*** -2.20%** -5.79%** -5.64%** 3.40%*** 3.17%*** 6.41%** 4.98%* 
(-3,0) -2.14%** -1.65%** -4.91%** -4.74%** 3.57%*** 3.55%*** 7.82%*** 5.37%** 
C.1 . Firms in Low CPRATIO (more Protestant) Areas 
 FE=1 (Earnings Surprise Quintile 1) FE=5 (Earnings Surprise Quintile 5) 
Holiday event window CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) 
(-2,0) -1.77% -2.27%* -16.37%*** -15.07%*** 6.77%*** 5.62%*** 2.76% 3.58% 
(-3,0) -2.34%** -2.79%*** -12.77%*** -11.54%*** 5.09%*** 4.31%*** 2.29% 2.79% 
This table shows univariate statistics for earnings announcements issued only in the (-2,0) and (-3,0) windows for Easter Holidays where  day 0 represents Good Friday. Cumulative abnormal 
returns(CARs) are defined in Table 2.1. In this table, FE represents earning surprise ranking quintiles ( 1 to 5 earnings surprise quintiles).Panel A shows univariate statistics only for extreme earnings 
surprise quintiles for the entire sample. Panels B and C show the results of extreme earnings surprise quintiles for different degrees of religiosity and different religious affiliations, respectively. In Panel 
B, the highest religiosity tercile of my sample represents firms located in more religious areas, and the lowest religiosity tercile of my sample represents firms located in less religious areas. Religiosity is 
measured by the adjusted county religious adherence rate (Finke and Scheitle (2005)) extracted from the ARDA database. In Panel C, CPRATIO represents Catholic to Protestant ratio of a county where 
a given firm located in. In Panel C, religious affiliation subsamples are defined based on the following CPRATIO cutoff points: if a county has a CPRATIO greater than or equal to (less than or equal to) 
1.2 (0.83) then this area is classified as more Catholic (more Protestant) area. This table reports statistical significance results for t-test of whether earning surprise is equal to zero or not. (* significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%). The sample period is from 1989 to 2006 in this table. 
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Table 2.3: Full Sample Tests 
 
Panel A. Delayed Response (PEAD) Regressions 
   Dependent Variable CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) 
Easter Holiday event window (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) 
EasterHoliday -0.0200 -0.0105 -0.0128 -0.0024 
 
(0.001)*** (0.384) (0.029)** (0.848) 
EasterHoliday*FE5 0.0374 0.0331 0.0295 0.0170 
 
(0.002)*** (0.011)** (0.007)*** (0.310) 
FE5 0.0305 0.0304 0.0306 0.0307 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
EasterHoliday*FE1 -0.0818 -0.0709 -0.0963 -0.0789 
 
(0.000)*** (0.004)*** (0.000)*** (0.010)*** 
FE1 -0.0068 -0.0066 -0.0053 -0.0051 
 
(0.018)** (0.014)** (0.020)** (0.019)** 
Constant -0.0501 -0.0503 -0.0359 -0.0361 
 
(0.018)** (0.016)** (0.168) (0.163) 
     Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 55303 55303 55303 55303 
R-squared 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.022 
     Panel B. Immediate Reaction Regressions 
    Dependent Variable Car (-1, 1) Car (0, 1) 
Easter Holiday event window (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) 
EasterHoliday -0.0016 0.0030 -0.0002 0.0010 
 
(0.531) (0.530) (0.842) (0.451) 
EasterHoliday*FE5 0.0109 0.0030 0.0119 0.0085 
 
(0.008)*** (0.664) (0.247) (0.252) 
FE5 0.0296 0.0297 0.0261 0.0261 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
EasterHoliday*FE1 -0.0115 -0.0144 -0.0140 -0.0145 
 
(0.072)* (0.043)** (0.006)*** (0.002)*** 
FE1 -0.0299 -0.0298 -0.0268 -0.0267 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Constant -0.0048 -0.0049 -0.0022 -0.0024 
 
(0.684) (0.677) (0.828) (0.815) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 55302 55302 55302 55302 
R-squared 0.063 0.063 0.058 0.058 
Dependent variables are CAR( Et,Et+1) and CAR(2,61) in Panel A and CAR(-1,1) and CAR (0,1) in Panel B. Cumulative abnormal 
returns(CARs) are defined in Table 2.1. FE represents earning surprise ranking quintiles. (1 to 5 earnings surprise quintiles).FE5 
is an indicator variable that takes value of 1 for the FE=5 and value of 0 for everything else.FE1 is an indicator variable that takes 
value of 1 for the FE=1 and value of 0 for everything else. EasterHoliday represents a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
if an earnings announcement occurs within the [-2,0] or [-3,0] event windows, where “0” represents the date of Good Friday for 
the event windows, and the value of zero otherwise. Control Variables: Firm size, B/M ratio,  Log(1+ #of analyst),Reporting Lag,  
Earnings Volatility, Share Turnover, Earnings Persistence, and Institutional ownership. Control variables are defined in Table 
2.1.  Other control variables are Two-digit SIC variables, Day of week, Month, Year variables. Control variables are not shown 
for brevity. Robust p-values in parentheses. (* significant at 10%;   ** significant at 5%;   *** significant at 1%).  Standard   
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by the day of announcement. The sample period is from 1989 to 2006 in 
this table. 
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Table 2.4: Easter Holiday Effect vs. Vacation Holiday Effect 
 
Panel A. Delayed Response (PEAD) Regressions 
   Dependent Variable CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) 
Holiday event window (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) 
EasterHoliday -0.0200 -0.0105 -0.0127 -0.0024 
 
(0.001)*** (0.385) (0.028)** (0.849) 
VacationHoliday 0.0118 0.0092 0.0141 0.0072 
 
(0.316) (0.330) (0.149) (0.450) 
EasterHoliday*FE5 0.0376 0.0333 0.0296 0.0171 
 
(0.002)*** (0.011)** (0.007)*** (0.310) 
VacationHoliday*FE5 0.0367 0.0165 0.0162 0.0062 
 
(0.122) (0.204) (0.222) (0.692) 
FE5 0.0302 0.0302 0.0305 0.0306 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
EasterHoliday*FE1 -0.0821 -0.0712 -0.0964 -0.0792 
 
(0.000)*** (0.004)*** (0.000)*** (0.010)*** 
VacationHoliday*FE1 -0.0346 -0.0266 -0.0192 -0.0209 
 
(0.047)** (0.256) (0.136) (0.179) 
FE1 -0.0065 -0.0063 -0.0052 -0.0049 
 
(0.019)** (0.017)** (0.018)** (0.019)** 
Constant -0.0503 -0.0510 -0.0361 -0.0365 
 
(0.017)** (0.017)** (0.167) (0.162) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 55303 55303 55303 55303 
R-squared 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.022 
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Table 2.4 (cont.) 
    
Panel B. Immediate Reaction Regressions 
    
Dependent Variable Car (-1, 1) Car (0, 1) 
Holiday event window (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) 
EasterHoliday -0.0016 0.0030 -0.0002 0.0010 
 
(0.526) (0.531) (0.840) (0.446) 
VacationHoliday -0.0025 -0.0012 -0.0004 0.0004 
 
(0.642) (0.792) (0.920) (0.916) 
EasterHoliday*FE5 0.0111 0.0031 0.0119 0.0084 
 
(0.007)*** (0.650) (0.246) (0.251) 
VacationHoliday*FE5 0.0170 0.0081 0.0006 -0.0034 
 
(0.160) (0.382) (0.945) (0.602) 
FE5 0.0295 0.0296 0.0261 0.0261 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
EasterHoliday*FE1 -0.0115 -0.0144 -0.0140 -0.0145 
 
(0.074)* (0.044)** (0.006)*** (0.002)*** 
VacationHoliday*FE1 0.0067 0.0048 0.0089 0.0034 
 
(0.228) (0.521) (0.180) (0.681) 
FE1 -0.0300 -0.0299 -0.0268 -0.0267 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Constant -0.0048 -0.0051 -0.0022 -0.0023 
 
(0.683) (0.671) (0.828) (0.819) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 55302 55302 55302 55302 
R-squared 0.063 0.063 0.058 0.058 
Dependent variables are CAR( Et,Et+1) and CAR(2,61) in Panel A and CAR(-1,1) and CAR (0,1) in Panel B. 
Cumulative abnormal returns(CARs) are defined in Table 2.1.  FE5 (FE1) and EasterHoliday variables are defined 
in Table 2.3. VacationHoliday is a dummy variable that takes value of one if a given earnings announcement occurs 
during Thanksgiving, 4th of July or Memorial day event window, otherwise the value of zero. All control variables 
are defined in Table 2.3. Control variables are not shown for brevity. Robust p-values in parentheses. (* significant 
at 10%;   ** significant at 5%;   *** significant at 1%).  Standard   errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
clustered by the day of announcement. The sample period is from 1989 to 2006 in this table. 
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Table 2.5: Easter Holiday Effect vs. Travel Volume Effect 
 
Panel A. Delayed Response (PEAD) Regressions 
Dependent Variable CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) 
Holiday event window (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) 
EasterHoliday -0.0266 -0.0153 -0.0187 -0.0065 
 
(0.002)*** (0.309) (0.019)** (0.659) 
AirPassengerVol -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(0.309) (0.315) (0.494) (0.505) 
EasterHoliday*FE5 0.0411 0.0344 0.0358 0.0180 
 
(0.002)*** (0.023)** (0.005)*** (0.410) 
AirPassengerVol*FE5 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.356) (0.353) (0.753) (0.764) 
FE5 0.0493 0.0493 0.0251 0.0254 
 
(0.085)* (0.084)* (0.129) (0.119) 
EasterHoliday*FE1 -0.0747 -0.0743 -0.0938 -0.0861 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
AirPassengerVol*FE1 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(0.961) (0.965) (0.691) (0.686) 
FE1 -0.0074 -0.0068 0.0092 0.0097 
 
(0.867) (0.876) (0.799) (0.786) 
Constant 0.0242 0.0235 0.0148 0.0137 
 
(0.717) (0.725) (0.832) (0.844) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 44164 44164 44164 44164 
R-squared 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 
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Table 2.5 (cont.) 
Panel B. Immediate Reaction Regressions 
Dependent Variable Car (-1, 1) Car (0, 1) 
Holiday event window (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) 
EasterHoliday -0.0032 0.0029 -0.0007 0.0012 
 
(0.220) (0.623) (0.208) (0.490) 
AirPassengerVol -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(0.452) (0.512) (0.853) (0.872) 
EasterHoliday*FE5 0.0155 0.0052 0.0136 0.0091 
 
(0.001)*** (0.572) (0.117) (0.190) 
AirPassengerVol*FE5 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
 
(0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.014)** (0.014)** 
FE5 0.0083 0.0086 -0.0045 -0.0045 
 
(0.142) (0.127) (0.614) (0.620) 
EasterHoliday*FE1 -0.0100 -0.0133 -0.0127 -0.0142 
 
(0.153) (0.067)* (0.022)** (0.006)*** 
AirPassengerVol*FE1 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 
(0.034)** (0.033)** (0.011)** (0.011)** 
FE1 -0.0027 -0.0025 0.0133 0.0134 
 
(0.794) (0.807) (0.265) (0.257) 
Constant 0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0035 -0.0039 
 
(0.941) (0.989) (0.812) (0.787) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 44163 44163 44163 44163 
R-squared 0.066 0.066 0.063 0.063 
Dependent variables are CAR( Et,Et+1) and CAR(2,61) in Panel A and CAR(-1,1) and CAR (0,1) in Panel B. 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are defined in Table 2.1.  FE5(FE1) and EasterHoliday variables are defined 
in Table 2.3. AirPassengerVol is a variable that proxies monthly total number of passenger enplanements. 
AirPassengerVol is in 1000s. All control variables are defined in Table 2.3. Control variables are not shown for 
brevity. Robust p-values in parentheses. (* significant at 10%;   ** significant at 5%;   *** significant at 1%).  
Standard   errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by the day of announcement.  The sample period 
is from 1991 to 2006 in this table. 
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Table 2.6: Religiosity Subsample Tests 
 
Panel A. Delayed Response (PEAD) regressions 
Dependent Variable CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) 
Religiosity subsamples More Religious Areas Less Religious Areas 
Easter Holiday event window (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) 
EasterHoliday -0.0285 -0.0200 -0.0186 -0.0119 -0.0024 -0.0030 0.0149 0.0161 
 
(0.009)*** (0.209) (0.085)* (0.361) (0.573) (0.448) (0.232) (0.057)* 
EasterHoliday*FE5 0.0287 0.0277 0.0061 -0.0039 0.0616 0.0576 0.0561 0.0440 
 
(0.039)** (0.085)* (0.666) (0.839) (0.193) (0.163) (0.346) (0.387) 
FE5 0.0329 0.0328 0.0342 0.0343 0.0241 0.0241 0.0253 0.0254 
 
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.010)** (0.010)*** 
EasterHoliday*FE1 -0.0504 -0.0388 -0.0649 -0.0420 -0.1628 -0.1265 -0.1752 -0.1413 
 
(0.364) (0.231) (0.399) (0.358) (0.029)** (0.084)* (0.036)** (0.064)* 
FE1 -0.0090 -0.0088 -0.0054 -0.0053 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0015 -0.0014 
 
(0.024)** (0.022)** (0.023)** (0.022)** (0.915) (0.917) (0.686) (0.698) 
Constant 0.0066 0.0070 0.0417 0.0429 -0.0395 -0.0399 -0.0418 -0.0422 
 
(0.679) (0.670) (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.493) (0.488) (0.483) (0.479) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21070 21070 21070 21070 16923 16923 16923 16923 
R-squared 0.029 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 
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Table 2.6 (cont.) 
        Panel B. Immediate Reaction Regressions 
Dependent Variable CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) 
Religiosity subsamples More Religious Areas Less Religious Areas 
Easter Holiday event window (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) 
EasterHoliday -0.0029 0.0016 0.0003 0.0034 0.0034 0.0115 -0.0032 -0.0018 
 
(0.086)* (0.666) (0.853) (0.320) (0.777) (0.356) (0.799) (0.830) 
EasterHoliday*FE5 0.0012 0.0014 0.0021 0.0028 0.0057 -0.0023 0.0197 0.0168 
 
(0.786) (0.747) (0.674) (0.476) (0.038)** (0.775) (0.012)** (0.061)* 
FE5 0.0270 0.0270 0.0229 0.0229 0.0324 0.0325 0.0295 0.0295 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
EasterHoliday*FE1 -0.0179 -0.0134 -0.0222 -0.0178 -0.0041 -0.0136 -0.0038 -0.0050 
 
(0.260) (0.140) (0.087)* (0.036)** (0.314) (0.314) (0.517) (0.261) 
FE1 -0.0298 -0.0297 -0.0268 -0.0267 -0.0320 -0.0319 -0.0283 -0.0282 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Constant -0.0271 -0.0273 -0.0292 -0.0296 0.0040 0.0039 0.0088 0.0088 
 
(0.044)** (0.047)** (0.022)** (0.021)** (0.796) (0.799) (0.502) (0.504) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 21069 21069 21069 21069 16923 16923 16923 16923 
R-squared 0.063 0.063 0.058 0.058 0.069 0.069 0.063 0.063 
Table 2.6 displays the multivariate test results of delayed response and immediate market reaction for different religiosity subsamples Dependent variables are 
CAR( Et,Et+1) and CAR(2,61) in Panel A and CAR(-1,1) and CAR (0,1) in Panel B. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are defined in Table 2.1.  In this table, 
religiosity is measured by the adjusted county religious adherence rate (Finke and Scheitle (2005)) extracted from the ARDA database. The highest religiosity 
tercile of my sample represents firms located in more religious areas, and the lowest religiosity tercile of my sample represents firms located in less religious 
areas.. FE5(FE1) and EasterHoliday variables are defined in Table 2.3. All control variables are defined in Table 2.3. Control variables are not shown for brevity. 
Robust p-values in parentheses. (* significant at 10%;   ** significant at 5%;   *** significant at 1%).  Standard   errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
clustered by the day of announcement. The sample period is from 1989 to 2006 in this table. 
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Table 2.7: Religious Affiliation Subsample Tests 
 
Panel A. Delayed Response (PEAD) regressions 
Dependent Variable CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) 
CPRATIO subsamples High CPRATIO (More Catholic) Areas Low CPRATIO(More Protestant) Areas 
Easter Holiday event window (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) 
EasterHoliday -0.0190 -0.0081 -0.0085 0.0017 -0.0363 -0.0279 -0.0342 -0.0211 
 
(0.013)** (0.507) (0.210) (0.886) (0.003)*** (0.091)* (0.005)*** (0.255) 
EasterHoliday*FE5 0.0418 0.0405 0.0263 0.0152 0.0353 0.0211 0.0403 0.0181 
 
(0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.011)** (0.156) (0.017)** (0.362) (0.000)*** (0.509) 
FE5 0.0294 0.0293 0.0289 0.0290 0.0321 0.0322 0.0332 0.0333 
 
(0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
EasterHoliday*FE1 -0.0504 -0.0441 -0.0647 -0.0525 -0.1413 -0.1177 -0.1323 -0.1104 
 
(0.000)*** (0.007)*** (0.000)*** (0.014)** (0.029)** (0.022)** (0.015)** (0.017)** 
FE1 -0.0080 -0.0078 -0.0059 -0.0058 -0.0058 -0.0054 -0.0059 -0.0056 
 
(0.063)* (0.062)* (0.089)* (0.090)* (0.147) (0.146) (0.104) (0.110) 
Constant -0.0695 -0.0694 -0.0578 -0.0578 0.0270 0.0283 0.0531 0.0540 
 
(0.032)** (0.033)** (0.051)* (0.051)* (0.130) (0.121) (0.041)** (0.036)** 
Observations 34393 34393 34393 34393 17102 17102 17102 17102 
R-squared 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.050 0.050 0.048 0.048 
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Table 2.7 (cont.) 
        Panel B. Immediate Reaction Regressions 
Dependent Variable CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) 
CPRATIO subsamples High CPRATIO (More Catholic) Areas Low CPRATIO(More Protestant) Areas 
Easter Holiday event window (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) 
EasterHoliday 0.0003 0.0060 0.0017 0.0034 -0.0001 -0.0016 -0.0008 -0.0022 
 
(0.893) (0.232) (0.513) (0.075)* (0.962) (0.383) (0.807) (0.401) 
EasterHoliday*FE5 0.0009 -0.0017 0.0052 0.0077 0.0378 0.0163 0.0313 0.0145 
 
(0.833) (0.630) (0.607) (0.365) (0.000)*** (0.289) (0.029)** (0.331) 
FE5 0.0307 0.0308 0.0272 0.0272 0.0282 0.0283 0.0243 0.0244 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
EasterHoliday*FE1 -0.0228 -0.0189 -0.0180 -0.0134 0.0027 -0.0059 -0.0061 -0.0144 
 
(0.141) (0.055)* (0.101) (0.087)* (0.367) (0.550) (0.062)* (0.142) 
FE1 -0.0303 -0.0303 -0.0270 -0.0270 -0.0283 -0.0282 -0.0258 -0.0256 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Constant 0.0080 0.0081 0.0098 0.0099 -0.0248 -0.0258 -0.0235 -0.0243 
 
(0.271) (0.262) (0.192) (0.188) (0.036)** (0.017)** (0.047)** (0.026)** 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 34392 34392 34392 34392 17102 17102 17102 17102 
R-squared 0.062 0.062 0.057 0.057 0.076 0.075 0.071 0.071 
Table 2.7 displays the multivariate test results of delayed response and immediate market reaction for different religious affiliation subsamples. Dependent 
variables are CAR( Et,Et+1) and CAR(2,61) in Panel A and CAR(-1,1) and CAR (0,1) in Panel B. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are defined in Table 2.1.  
In this table, religious affiliation is measured CPRATIO. CPRATIO represents Catholic to Protestant ratio of a county where a given firm located in. Religious 
affiliation areas are defined based on the following CPRATIO cutoff points: if a county has a CPRATIO greater than or equal to (less than or equal to) 1.2 (0.83) 
then this area is classified as more Catholic (more Protestant) area. FE5(FE1) and EasterHoliday variables are defined in Table 2.3. All control variables are 
defined in Table 2.3.Control variables are not shown for brevity. Robust p-values in parentheses. (* significant at 10%;   ** significant at 5%;   *** significant at 
1%).  Standard   errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by the day of announcement. The sample period is from 1989 to 2006 in this table. 
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Table 2.8: Religiosity and Religious Affiliation Subsample Tests 
 
Panel A. Delayed Response (PEAD) regressions 
Dependent Variable CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) 
Religiosity & CPRATIO subsamples High CPRATIO parts of More Religious Areas Low CPRATIO parts of More Religious Areas 
Easter Holiday event window (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) 
EasterHoliday -0.0277 -0.0173 -0.0207 -0.0108 -0.0329 -0.0266 -0.0089 -0.0111 
 
(0.003)*** (0.288) (0.191) (0.537) (0.104) (0.264) (0.424) (0.358) 
EasterHoliday*FE5 0.0250 0.0343 0.0041 -0.0012 0.0444 -0.0145 0.0248 -0.0270 
 
(0.145) (0.072)* (0.733) (0.921) (0.527) (0.856) (0.759) (0.683) 
FE5 0.0333 0.0331 0.0337 0.0338 0.0322 0.0326 0.0376 0.0379 
 
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
EasterHoliday*FE1 -0.0133 -0.0222 -0.0312 -0.0278 -0.2107 -0.1241 -0.2107 -0.1187 
 
(0.809) (0.476) (0.692) (0.530) (0.002)*** (0.186) (0.007)*** (0.230) 
FE1 -0.0093 -0.0091 -0.0063 -0.0061 -0.0083 -0.0083 -0.0011 -0.0012 
 
(0.020)** (0.020)** (0.035)** (0.038)** (0.482) (0.481) (0.903) (0.895) 
Constant -0.0828 -0.0826 -0.1513 -0.1511 0.0043 0.0072 0.0211 0.0234 
 
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.936) (0.893) (0.545) (0.509) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16616 16616 16616 16616 4077 4077 4077 4077 
R-squared 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.063 0.063 0.062 0.061 
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Table 2.8 (cont.) 
Panel B. Delayed Response (PEAD) regressions 
Dependent Variable CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) 
Religiosity & CPRATIO subsamples High CPRATIO parts of Less Religious Areas Low CPRATIO parts of Less Religious Areas 
Easter Holiday event window (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) 
EasterHoliday -0.0005 0.0003 0.0294 0.0291 -0.0150 -0.0218 -0.0206 -0.0191 
 
(0.863) (0.920) (0.288) (0.128) (0.063)* (0.028)** (0.040)** (0.072)* 
EasterHoliday*FE5 0.0499 0.0397 0.0327 0.0184 0.1130 0.0919 0.1239 0.0849 
 
(0.392) (0.431) (0.684) (0.782) (0.002)*** (0.036)** (0.000)*** (0.127) 
FE5 0.0229 0.0229 0.0223 0.0225 0.0321 0.0322 0.0362 0.0365 
 
(0.049)** (0.048)** (0.072)* (0.068)* (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.009)*** 
EasterHoliday*FE1 -0.1420 -0.0999 -0.1431 -0.1090 -0.2512 -0.1927 -0.2338 -0.1801 
 
(0.126) (0.288) (0.190) (0.258) (0.000)*** (0.010)*** (0.000)*** (0.011)** 
FE1 0.0035 0.0034 0.0034 0.0034 -0.0038 -0.0035 -0.0040 -0.0037 
 
(0.756) (0.764) (0.692) (0.691) (0.567) (0.579) (0.548) (0.571) 
Constant -0.0649 -0.0651 -0.0868 -0.0869 0.2275 0.2272 0.2683 0.2679 
 
(0.276) (0.275) (0.197) (0.196) (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9991 9991 9991 9991 4775 4775 4775 4775 
R-squared 0.042 0.042 0.041 0.040 0.062 0.061 0.059 0.058 
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Table 2.8 (cont.) 
Panel C. Immediate Reaction Regressions 
Dependent Variable CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) 
Religiosity & CPRATIO subsamples High CPRATIO parts of More Religious Areas Low CPRATIO parts of More Religious Areas 
Easter Holiday event window (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) 
EasterHoliday -0.0073 -0.0001 -0.0009 0.0031 0.0161 0.0095 0.0057 0.0057 
 
(0.026)** (0.985) (0.617) (0.281) (0.008)*** (0.144) (0.507) (0.388) 
EasterHoliday*FE5 0.0048 0.0037 0.0022 0.0043 -0.0130 -0.0137 0.0042 -0.0099 
 
(0.253) (0.372) (0.684) (0.370) (0.110) (0.266) (0.491) (0.066)* 
FE5 0.0270 0.0270 0.0231 0.0230 0.0279 0.0280 0.0232 0.0233 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
EasterHoliday*FE1 -0.0217 -0.0116 -0.0155 -0.0089 -0.0050 -0.0243 -0.0507 -0.0584 
 
(0.457) (0.452) (0.235) (0.258) (0.895) (0.264) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
FE1 -0.0282 -0.0282 -0.0253 -0.0252 -0.0353 -0.0351 -0.0322 -0.0319 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
Constant 0.0028 0.0029 0.0035 0.0036 -0.0222 -0.0227 -0.0282 -0.0286 
 
(0.999) (0.999) (0.999) (0.999) (0.009)*** (0.010)** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16615 16615 16615 16615 4077 4077 4077 4077 
R-squared 0.061 0.061 0.056 0.056 0.098 0.098 0.095 0.096 
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Table 2.8 (cont.) 
Panel D. Immediate Reaction Regressions 
Dependent Variable CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) 
Religiosity & CPRATIO subsamples High CPRATIO parts of Less Religious Areas Low CPRATIO parts of Less Religious Areas 
Easter Holiday event window (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) 
EasterHoliday 0.0116 0.0194 0.0006 0.0005 -0.0082 -0.0095 -0.0064 -0.0095 
 
(0.425) (0.149) (0.973) (0.966) (0.094)* (0.020)** (0.179) (0.016)** 
EasterHoliday*FE5 -0.0144 -0.0204 0.0054 0.0075 0.0521 0.0429 0.0567 0.0486 
 
(0.030)** (0.027)** (0.254) (0.379) (0.019)** (0.069)* (0.002)*** (0.018)** 
FE5 0.0337 0.0338 0.0312 0.0312 0.0332 0.0332 0.0274 0.0273 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
EasterHoliday*FE1 -0.0200 -0.0273 -0.0068 -0.0049 0.0169 0.0107 0.0033 0.0012 
 
(0.496) (0.247) (0.840) (0.834) (0.394) (0.639) (0.869) (0.951) 
FE1 -0.0335 -0.0334 -0.0293 -0.0294 -0.0264 -0.0264 -0.0241 -0.0241 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Constant -0.0033 -0.0034 0.0043 0.0043 -0.1050 -0.1051 -0.0776 -0.0777 
 
(0.824) (0.818) (0.748) (0.748) (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)** (0.010)** 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9991 9991 9991 9991 4775 4775 4775 4775 
R-squared 0.069 0.069 0.062 0.062 0.097 0.097 0.088 0.088 
Table 2.8 displays the multivariate test results of delayed response and immediate market reaction for different combination of religiosity degrees and religious 
affiliations. Dependent variables are CAR( Et,Et+1) and CAR(2,61) in Panels A and B. Dependent variables are CAR(-1,1) and CAR (0,1) in Panels C and D. 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are defined in Table 1.  Religiosity degree definitions are based on Table 2.6. Religious affiliation definitions are based on 
Table 2.7. CPRATIO represents Catholic to Protestant ratio of a county where a given firm located in. Religious affiliation areas are defined based on the 
following CPRATIO cutoff points: if a county has a CPRATIO greater than or equal to (less than or equal to) 1.2 (0.83) then this area is classified as more 
Catholic (more Protestant) area. FE5(FE1) and EasterHoliday variables are defined in Table 2.3. All control variables are defined in Table 2.3. Control variables 
are not shown for brevity. Robust p-values in parentheses. (* significant at 10%;   ** significant at 5%;   *** significant at 1%).  Standard   errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustered by the day of announcement. The sample period is from 1989 to 2006 in this table. 
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Table 2.9: Stock Response Tests excluding Metropolitan Areas 
 
Panel A. Delayed Response (PEAD) regressions 
Dependent Variable CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) 
Easter Holiday event window (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) 
EasterHoliday -0.0179 -0.0066 -0.0104 0.0015 
 
(0.006)*** (0.666) (0.020)** (0.921) 
EasterHoliday*FE5 0.0654 0.0426 0.0564 0.0281 
 
(0.015)** (0.198) (0.034)** (0.441) 
FE5 0.0284 0.0285 0.0298 0.0300 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
EasterHoliday*FE1 -0.0855 -0.0705 -0.1007 -0.0758 
 
(0.000)*** (0.009)*** (0.000)*** (0.034)** 
FE1 -0.0047 -0.0045 -0.0046 -0.0045 
 
(0.196) (0.196) (0.097)* (0.098)* 
Constant -0.0508 -0.0513 -0.0322 -0.0327 
 
(0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.288) (0.281) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 40158 40158 40158 40158 
R-squared 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 
Panel B. Immediate Reaction Regressions 
    Dependent Variable Car (-1, 1) Car (0, 1) 
Easter Holiday event window (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) 
EasterHoliday -0.0030 0.0038 -0.0039 0.0001 
 
(0.394) (0.608) (0.013)** (0.980) 
EasterHoliday*FE5 0.0119 0.0026 0.0128 0.0080 
 
(0.005)*** (0.753) (0.097)* (0.198) 
FE5 0.0294 0.0294 0.0259 0.0259 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
EasterHoliday*FE1 0.0009 -0.0093 -0.0058 -0.0110 
 
(0.877) (0.453) (0.117) (0.115) 
FE1 -0.0297 -0.0296 -0.0263 -0.0262 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Constant -0.0044 -0.0046 -0.0060 -0.0061 
 
(0.774) (0.767) (0.668) (0.661) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 40158 40158 40158 40158 
R-squared 0.063 0.063 0.057 0.057 
Dependent variables are CAR( Et,Et+1) and CAR(2,61) in Panel A and CAR(-1,1) and CAR (0,1) in Panel B. 
Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are defined in Table 2.1.  FE5(FE1) and EasterHoliday variables are defined 
in Table 2.3. This table shows multivariate test results for a sample that excludes firms whose location is within 100 
miles of the biggest metropolitan areas (New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles) All control variables are 
defined in Table 2.3. Control variables are not shown for brevity. Robust p-values in parentheses. (* significant at 
10%;   ** significant at 5%;   *** significant at 1%).  Standard   errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
clustered by the day of announcement. The sample period is from 1989 to 2006 in this table. 
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Table 2.10: Subsample Tests: Geographic Regions  
 
Panel A. Delayed Response (PEAD) regressions 
Dependent Variable CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) 
Geographic region subsamples Northeast Midwest 
Easter Holiday event window (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) 
EasterHoliday -0.0183 -0.0036 -0.0063 0.0101 -0.0273 -0.0171 -0.0294 -0.0210 
 
(0.042)** (0.818) (0.774) (0.644) (0.004)*** (0.267) (0.001)*** (0.143) 
EasterHoliday*FE5 -0.0135 0.0164 -0.0314 -0.0076 -0.0068 -0.0152 -0.0023 -0.0184 
 
(0.493) (0.579) (0.008)*** (0.711) (0.870) (0.627) (0.932) (0.480) 
FE5 0.0344 0.0342 0.0340 0.0339 0.0319 0.0321 0.0311 0.0315 
 
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** 
EasterHoliday*FE1 0.0495 0.0120 0.0149 -0.0173 -0.0768 -0.0578 -0.0809 -0.0581 
 
(0.097)* (0.777) (0.773) (0.726) (0.222) (0.259) (0.231) (0.292) 
FE1 -0.0100 -0.0097 -0.0044 -0.0041 -0.0147 -0.0146 -0.0118 -0.0117 
 
(0.058)* (0.060)* (0.367) (0.394) (0.007)*** (0.007)*** (0.051)* (0.052)* 
Constant -0.1047 -0.1044 -0.0639 -0.0635 -0.0762 -0.0762 -0.0644 -0.0647 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.264) (0.263) (0.092)* (0.093)* (0.102) (0.102) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12222 12222 12222 12222 10451 10451 10451 10451 
R-squared 0.030 0.030 0.028 0.028 0.051 0.051 0.046 0.045 
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Table 2.10 (cont.) 
Panel B. Delayed Response (PEAD) regressions 
Dependent Variable CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) CAR (Et,Et+1) CAR (2,61) 
Geographic region subsamples South West 
Easter Holiday event window (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) 
EasterHoliday -0.0604 -0.0476 -0.0454 -0.0320 0.0310 0.0271 0.0461 0.0435 
 
(0.001)*** (0.050)** (0.004)*** (0.120) (0.025)** (0.038)** (0.023)** (0.003)*** 
EasterHoliday*FE5 0.0742 0.0398 0.0528 0.0198 0.0350 0.0663 0.0255 0.0443 
 
(0.217) (0.412) (0.422) (0.684) (0.405) (0.244) (0.688) (0.439) 
FE5 0.0259 0.0261 0.0267 0.0269 0.0250 0.0245 0.0260 0.0258 
 
(0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.015)** (0.017)** 
EasterHoliday*FE1 -0.0889 -0.0888 -0.1000 -0.0845 -0.1525 -0.1073 -0.1709 -0.1298 
 
(0.021)** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.001)*** (0.092)* (0.025)** (0.068)* 
FE1 -0.0023 -0.0018 -0.0037 -0.0033 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0009 
 
(0.640) (0.715) (0.438) (0.483) (0.965) (0.944) (0.858) (0.849) 
Constant 0.0268 0.0289 0.0484 0.0502 -0.0455 -0.0455 -0.0461 -0.0462 
 
(0.180) (0.144) (0.015)** (0.017)** (0.505) (0.505) (0.537) (0.536) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13982 13982 13982 13982 14338 14338 14338 14338 
R-squared 0.048 0.048 0.046 0.046 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 
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Table 2.10 (cont.) 
Panel C. Immediate Reaction Regressions 
Dependent Variable CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) 
Geographic region subsamples Northeast Midwest 
Easter Holiday event window (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) 
EasterHoliday -0.0166 -0.0041 -0.0099 -0.0020 -0.0032 -0.0032 0.0084 0.0052 
 
(0.003)*** (0.712) (0.008)*** (0.773) (0.450) (0.408) (0.045)** (0.377) 
EasterHoliday*FE5 0.0167 0.0268 0.0097 0.0227 0.0025 -0.0062 0.0012 -0.0035 
 
(0.005)*** (0.122) (0.466) (0.218) (0.631) (0.487) (0.903) (0.674) 
FE5 0.0298 0.0296 0.0257 0.0255 0.0272 0.0274 0.0227 0.0228 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
EasterHoliday*FE1 -0.0093 -0.0136 -0.0132 -0.0190 -0.0180 -0.0178 -0.0236 -0.0267 
 
(0.696) (0.337) (0.446) (0.161) (0.273) (0.169) (0.124) (0.052)* 
FE1 -0.0287 -0.0286 -0.0266 -0.0264 -0.0289 -0.0288 -0.0259 -0.0258 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Constant -0.0278 -0.0275 -0.0225 -0.0223 0.0095 0.0093 0.0157 0.0155 
 
(0.579) (0.581) (0.529) (0.530) (0.424) (0.434) (0.191) (0.196) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 12221 12221 12221 12221 10451 10451 10451 10451 
R-squared 0.067 0.067 0.064 0.064 0.081 0.081 0.073 0.073 
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Table 2.10 (cont.) 
Panel D. Immediate Reaction Regressions 
Dependent Variable CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) CAR (-1,1) CAR (0,1) 
Geographic region subsamples South West 
Easter Holiday event window (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) (-2,0) (-3,0) 
EasterHoliday 0.0034 0.0033 -0.0005 0.0010 0.0088 0.0148 -0.0008 -0.0022 
 
(0.362) (0.216) (0.949) (0.856) (0.492) (0.194) (0.944) (0.769) 
EasterHoliday*FE5 0.0138 -0.0004 0.0148 0.0011 0.0051 -0.0034 0.0155 0.0175 
 
(0.009)*** (0.968) (0.076)* (0.925) (0.441) (0.760) (0.072)* (0.094)* 
FE5 0.0263 0.0264 0.0230 0.0231 0.0334 0.0335 0.0311 0.0311 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
EasterHoliday*FE1 -0.0160 -0.0214 -0.0171 -0.0212 0.0028 -0.0044 -0.0004 0.0025 
 
(0.037)** (0.012)** (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.421) (0.653) (0.891) (0.483) 
FE1 -0.0282 -0.0281 -0.0255 -0.0254 -0.0333 -0.0332 -0.0291 -0.0291 
 
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Constant -0.0276 -0.0281 -0.0259 -0.0262 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0039 0.0039 
 
(0.009)*** (0.007)*** (0.026)** (0.023)** (0.977) (0.975) (0.792) (0.791) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 13982 13982 13982 13982 14338 14338 14338 14338 
R-squared 0.070 0.070 0.065 0.066 0.069 0.069 0.063 0.064 
Table 2.10 displays the multivariate test results of delayed response and immediate market reaction for different geographic regions. Four main geographic 
region (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West) definitions are based on CENSUS definitions. Dependent variables are CAR( Et,Et+1) and CAR(2,61) in Panels A 
and B. Dependent variables are CAR(-1,1) and CAR (0,1) in Panels C and D. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are defined in Table 2.1.  FE5 (FE1) and 
EasterHoliday variables are defined in Table 2.3. All control variables are defined in Table 2.3. Control variables are not shown for brevity. Robust p-values in 
parentheses. (* significant at 10%;   ** significant at 5%;   *** significant at 1%).  Standard   errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by the day 
of announcement. The sample period is from 1989 to 2006 in this table. 
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